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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://purl.umn.edu/45875

Title: When Government Spending Serves the Elites: Consequences for Economic Growth in a Context of Market Imperfections
Authors: Lopez, Ramon
Islam, Asif
Authors (Email): Lopez, Ramon (RLopez@arec.umd.edu)
Islam, Asif (AIslam@arec.umd.edu)
Keywords: government spending
economic growth
market imperfections
investment
subsidies
Issue Date: 2008
Series/Report no.: Working Papers
WP 08-13
Abstract: Government spending should be regarded as a social and political phenomenon, not merely as a technical choice. We argue that there is an implicit contract between the organized elites and politicians which often leads to a pro-elite allocation of public resources. A natural and simple taxonomy of government spending follows from this view: spending in public goods broadly defined which mitigate market failures versus spending in non-social subsidies, mainly a vehicle to serve the elites. We theoretically and empirically show that pro-elite spending biases are costly in terms of economic growth. The empirical findings are exceptionally robust.
URI: http://purl.umn.edu/45875
Institution/Association: University of Maryland>Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Working Papers
Total Pages: 58
Collections:Working Papers

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