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American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) >
2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/19530
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| Title: | Collective Action in Plant Breeding |
| Authors: | Binenbaum, Eran
Pardey, Philip G. |
| Authors (Email): | Binenbaum, Eran (eran.binenbaum@adelaide.edu.au)
Pardey, Philip G. (ppardey@umn.edu) |
| Issue Date: | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | Selected Paper 135225 |
| Abstract: | Olson (1965) formulated a "Logic of Collective Action". We investigate whether a logic of collective action in plant breeding - and research and development generally - can be constructed. Using a case study on the Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR) as well as other real-world institutions of collective action in R&D, we construct an expanded logic of collective action, which revolves around two core features: Impure public goods and the tragedy of the anticommons. Provisions of FLAR and other institutions are related to game theory and contract theory, and theoretical, methodological and policy implications are outlined. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/19530 |
| Institution/Association: | American Agricultural Economics Association>2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI |
| Total Pages: | 35 |
| Language: | English |
| Collections: | 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI
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