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Discussion Papers in Ecological Economics >
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http://purl.umn.edu/140540
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| Title: | IMPEDIMENTS TO TRADE IN MARKETS FOR POLLUTION PERMITS |
| Authors: | Munro, Alistair
Hanley, Nick
Faichney, Robin
Shortle, James S. |
| Issue Date: | 1995-02 |
| Series/Report no.: | Series No. 95-2 |
| Abstract: | This paper considers nine possible reasons why firms might trade less often in permit markets
than was expected in the early development, and consequent simulations, of the theory. Fewer
trades are bad in the sense that they lead to a potential erosion of the cost-saving properties
of tradeable permit systems. The first reason considered is one which has popular currency,
namely that of imperfect competition in the permit market. However, we reject this as a
convincing explanation. The paper then reviews eight other possible explanations; these are
oligopoly in the output market; future endowments of property rights; loss aversion;
asymmetric information; non-convexities in cost functions; agency problems within the firm;
transactions costs; and the sequential nature of trading. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/140540 |
| Institution/Association: | University of Stirling>Department of Economics>Discussion Papers in Ecological Economics |
| Total Pages: | 32 |
| Collections: | Discussion Papers in Ecological Economics
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| us-95-02.pdf | | 730Kb | PDF | View/Open |
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