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Volume 11, Number 4, 1996 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/28127
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| Title: | TRANSBOUNDARY RENEWABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A DYNAMIC GAME WITH DIFFERING NONCOOPERATIVE PAYOFFS. |
| Authors: | Ferrara, Ida
Missios, Paul C. |
| Issue Date: | 1996 |
| Abstract: | Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with, and provide insights into, the particulars of recent disputes. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/28127 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 11, Number 4, 1996 |
| Total Pages: | 7 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 239 |
| To Page: | 245 |
| Collections: | Volume 11, Number 4, 1996
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