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Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics >
Volume 27, Number 02, December 2002 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/31117
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| Title: | GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS? |
| Authors: | Baerenklau, Kenneth A. |
| Issue Date: | 2002-12 |
| Abstract: | Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/31117 |
| Institution/Association: | Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics>Volume 27, Number 02, December 2002 |
| Total Pages: | 14 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 406 |
| To Page: | 419 |
| Collections: | Volume 27, Number 02, December 2002
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