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Volume 11, Number 3, 1996 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/28173
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| Title: | WHY FISHING FLEETS TEND TO BE "TOO BIG" |
| Authors: | Matthiasson, Thorolfur |
| Issue Date: | 1996 |
| Abstract: | The aim of fisheries management is to avoid over-investment in fleet capacity and over-exploitation of economically exploitable fish stocks. In this paper a model is developed where a (big) share of rents created by control accrues to boat owners while costs are covered by the general public, which also gets a (small) share of the rent. The distribution of rent is governed by administrative rule which opens the possibility of profitable rent seeking. Cost of control is assumed to increase as rent per boat increases. Control outlays are assumed to be determined so as to maximize gains to the general public. It is shown that the optimal size of the fishing fleet exceeds the size that maximizes fishery rent. It is also shown that the higher the share that accrues to the general public, the closer the optimal fleet size is to the rent-maximizing fleet size. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/28173 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 11, Number 3, 1996 |
| Total Pages: | 7 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 173 |
| To Page: | 179 |
| Collections: | Volume 11, Number 3, 1996
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