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Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics >
Volume 29, Number 01, April 2004 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/31137
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| Title: | Activists and Corporate Behavior in Food Processing and Retailing: A Sequential Bargaining Game |
| Authors: | Hudson, Darren
Lusk, Jayson |
| Keywords: | activists
corporate behavior
food industries
sequential bargaining game |
| Issue Date: | 2004-04 |
| Abstract: | This study examines the strategic interaction between food companies and activists using a game theoretic model of sequential bargaining in the absence of complete information. In a rather confined set of circumstances, findings indicate it is always in the best interest of the food company to comply with activists' demands. More frequently, however, there will be cases where compliance is not optimal, depending on the size of the expected effect of protest, cost of defending against protest, and the cost of protest to the activist. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/31137 |
| Institution/Association: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 29, Number 01, April 2004 |
| Total Pages: | 15 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 79 |
| To Page: | 93 |
| Collections: | Volume 29, Number 01, April 2004
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| 29010079.pdf | 738Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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