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Volume 17, Number 4, 2002 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/28272
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| Title: | BANKRUPTCY OF FISHING RESOURCES: THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN ANGLERFISH FISHERY |
| Authors: | Gallastegui, M. Garmen
Inarra, Elena
Prellezo, Raul |
| Issue Date: | 2002 |
| Abstract: | Since 1983 the Northern European anglerfish fishery, exploited by fleets of seven countries, has been regulated using a policy of Total Allowable Catch (TAC). In this paper, the strategy followed by the European Union (EU) in distributing the established TAC among the seven countries is explored. It is inferred that the EU has utilized a weighted proportional rule, taking the average catches for the period l97378 as the reference point. On the other hand, given that the fishery situation for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 can be characterized as a bankruptcy problem, this paper also explores, as possible means of enriching the Common European Fishery policy, alternatives to this rule. This work proposes the application of two additional rules derived from game theory, the nucleolus and the Shapley value, and studies their properties. The analysis suggests that it may be worth considering not only the proportional distribution, but also the alternative rules. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/28272 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 17, Number 4, 2002 |
| Total Pages: | 17 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 291 |
| To Page: | 307 |
| Collections: | Volume 17, Number 4, 2002
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| 17040291.pdf | 1218Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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