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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://purl.umn.edu/31117

Title: GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS?
Authors: Baerenklau, Kenneth A.
Issue Date: 2002-12
Abstract: Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.
URI: http://purl.umn.edu/31117
Institution/Association: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 27, Number 02, December 2002
Total Pages: 14
Language: English
From Page: 406
To Page: 419
Collections:Volume 27, Number 02, December 2002

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