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Volume 15, Number 4, 2000 >
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| Title: | THE UNITED NATIONS FISH STOCKS AGREEMENT OF 1995: HISTORY AND PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION |
| Authors: | Munro, Gordon R. |
| Issue Date: | 2000 |
| Abstract: | The United Nations (UN) Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995 arose in response to a worldwide resource management crisis involving those transboundary fishery resources found both within the coastal state Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the adjacent high seas-highly migratory fish stocks and straddling fish stocks. The need for the Agreement rested upon the inadequacies of those articles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea pertaining to the management of high-seas fishery resources. The Agreement is on the verge of coming into force. However, ratification is not implementation. With the aid of basic theory of games, both non-cooperative and cooperative, an attempt is made to assess, from an economist's perspective, the long-term viability of the Agreement, and the accompanying regime of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RMFOs). Certain key issues remain unresolved, but there are, nonetheless, grounds for cautious optimism. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/28205 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 15, Number 4, 2000 |
| Total Pages: | 16 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 265 |
| To Page: | 280 |
| Collections: | Volume 15, Number 4, 2000
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