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Marine Resource Economics >
Volume 02, Number 2, 1985 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/47747
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| Title: | Inefficiency Through Government Regulations: The Case of Norway's Fishery Policy |
| Authors: | Hannesson, Rognvaldur |
| Issue Date: | 1985 |
| Series/Report no.: | Marine Resource Economics
Vol. 2 No. 2 |
| Abstract: | The fishery is a classic example of market failure. Government intervention does not necessarily correct this, but may instead seek economically inefficient solutions, because of either a deliberate trade-off between efficiency and equity or political
expediency. Norway's fishery policy is seen as a case in point. Its stated objectives put a low priority on economic efficiency,
while various objectives based on equity are put in the foreground. The result is that the contribution of Norway's fisheries
to the national income is slight. Norway's fishery policy consists of two largely uncoordinated parts, one concerned with maintaining fishermen's incomes and the other with managing fish
stocks. Since the introduction of the 200-mile limit, most fish stocks
exploited by Norway have been managed by total allowable catches (TACs). While this has prevented the depletion of fish stocks, the regulations introduced to enforce the TACs have been an economic failure. The setting of TACs has in some cases revealed
a willingness to attain solutions expedient in the short term at the expense of long-term benefits. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/47747 |
| Identifiers: | 0738-1360 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 02, Number 2, 1985 |
| From Page: | 115 |
| To Page: | 141 |
| Collections: | Volume 02, Number 2, 1985
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