|
AgEcon Search >
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society >
2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://purl.umn.edu/10391
|
| Title: | Environmental lobbying with imperfect public monitoring of environmental quality |
| Authors: | Beard, Rodney
Mallawaarachchi, Thilak
Salerno, Gillian |
| Keywords: | Game theory
public choice
imperfect public monitoring
imperfect private monitoring
non-point source pollution
agricultural extension
public education |
| Issue Date: | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | Conference Paper |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance
environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of
environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality.
We characterize perfect public (politico-economic) equilibria in the game for the case of both perfect
and imperfect monitoring of environmental quality and compare these with imperfect private
monitoring of environmental quality. Results are discussed with respect to farmer behaviour in the
context of non-point source pollution and implications for the political consequences of farm
extension programmes highlighted. |
| URI: | http://purl.umn.edu/10391 |
| Institution/Association: | Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society - 2007>2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand |
| Total Pages: | 32 |
| Language: | English |
| Collections: | 2007 Conference (51st), February 13-16, 2007, Queenstown, New Zealand
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Size | Format |
|---|
| cp01be01.pdf | 191Kb | PDF | View/Open |
|
Recommend this item
All items in AgEcon Search are protected by copyright.
|
