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Volume 15, Number 2, 2000 >
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http://purl.umn.edu/28182
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| Title: | FENCING THE FISHERIES COMMONS: REGULATORY BARBED WIRE IN THE ALASKAN GROUNDFISH FISHERIES |
| Authors: | Holland, Daniel S. |
| Issue Date: | 2000 |
| Abstract: | Many economists have long advocated individual transferable quotas (ITQs) as a means to internalize the stock externalities in fisheries that lead to the dissipation of resource rents. Under certain circumstances, group catch rights can provide similar rights and benefits. This paper describes the transformation of groundfish resources off Alaska from essentially open access to common property and private property resources through allocation of catch rights to both groups and individuals. Some implications of alternative rights-based systems for efficiency, equity, and other social goals are discussed. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/28182 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 15, Number 2, 2000 |
| Total Pages: | 9 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 141 |
| To Page: | 149 |
| Collections: | Volume 15, Number 2, 2000
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