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Volume 16, Number 4, 2001 >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/28126
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| Title: | MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES IN THE EU: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ANALYSIS |
| Authors: | Jensen, Frank
Vestergaard, Niels |
| Issue Date: | 2001 |
| Abstract: | In this paper, an EU tax on fishing effort is studied as an alternative to the system of Total Allowable Catches (TACs). The analysis is conducted under imperfect information, and the hypothesis adopted is that the EU lacks information about the costs of individual fishermen. In light of this imperfection, there are at least two reasons for considering an EU tax. First, it can be used to correct part of the market failure associated with fisheries. Second, it can be used to secure correct revelation of fishermen types in light of asymmetric information. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/28126 |
| Institution/Association: | Marine Resource Economics>Volume 16, Number 4, 2001 |
| Total Pages: | 15 |
| Language: | English |
| From Page: | 277 |
| To Page: | 291 |
| Collections: | Volume 16, Number 4, 2001
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