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Agricultural and Resource Economics Review >
Volume 28, Number 1, April 1999 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/31489
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| Title: | MULTIPLE AGENTS, AND AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT-SOURCE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES |
| Authors: | Smith, Rodney B.W.
Tomasi, Theodore D. |
| Issue Date: | 1999-04 |
| Abstract: | Assuming asymmetric information over farmer profits and zero transaction costs, prior literature has suggested that when regulating nonpoint source water pollution, a tax on management practices (inputs) can implement full-information allocations and is superior to a tax on estimated runoff. Using mechanism design theory under asymmetric information, this paper show that under the same assumptions, management practice taxes and taxes on estimated runoff are equally efficient. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/31489 |
| Institution/Association: | Agricultural and Resource Economics Review>Volume 28, Number 1, April 1999 |
| Total Pages: | 7 |
| Language: | English |
| Journal Issue : | Agricultural and Resource Economics Review |
| Journal Volume: | 28 |
| Journal Date: | April 1999 |
| From Page: | 37 |
| To Page: | 43 |
| Collections: | Volume 28, Number 1, April 1999
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Files in This Item:
| File |
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| 28010037.pdf | 564Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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