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Marine Resource Economics >
Volume 04, Number 4, 1987 >
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http://purl.umn.edu/48045
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| Title: | Cooperatives as an Alternative to Regulation in Commercial Fisheries |
| Authors: | Stollery, Kenneth R. |
| Issue Date: | 1987 |
| Series/Report no.: | Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 4 No. 4 |
| Abstract: | The problem of fisheries regulation is essentially one of assigning property rights to a scarce resource. This paper investigates the effects of the establishment of a fishery cooperative as an alternative to limited-entry licensing of a fishery, in effect transferring the property rights to the managers of the cooperative. The consequences of this for resource conservation are found to depend on the cooperative management policy. While a cooperative that is passive with respect to entry will behave in a manner identical to that of a competitive fishery, a cooperative that limits entry in order to maximize
the existing members' share tends to overconserve the resource relative to
optimum fishing and processing and produce at excess cost in both sectors. The intermediate case of a cooperative that charges an entry fee may either overconserve or underconserve the stock. The results are illustrated by means of a simulation employing parameters from the Pacific halibut fishery. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/48045 |
| Identifiers: | 0738-1360 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 04, Number 4, 1987 |
| Total Pages: | 16 |
| From Page: | 289 |
| To Page: | 304 |
| Collections: | Volume 04, Number 4, 1987
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| 8175736.pdf | | 3771Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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