Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

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Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form

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Abstract

This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations.

Keywords: international fisheries, overexploitation, partial cooperation, games in partition function form, competitive equilibrium, modified Shapley value

1 Introduction

The oceans’ fish stocks have been exploited as never before. Most of the world’s marine fishing areas have already reached their maximum potential for fish captures (UN, 2002). FAO (2000) shows that about 47 to 50 percent of marine fish stocks are fully exploited and are, therefore, producing catches that have either reached or are very close to their maximum limits, with no room for further expansion. Another 15 to 18 percent are overexploited and there is an increasing likelihood that catches from these stocks will decrease, if remedial action is not taken to reduce or revert overfishing conditions.

The world catch of marine fish has continued to rise in spite of extensions of fisheries jurisdictions (Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ) in the mid-1970s to 200 miles, though at a slower rate. To regulate the exploitation of the ocean’s fish stocks further, several international agreements have been concluded. The relevant international law was codified, developed and enhanced through, inter-alia, the entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1994, the adoption of the Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 1995 (abbreviated as 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement), and the adoption of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in the same year. Moreover, an international jurisprudence on fisheries related issues is slowly emerging through the work of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (for details see Green Paper, 2001).

The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement calls for those nations who wish to participate in the harvesting of the fish resources in the high seas, but are not currently members of the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO), to
declare a willingness to join and to enter into negotiations over mutually acceptable terms of entry. Under the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which is of direct relevance to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, coastal states (CSs) and distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) shall apply the precautionary approach to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living resources and preserve the marine environment. In addition, all states are obliged to take conservation and management measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas (Article 117). Moreover, international cooperation and negotiations are required for all states involved in the exploitation of such resources (Article 118).

Although the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement entered into force on 11 December 2001 (UN, 2002), the precise meaning of the provisions describing these obligations is not clear nor the manner in which they will be applied. For example, Article 63 expresses that the states concerned should seek to agree on conservation measures applicable beyond the EEZs, either directly or through appropriate RFMOs. Article 64 requires that coastal and other states whose nationals fish in the region "shall cooperate" directly or through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and optimum utilization. Furthermore, Article 118 on high seas stocks, referring to the need to establish RFMOs, provides that states exploiting such stocks or different ones in the same area "shall enter into negotiations" with a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned.

Due to inter alia its ambiguities, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides little or no guidance as to how cooperation, through a RFMO, is to be effected (Munro, 2000). The lack of cooperation has resulted in conflicts between coastal states and distant water fishing states (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). Moreover, overexploitation has continued and the need for a cooperative management regime is evident.

The literature on the economic analysis of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement notes that the new member or participant problem is one of the most important problems in the high seas fishery management (Kaitala and Munro, 1995; Bjørndal and Munro, 2003), since the interests of current members of the RFMO and of the applicants are often strongly opposed: the current members face the likelihood of having to give up a portion of their present quotas to the newcomer, and the applicant believes that it may be better off by staying outside of the coalition and continuing harvesting while facing fewer constraints. According to Kaitala and Munro (1997), the likelihood of achieving stable cooperation will be very low if the new member problem is mishandled. In addition, Datta and Miraman (1999) show that with an increasing number of countries, the inefficiency of the noncooperative equilibrium generated by the common access feature of high seas dominates and overharvesting increases. Although the nations involved in a regional fishery resource often recognize an advantage in cooperative management of the resource, on-going negotiations over harvest allotments often have proven to be arduous and frustrating, and interrupted by brief but astonishingly violent 'fish wars'.

This paper examines how a RFMO might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery. We consider the high seas fishery stock as common property and assume that all nations are allowed to exploit it. We view concluding a feasible Regional Fishery Agreement (RFA) as a game where countries freely decide whether

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1 According to these authors, the inadequacies of Part VII, section 2 (Articles 116-120), of the UN Convention pertaining to the management of high seas fisheries are the source of the lack of cooperation and conflicts.

2 For a review of the history of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement as well as its implementation, the reader is referred to Bjørndal and Munro (2003).
or not to join a coalition (i.e. a RFMO)\(^3\). The question that we deal with in this paper is the feasibility of partial cooperation and its impacts on fishing efforts. Moreover, we analyze how to allocate property rights among fishing nations that have expressed an interest in sustainable exploitation of a fish stock in a partial cooperative setting\(^4\). Particularly, we examine the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants.

In this paper, the feasibility and impacts of partial cooperation are analyzed by means of games in partition function form. This class of games was introduced in Thral and Lucas (1963) and is a generalization of the characteristic function form games. The partition function game allows the complements to split into coalitions in an arbitrary manner, while the classical characteristic function game is defined only in terms of coalitions and their complements. We apply the modified Shapley value as a device for the division of the gains from partial cooperation. We observe that the emphasis in this paper is on the cost function rather than on the production function.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model and introduces notations and definitions. Section 3 analyses the effects of partial cooperation in terms of fishing efforts. Section 4 demonstrates that the modified Shapley value is a feasible solution concept for RFMOs. Concluding remarks follow in the last section.

### 2 The model and definitions

We begin by specifying a static model\(^5\) of a common fishery resource as a \(n\)-person game (c.f. Funaki and Yamato, 1999; and Cornes and Hartley, 2000). Let \(N = \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}\) be the set of \(n\) fishing nations, with generic element \(j \in N\). Let \(e = (e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n)\) be a vector of fishing efforts, where \(e_j \geq 0\) is country \(j\)'s fishing effort, and let \(e_N = \sum_{j=1}^{n} e_j\) be the aggregate fishing effort of all countries.

We introduce the production function \(f(e_N)\) that specifies the amount of fish caught for each value of the total effort \(e_N\). We assume that effort as input is homogenous and that all countries are equally likely to catch a fish per unit of effort. This implies that the share of the total harvest obtained by country \(j\) is directly proportional to the share of country \(j\)'s effort in total effort \(e_N\). In other words, the harvest of country \(j\) is given by \(\frac{e_j}{e_N} f(e_N)\) for a given fish stock\(^6\).

Different levels of technology efficiency among countries are represented by the cost functions \(c_j(e_j), \forall j \in N\). Normalizing the price of the resource to unity, the net rent or benefit of country \(j\) is given by

\[
\pi_j(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_n) = \frac{e_j}{e_N} f(e_N) - c_j(e_j),
\]

where \(\pi_j(0, 0, \ldots, 0) = 0\).

We make the following assumptions:

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\(^3\)For related application of cooperative game theoretic approaches on high seas fishery management, see Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), Li (1998), Bjørndal et al. 2000 and Pintassilgo (2003).

\(^4\)Since the free rider behaviour of nonmember countries, which tend to occur in the presence of externalities is one of the main factors behind the difficulties faced by RFMOs for achieving the cooperative management on the high seas (Kaitala and Munro, 1995, 1997). Therefore, if a RFMO intends to adopt conservation strategies, it may either adopt a free rider strategy of nonmembers or allow the extension of its RFMO.

\(^5\)This is equivalent to countries choosing across different possible steady states, ignoring the transitional dynamics.

\(^6\)Note that the distribution of fish is not a result of negotiations among fishing countries; it is simply a reflection of the dependence of harvesting on its effort level \(e_i\) and \(e_N\).
Assumption A1: $f(e_N)$ is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave\(^7\) for $e_N > 0$, and $f(0) = 0$.

Assumption A2: $c_j(.)$ is continuously differentiable, increasing and convex for all $j$.

To simplify the analysis, we assume that $c_j(e_j) = e_j c_j$, where $c_j > 0$ for all $j \in N$.

Assumption A3: $0 < c_j < f(0)$, for all $j \in N$

This assumption guarantees the existence of an interior solution.

For every $e = (e_1,e_2,...,e_n)$, and $i \in N$ we define $e_{-i} = (e_1,...,e_{i-1},e_{i+1},...,e_n)$. In a similar vein, a vector $e = (e_1,e_2,...,e_n)$ is written as $e = (e_i,e_{-i})$.

The above assumptions imply that the benefit function (1) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave on $e_j$. Moreover, from biological constraints it follows that the benefit function is decreasing for $e_N$ large enough.

- A vector of effort $e^* = (e^*_1,e^*_2,...,e^*_n)$ is said to be a competitive equilibrium or Nash equilibrium (NE) if $\forall i \in N$, and $\forall e_i \geq 0$

$$\pi_i(e^*_i,e^*_{-i}) \geq \pi_i(e_i,e^*_{-i}), \quad (2)$$

where $e^*_i \geq 0$, $\forall i \in N$.

The assumptions A1-A3 guarantee that the existence of the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is unique (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in Watt, 1996).

Assumption A4: a country behaves cooperatively only inside its coalition in order to maximize the aggregate payoff, whereas coalitions interact with one another in a non cooperative way, and

Assumption A5: a country is free to enter or leave a coalition. When a country defects from a coalition defectors either play as singletons or form a new coalition.

We introduce the following notions and definitions that will be used to analyse partial cooperation.

- A coalition structure, $\kappa$, is a partition of the set $N$ of countries. Let $P(N)$ be the set of all partitions of $N$. So, a coalition structure $\kappa \in P(N)$ means that $\kappa = \{S_1,...,S_m\}$, $N \supseteq S_j \neq \emptyset$, $S_j \cap S_k = \emptyset$, for all $j,k = 1,...,m$, $j \neq k$ and $\cup_{j=1}^m S_j = N$.

For a given $\kappa \in P(N)$, let $I(\kappa)$ and $|I(\kappa)|$ denote the index number and the cardinality, respectively. The partition which consists of singleton coalitions only, $\kappa = \{\{1\},\{2\},...,\{n\}\}$, is denoted by $[N]$ whereas the partition which consists of the grand coalition only is denoted by $\{N\}$.

- A pair $(S,\kappa)$ which consists of a coalition $S$ and a partition $\kappa$ of $N$ to which $S$ belongs is called an embedded coalition.

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\(^7\)This assumption implies that the additional catch from an extra unit of effort will clearly decrease as the total effort expended increases, i.e. there are decreasing returns to fishing effort.
Let $\mathcal{E}(N)$ denote the set of embedded coalitions, i.e.
$$\mathcal{E}(N) = \{(S, \kappa) \in 2^N \times \mathcal{P}(N) | S \subseteq \kappa \}.$$  

**Definition 2.1** A mapping
$$w : \mathcal{E}(N) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$
that assigns a real value, $w(S, \kappa)$, to each embedded coalition $(S, \kappa)$ is called a partition function. The ordered pair $(N, w)$ is called a partition function form game.

The value $w(S, \kappa)$ represents the payoff of coalition $S$, given that coalition structure $\kappa$ forms. For a given partition $\kappa = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_m\}$ and a partition function $w$, let $\pi(S_1, S_2, ..., S_m)$ denote the $m$-vector $(w(S_i, \kappa))_{i=1}^m$.

It will be convenient to economize on brackets and suppress the commas between elements of the same coalition. Thus, we will write, for example, $w(i, j, k)$, $\{i, j, k\}, \{i, h\}$ as $w(ijk, \{ijk, lh\})$, and $\pi(ikj, \{lh\})$ as $\pi(ijk, lh)$. The set of partition function form games with player set $N$ is denoted by $PFFG^N$.

**Definition 2.2** Let $(N, w)$ be a partition function form game and $\kappa \in \mathcal{P}(N)$.

(i) coalition $S \subseteq \kappa$ is feasible under coalition structure $\kappa$ if
$$w(S, \kappa) \geq \sum_{i \in S} w(i, [N])$$

(ii) a coalition structure $\kappa \in \mathcal{P}(N)$ is a feasible structure if all coalitions are feasible under coalition structure $\kappa$, i.e.
$$w(S, \kappa) \geq \sum_{i \in S} w(i, [N]), \text{ for all } S \subseteq \kappa$$

A feasible coalition implies that the worth of its members is at least as much as their worth under the stand-alone structure. In a similar vein, a coalition structure is feasible if the worth of each coalition in the coalition structure is at least as much as its stand-alone worth.

**Example 2.1** Consider the game $(N, w)$, where $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$, the players are identical and $w$ is given as follows.
$$w(1, [N]) = 3, w(i, \{i,j,N\setminus\{ij\}\}) = 2, w(i, \{i,jk\}) = 3,$$
$$w(ij, \{ij,k,l\}) = 4, w(ij, \{ijk,l\}) = 5, w(ijk, \{ijk,l\}) = 10, w(\{N\}) = 11.$$

In this example, every coalition formed by 3 players such as $\{i, j, k\}$, has $w(ijk, \{ijk,l\}) \geq w(1, [N]) + w(j, [N]) + w(k, [N])$, while the value for a singleton in this coalition structure is $w(l, \{ijk,l\}) = 3 = w(1, [N]).$

For every coalition consisting of 2 players, we have two cases:
(i) if $\kappa = \{ijk, l\}$ then $w(\{ijk\}, \kappa) < w(\{i\}, [N]) + w(\{j\}, [N]),$
(ii) if $\kappa = \{ijk, k, l\}$ then $w(\{ijk\}, \kappa) < w(\{i\}, [N]) + w(\{j\}, [N])$ and $w(\{i, j, N\setminus\{ij\}\}) = 2 < w(\{i\}, [N]).$

In addition, $w(\{N\}) < \sum_{i=1}^4 w(i, [N]).$

Hence, only one coalition structure is feasible: $\{i, jk\}$.

**Definition 2.3** A solution of $PFFG^N$ is a function $\Psi$ which associates with each game $(N, w)$ in $PFFG^N$ a vector $\Psi(N, w)$ of individual payoffs in $\mathbb{R}^N$, i.e.
$$\Psi(N, w) = (\Psi_i(N, w))_{i \in N} \in \mathbb{R}^N.$$
We now turn to the case that some countries agree to form a coalition, say $S$, $S \subseteq N$. Since countries have different technologies, we consider the case in which cooperation among countries is possible in term of transferable technologies\(^8\) (c.f. Norde et al. 2002). This implies that the cost function of coalition $S$, $c_S(\cdot)$, is the cheapest cost function which is available among members in their coalition, i.e.

$$c_S(e_S) = \min_{j \in S}\{c_j(e_S)\},$$  

where $e_S = \sum_{j \in S} e_j$ is the total effort of $S$.

Suppose that a coalition structure $\kappa = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_m\}$ is formed. Total effort for an admissible coalition structure $S_i$ in $\kappa$ is denoted by $e_{S_i}$. The benefit function of coalition $S_i$ is defined by

$$\pi_{S_i}(e_{S_i}, e_{-S_i}) = \frac{e_{S_i}}{e_{N}} f(e_{N}) - c_{S_i}(e_{S_i}),$$

where $e_{-S_i} = (e_{S_1}, ..., e_{S_{i-1}}, e_{S_{i+1}}, ..., e_{S_m})$

• A non-negative vector $e^* = (e_{S_1}^*, e_{S_2}^*, ..., e_{S_m}^*)$ associated with coalition structure $\kappa = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_m\}$, is called a competitive equilibrium under coalition structure $\kappa$ (or equilibrium under $\kappa$) if for all $i \in I(\kappa)$, and $e_{S_i} \geq 0$

$$\pi_{S_i}(e_{S_i}^*, e_{-S_i}^*) \geq \pi_{S_i}(e_{S_i}, e_{-S_i}).$$  

Note that if $m = n$, then (5) is the definition of Nash equilibrium, and if $m = 1$ then it presents Pareto efficiency.

The existence of a unique competitive equilibrium under a given coalition structure is straightforward since the strategy sets are 1-dimensional and the $m$–person game with payoff functions (3) is obtained\(^9\) from the $n$–person game with payoff functions (1).

We are now in a position to define the fishery game in partition function form.

**Definition 2.4** A fishery game in partition function form (FGPFF) is an ordered pair $(N, \pi)$, where $N$ is the set of players and $\pi$ is the partial (benefit) function derived from competitive equilibrium $e^*$ under $\kappa$ such that

$$\pi(S_i, \kappa) = \pi_{S_i}(e_{S_i}^*, e_{-S_i}^*)$$

for all $(S, \kappa) \in E(N)$,

with $\pi_{S_i}(e)$ defined by (3).

Let $\kappa(S_i)$ denote a coalition structure $\kappa$, where $S_i$ belongs to. Note that $\pi(S_i, \kappa)$ may differ from $\pi(S_i, \kappa')$ since there exist many coalition structures which a coalition $S_i$ may belong to while the equilibria under coalition structures $\kappa$ and $\kappa'$ are different.

In the remainder of this paper, we use the notations $\pi(i, [N])$ and $\pi(S_i, \kappa)$ to denote the payoff of a single coalition $\{i\}$ in the Nash equilibrium and the payoff of a coalition $S_i$ under coalition structure $\kappa$, respectively.

\(^8\)For example, cooperation may lead to an exchange of vessels or labor among coalition partners.

\(^9\)The assumptions A1–A3 still hold for this game.
3 Implications of partial cooperation

In this section we analyze various impacts of coalitions and coalition structures. For each coalition structure $\kappa = \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k\}$, let $e(k, \kappa)$ be total effort associated with $\kappa$, i.e., $e(k, \kappa) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} e^*_S$, where $\{e^*_S, e^*_S, \ldots, e^*_S\}$ is the unique competitive equilibrium under $\kappa$. Let $\pi(e(k, \kappa)) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \pi(S_j, \kappa)$ be total net rents or benefits associated with $\kappa$ at equilibrium $e(k, \kappa)$, where $\pi(S_j, \kappa)$, defined by (6), is the net rent of coalition $S_j$ under $\kappa$.

Without loss of generality, we assume that $c_1 \leq c_2 \leq \ldots \leq c_n$. Thus, condition A.2 implies: $0 \leq c_n < f'(0)$.

For each coalition structure $\kappa$, a straightforward result is that in a competitive equilibrium a coalition with lower $c_{S_i}$ has a higher fishing effort level $e_{S_i}$.

**Proposition 3.1** For every coalition structure $\kappa$, the lower the marginal cost $c_{S_i}$, the higher the effort level in the coalition structure equilibrium. That is, for every $S_i, S_j \in \kappa$, if $c_{S_i} \geq c_{S_j}$ then $e_{S_i} \geq e_{S_j}$ in the equilibrium.

**Proof.** Observe that in a coalition structure equilibrium $e^* = (e^*_S, e^*_S, \ldots, e^*_S)$ we have

$$e_{S_i} = \frac{e^*_S}{e(k, \kappa)^2} [(f'(e(k, \kappa))e(k, \kappa) - f(e(k, \kappa))] + \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)},$$

for all $i \in I(\kappa)$, and $e(k, \kappa) = \sum_{i \in I(\kappa)} e^*_S$.

Strict concavity and assumption A1 imply\(^{10}\) that $f'(e^*_N) < f(e^*_N)/e^*_N$. Hence, $f'(e(k, \kappa))e(k, \kappa) - f(e(k, \kappa)) < 0$, in the equilibrium. Moreover, from (7), we have $\frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} \geq c_{S_i} > 0$ for every coalition structure equilibrium.

From (7), we obtain

$$e_{S_i} - e_{S_j} = \frac{e^*_S - e^*_S}{e(k, \kappa)^2} [(f'(e(k, \kappa))e(k, \kappa) - f(e(k, \kappa))].$$

Hence, if $e_{S_i} - e_{S_j} \geq 0$ we have $e^*_S \leq e^*_S$.

Summing up (7), it follows that total effort $e(k, \kappa)$ is determined by the following equation:

$$f'(e(k, \kappa)) + (k-1) \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} = \sum_{j=1}^{k} c_{S_j}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Furthermore, from (7) and (8), it follows that

$$e^*_{S_j} = \frac{e(k, \kappa)(c_{S_j} - \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)})}{f'(e(k, \kappa))e(k, \kappa) - f(e(k, \kappa))}$$

and

$$f'(e(k, \kappa))e(k, \kappa) - f(e(k, \kappa)) = \sum_{m=1}^{k} e^*_{S_m} - k \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)}.$$
Therefore, for every coalition structure $\kappa = \{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k\}$ we have:

$$e^*_S = e(k, \kappa) \left( \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{c(k, \kappa)} - c_S \right),$$

(9)

where $e(k, \kappa) = \sum_{j=1}^k e^*_S$, and $e^* = (e^*_{S_1}, e^*_{S_2}, \ldots, e^*_{S_k})$.

If the share of efforts of coalition $S_j$ in the competitive equilibrium under structure $\kappa$ is defined by $sh(S_j) = \frac{e^*_j}{c(k, \kappa)}$. Then from (9) it follows that

$$sh(S_j) = \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{c(k, \kappa)} - c_S \sum_{m=1}^k c_{S_m}.$$

The above equations (8) and (9) form an alternative to the proof of Proposition 3.1 and show how to calculate total effort and each coalition effort in coalition structures. Hence, total effort can be predicted by the aggregate marginal cost and the number of coalitions $k$. In the following example we will demonstrate how to calculate total effort and the effort of each coalition, under a given coalition structure in the competitive equilibrium.

**Example 3.1** Consider four countries, indexed by $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, with the production function $f(e_N) = (60 - e_N)e_N$ and marginal costs $c_1 = 2$, $c_2 = 3$, $c_3 = 6$, $c_4 = 9$. Aggregate marginal costs, total effort and total benefits as calculated by means of (8) and (9) are presented in Table 3.1. Consider, for example, the case $k = 3$ with $\kappa = \{12, 3, 4\}$. Aggregate marginal cost of this coalition structure is $2 + 6 + 9 = 17$. Since $f'(e(k, \kappa)) = 60 - 2e(k, \kappa)$ and $f(e(k, \kappa)) = 60 - e(k, \kappa)$, equation (8) implies that

$$60 - 2e(k, \kappa) + 2[60 - e(k, \kappa)] = 17.$$

<table>
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<tr>
<th>coalitions</th>
<th>$\kappa$</th>
<th>$\sum_{m=1}^k c_{S_m}$</th>
<th>$e(k, \kappa)$</th>
<th>$\pi(e(k, \kappa))$</th>
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<td>1 - 2 - 3 - 4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
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<td>41.50</td>
<td>602.75</td>
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<td>41.50</td>
<td>602.75</td>
</tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>42.25</td>
<td>603.68</td>
</tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>42.25</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>841</td>
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Table 3.1. The possible coalition structures for the four countries.

\(^{11}\text{Observe that transferable technology within a coalition is assumed.}\)
Solving the above equation, the total effort in the competitive equilibrium is obtained by 
\( e(k, \kappa) = \frac{100 - 17}{4} = 40.75 \).

Substituting \( e(k, \kappa) \) into (9) we have
\[
\begin{align*}
    e_{12}' &= 40.75 \left( \frac{60 - 40}{40 - 40} \right) = 17.25, \\
    e_{3}' &= 40.75 \left( \frac{60 - 40}{40 - 40} \right) = 13.25, \text{ and} \\
    e_{4}' &= 40.75 \left( \frac{60 - 40}{40 - 40} \right) = 10.25. \\
\end{align*}
\]

Similarly for all other coalition structures.

**Corollary 3.1** For every coalition structure \( \kappa \), the lower the marginal cost \( c_{S_j} \), the higher the net benefits in the coalition structure equilibrium.

**Proof.** Let \( e^* = (e_{S_1}, e_{S_2}, \ldots, e_{S_m}) \) be a coalition structure equilibrium. By Proposition 3.1 above, if \( c_{S_j} \geq c_{S_i} \), then \( c_{S_j} \leq e_{S_j}^* \). Moreover, at this equilibrium, the difference in payoffs between coalitions \( S_i \) and \( S_j \) is:
\[
\pi(S_i, \kappa) - \pi(S_j, \kappa) = \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} (e_{S_i}^* - e_{S_j}^*) - c_{S_i} (e_{S_i}^* - e_{S_j}^*) + e_{S_j} (c_{S_j} - c_{S_i}) =
\]
\[
\left( \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} - c_{S_i} \right) (e_{S_i}^* - e_{S_j}^*) + e_{S_j} (c_{S_j} - c_{S_i}).
\]

Since in the competitive equilibrium \( \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} \geq c_{S_i} \), it follows that \( \pi(S_i, \kappa) - \pi(S_j, \kappa) \leq 0 \).

**Proposition 3.2** Let \( \kappa \) and \( \kappa' \) be two coalition structures of a game \((N, w) \in \text{FGPFF, where } \kappa \text{ is formed by values } c_{S_j}, j \in I(\kappa) \text{ and } \kappa' \text{ is formed by } c_{S_j'}, j \in I(\kappa'), \text{ and } |I(\kappa)| \geq |I(\kappa')| \). Then
\[
e(k, \kappa) \geq e(k, \kappa') \text{ if } \sum_{j \in I(\kappa)} c_{S_j} \leq \sum_{j \in I(\kappa')} c_{S_j'}.
\]

**Proof.** Suppose that \( |I(\kappa)| = k \) and \( |I(\kappa')| = m \), \( k \geq m > 1 \), and \( \sum_{j \in I(\kappa)} c_{S_j} \leq \sum_{j \in I(\kappa')} c_{S_j'} \). By (8) we have
\[
f'(e(k, \kappa)) + (k - 1) \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} \leq f'(e(k, \kappa')) + (m - 1) \frac{f(e(k, \kappa'))}{e(k, \kappa')}. \text{ Hence}
\]
\[
f'(e(k, \kappa)) - f'(e(k, \kappa')) + (m - 1) \left[ \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} - \frac{f(e(k, \kappa'))}{e(k, \kappa')} \right] + (k - m) \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} \leq 0 \quad (*)
\]

Assume to the contrary that \( e(k, \kappa) < e(k, \kappa') \). Since \( \frac{f(e)}{e} \) and \( f'(e) \) are decreasing functions, it follows that
\[
f'(e(k, \kappa)) > f'(e(k, \kappa')) \text{ and } \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} > \frac{f(e(k, \kappa'))}{e(k, \kappa')}.
\]

Moreover, \( k - m \geq 0 \). Therefore the left hand side of inequation \((*)\) is positive which is a contradiction.
This Proposition shows that total fishing effort for a coalition structure depends on the number of coalitions and aggregate marginal cost in the competitive equilibrium. This result is illuminated in Table 3.1:

(i) coalition structures \{14, 2, 3\} and \{123, 4\} have the same aggregate marginal cost, i.e. 11, but \(e(3, \{14, 2, 3\}) > e(2, \{123, 4\})\).

(ii) coalition structures \{123, 4\} and \{124, 3\} have the same number of coalitions, i.e. \(k = 2\), but aggregate marginal cost is 11 for \{123, 4\} which is larger than aggregate marginal cost 8 for \{124, 3\}. Then the total effort \(e(2, \{123, 4\}) < e(2, \{124, 3\})\).

Applying (6), the partition function form game \((N, w)\) is obtained as follows

\[
\pi(1, 2, 3, 4) = (196, 169, 100, 49);
\]

\[
\pi(12, 3, 4) = (297.56, 175.56, 105.06);
\]

\[
\pi(13, 2, 4) = \pi(1, 23, 4) = (272.25, 240.25, 90.25);
\]

\[
\pi(14, 2, 3) = \pi(1, 24, 3) = \pi(1, 2, 34) = (248.06, 217.56, 138.06); \hspace{1cm} (G3.1)
\]

\[
\pi(123, 4) = (469.59, 214.92);
\]

\[
\pi(124, 3) = \pi(12, 34) = (427.25, 277.56);
\]

\[
\pi(1, 234) = \pi(13, 24) = \pi(14, 23) = \pi(134, 2) = (386.91, 348.20);
\]

\[
\pi(1234) = 841.
\]

From this partition function it follows that for the case of \(k = 3\) coalition structure \{14, 2, 3\} is the only feasible\(^{12}\), while every coalition structure consisting of two coalitions is feasible.

**Corollary 3.2** The forming of coalitions will determine the situation of a fish stock. Moreover, aggregate effort under a given coalition structure depends strongly upon how coalitions are formed. For a given number of coalitions, the coalition structure with lower aggregate marginal cost has higher total effort. In addition, for a given coalition structure, the forming of coalitions with lower costs need not reduce the total effort.

Observe that if countries are identical, i.e. \(c_i = c_j\) for all \(i \neq j\), the equations (8) and (9) in the unique equilibrium \(e^* = (e_{S_1}^*, e_{S_2}^*, ..., e_{S_m}^*)\) under \(\kappa\) satisfy:

\[
f'(e(k, \kappa)) + (k - 1) \frac{f(e(k, \kappa))}{e(k, \kappa)} = k \cdot c,
\]

\[
e_{S_j}^* = \frac{e(k, \kappa)}{k_{j}} > 0, \text{ for all } j = 1, 2, \ldots, k, \text{ where } e(k, \kappa) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} e_{S_j}^*.
\]

This implies that the effort of each coalition only depends on the number of coalitions. Furthermore, for any coalition structure \(\kappa = \{S_1, S_2, ..., S_k\}\), total fishing effort is an increasing function of the number of coalitions \(k\), whereas total net rents and the net rent of each coalition are decreasing functions of \(k\) (Theorem 2 in Funakı and Yamato, 1999).

**Corollary 3.3** For the case of identical countries, it follows that

---

\(^{12}\)This is because \(\pi(14, \{14, 2, 3\}) = 248.06 > \pi(1, \{N\}) + \pi(4, \{N\}) = 245, \pi(2, \{14, 2, 3\}) > \pi(2, \{N\}) \text{ and } \pi(3, \{14, 2, 3\}) > \pi(3, \{N\}).\)
the number of countries

\[ \pi(S, \kappa) = \pi(S, S \cup [N \setminus S]), \]

\[ \max_{\kappa : S \in \kappa} \pi(S, \kappa) = \pi(S, S \cup \{N \setminus S\}). \]

(ii) a coalition structure \( \kappa \) is feasible if the size of the largest coalition is feasible under the equal sharing rule.

**Proof.** (i) We have \( \min_{\kappa : S \in \kappa} \pi(S, \kappa) \leq \pi(S, \kappa') \leq \max_{\kappa : S \in \kappa} \pi(S, \kappa) \) for all coalition structures \( \kappa' \neq \kappa \). Moreover, from Proposition 3.2, i.e. that fishing effort is an increasing function of the number of coalitions, it follows that for any two coalition structures \( \kappa = \{S_1, S_2, \ldots S_k\} \) and \( \kappa' = \{S'_1, S'_2, \ldots S'_m\} \) such that \( k < m \)

\[ e(k, \kappa) < e(m, \kappa'); \]

\[ \pi(e(k, \kappa)) > \pi(e(m, \kappa')); \]

and if \( S \in \kappa \) and \( S \in \kappa' \)

\[ \pi(S, \kappa) > \pi(S, \kappa') \]

where \( e(k, \kappa) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} e_{j}^{S} \), \( e(m, \kappa') = \sum_{i=1}^{m} e_{i}^{S} \). Thus, result (i) is obtained.

(ii) In a Nash equilibrium, \( e^* \), the net benefits are:

\[ \pi(i, \lbrack N \rbrack) = \frac{[f(e^*_i) - c e_i^*_i]}{n} \text{ for all } i \in N, \text{ and } \sum_{j \in S} \pi(i, \lbrack N \rbrack) = \left| S \right| [f(e^*_i) - c e_i^*_i] \]

Then, if countries have prudent perceptions (pessimistic expectations), a vector \( z = (z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_n) \) can be considered as a feasible payoff if \( \sum_{j \in S} z_j \geq \left| S \right| [f(e^*_i) - c e_i^*_i] \).

We observe that for a given coalition structure \( \kappa \) with \( k \) coalitions, a vector \( z \) is a feasible payoff vector if \( z_j = \frac{c e(k, \kappa) - f(e(k, \kappa))}{\left| S \right|} \geq \frac{f(e^*_i) - c e_i^*_i}{n} \text{ for all } j \in S, \) where

\( e(k, \kappa) \) is the total effort in an equilibrium under \( \kappa \), and \( e^*_N \) is the Nash equilibrium. Since \( \pi(S, \kappa) = \frac{f(e(k, \kappa)) - c e(k, \kappa)}{k} \) for all \( S \in \kappa \), then, if

\[ \frac{f(e(k, \kappa)) - c e(k, \kappa)}{k |S_m|} \geq \frac{f(e^*_i) - c e_i^*_i}{n} \] for the coalition \( S_m \), where \( |S_m| = \max_{j \in N} |S_j| \),

it follows that

\[ \frac{f(e(k, \kappa)) - c e(k, \kappa)}{k |S_j|} \geq \frac{f(e(k, \kappa)) - c e(k, \kappa)}{k |S_m|} \geq \frac{f(e^*_i) - c e_i^*_i}{n} \] for all \( S_j \in \kappa \). \( \square \)

**Example 3.2** Consider four identical countries, \( i = 1, 2, 3, 4 \), with marginal cost \( e = 9 \) and production function \( f(e) = (60 - e)e \). Since all countries are identical, there are only five types of coalition structures:

\( \kappa_1 = \{1, 1, 1, 1\} \), \( \kappa_2 = \{1, 1, 1, 2\} \), \( \kappa_3 = \{2, 2, 2\} \), \( \kappa_4 = \{1, 3\} \), and \( \kappa_5 = \{4\} \), where \( |i| \) denotes the number of countries. The game \( (N, \pi) \in FGPF^N \) is given by

\[ \pi(1, 1, 1, 1) = (100.40, 100.40, 100.40, 100.40); \]
\[ \pi(1, 1, 2, 2) = (162.56, 162.56, 162.56); \]
\[ \pi(2, 2) = \pi(1, 3) = (289, 289); \]
\[ \pi(4) = 650.25. \]

The coalition structures \( \kappa_3 \) is feasible since \( \pi(2, \kappa_3) = 289 > 2 \cdot \pi(1, \kappa_1) = 200.80 \), under the equal sharing rule. However, a coalition with 2 players for a coalition structure consisting of 3 coalitions is not feasible since \( \pi(2, \kappa_2) = 162.56 < 2 \cdot \pi(1, \kappa_1) = 200.80. \)
4 Distribution of payoffs

This section considers the distribution of payoffs of partial cooperation that countries can agree upon. To simplify the analyses, suppose the production function takes the quadratic form \( f(e) = (b - c)e \). The parameter \( b \) can be considered a critical (maximum) effort level where production cannot recover the total cost, i.e. \( f(e_N) \leq c \cdot e_N \) if \( e_N \geq b \), and \( c \in [\min_{i \in N} c_i, \max_{i \in N} c_i] \).

Recall that \( c_1 \leq c_2 \leq ... \leq c_n \). To ensure that all countries have the possibility to catch, i.e. \( e_j \geq 0 \) for all \( j \in N \), we assume that \( \frac{b + \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i}{n+1} > c_n \).\(^{13}\) The net benefit function of coalition \( S_j \) under coalition structure \( \kappa \) is:

\[
\pi(S_i, e_{-S_i}) = (b - e_N) e_{S_i} - e_{S_i} \cdot e_{S_i}.
\]

Denote the share of efforts of coalition \( S \) in the competitive equilibrium \( e^* \) under structure \( \kappa \) as \( sh(S) = e^*_{(k, \kappa)} \), where \( e(k, \kappa) = \sum_{S \in \kappa} e^*_S \) and \( e^*_S = \sum_{i \in S} e^*_i \).

Moreover, let \( \pi(e(k, \kappa)) = \sum_{S \in \kappa} \pi(S) \) be the total net benefit.

**Proposition 4.1** For every coalition structure \( \kappa \), the following results hold for every competitive equilibrium

(i) for any \( i < j \), \( e_{S_j} - e_{S_i} = e^{*}_{S_i} - e^{*}_{S_j} \geq 0 \)

(ii) \( \frac{\partial \pi_{S_j}}{\partial c_{S_j}} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} -\frac{k}{k+1} & if \ i = j \\ \frac{k}{k+1} & if \ i \neq j \end{array} \right. \)

(iii) \( \frac{\partial \pi_{S_i} \dot{\epsilon}}{\partial c_{S_i}} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} -\frac{2k}{k+1} e_{S_i}^2 & if \ i = j \\ \frac{2k}{k+1} e_{S_i}^2 & if \ i \neq j \end{array} \right. \)

(iv) \( \frac{\partial \pi(e(k, \kappa))}{\partial c_{S_i}} > 0 \iff sh(S_j) < 1/(k + 1) \)

**Proof.** (i) From (7) and \( f(e) = (b - c)e \) which implies (i).

(ii) Since \( e^*_N = (kb - \sum_{i=1}^{k} e_{S_i}) / (k + 1) \) and \( e^*_S = (b - e^*_N) - e_{S_i} \) it follows that

\[
e^*_S = \frac{b - ke_{S_i} + \sum_{j \neq i} e_{S_j}}{k + 1}
\]

leading to (ii).

(iii) As \( \pi_{S_j}(\dot{\epsilon}) = (b - e^*_N - e_{S_i}) e_{S_j} = (e_{S_j}^*)^2 \), it follows that

\[
\frac{\partial \pi_{S_j}(\dot{\epsilon})}{\partial c_{S_j}} = 2e^*_j \frac{\partial e_{S_j}}{\partial c_{S_j}} = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} -\frac{2k}{k+1} e_{S_j} & if \ i = j \\ \frac{2k}{k+1} e_{S_j} & if \ i \neq j \end{array} \right. \)

leading to (iii).

(iv) Since \( \pi(e(k, \kappa)) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \pi_{S_j}(\dot{\epsilon}) \) and (iii), it follows that

\[
\frac{\partial \pi(e(k, \kappa))}{\partial c_{S_i}} = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \frac{\partial \pi_{S_j}(\dot{\epsilon})}{\partial c_{S_i}} = \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{\partial \pi_{S_j}(\dot{\epsilon})}{\partial c_{S_i}}
\]

\[
= 2 \frac{-k}{k+1} e^*_i + \frac{1}{k+1} \sum_{j \neq i} e^*_j = \frac{2}{k+1} \left( -ke^*_i + \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{k} e^*_m - e^*_i \right] \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{2}{k+1} \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{k} e^*_m \right] > 0 \iff \frac{(k+1) e^*_i}{\sum_{m=1}^{k} e^*_m} > 0
\]

\[
\iff sh(S_j) < 1/(k + 1),
\]

\(^{13}\)This assumption is equivalent to the requirement of positive shares at the equilibrium for all players (for details, see Zhao, 2001).
which implies (iv).

Proposition 4.1 shows the relationship between marginal costs, fishing efforts and net benefits for coalitions in the competitive equilibrium. To illustrate Proposition 4.1 consider a coalition structure \( \kappa \) consisting of \( k \) coalitions \( (I(\kappa) = k) \) and the case where one member \( i \) leaves its coalition \( S_{i(\kappa)} \) \((\in \kappa)\) and joins another coalition, say \( S_{i(\kappa')} \) \( \kappa' \). If the marginal cost \( c_i \) of this member is larger than the marginal cost \( c_{S_{i(\kappa)}} \) of its former coalition \( S_{i(\kappa)} \) but smaller than the cost \( c_{S_{i(\kappa')}} \) of its new coalition \( S_{i(\kappa')} \), then the joining of this member will lead to a cost reduction of coalition \( S_{i(\kappa')} \). Moreover, the marginal cost of the coalition to which \( i \) used to belong does not change. Therefore, although the number of a new coalition structure \( \kappa' \) does not change, i.e. \( I(\kappa') = k \) (since only \( i \) changes coalitions), the cost structure does change. In similar vein, (ii) and (iii) describe the impacts on coalition efforts and coalition net benefits. If own marginal costs of a coalition increase, own efforts and net benefits decrease, whereas if the marginal costs of another coalition increase own efforts and net benefits increase. According to (iv), the forming of a new coalition structure may cause a reduction of total net benefit if at least one of the effort shares is larger than \( \frac{1}{n+1} \).

The above Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 4.1 imply that although an outcome depends on both the marginal cost \( c_{\kappa} \), and cardinality of \( \kappa \), countries with high costs have an incentive to cooperate since they will take advantage by reducing costs when joining a coalition with lower costs. The following example illuminates this.

**Example 4.1** Consider Example 3.1. The benefits of free-riding are presented in Table 4.1. The number of coalitions is presented in the first column and the benefit of each free-rider follows in the next columns.

In Table 4.1 the second row represents noncooperative net benefits. The third and fourth rows represent free-riding benefits for countries \( i, j, i \neq j \) when countries \( k \) and \( l \) form a coalition \( \{kl\}, k,l \in N\setminus\{i,j\} \). For example, for \( k = 3, 272.25 \) and 248.06 are the payoffs of country 1 in the coalition structures \( \kappa = \{1,4,23\} \) with aggregate marginal cost 14 and \( \kappa = \{1,3,24\} \) with aggregate marginal cost 11, respectively (see Table 3.1). The last row represents free riding benefits for country \( i \) when \( N\setminus\{i\} \) forms a coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( I(\kappa) )</th>
<th>( \pi({1},\kappa) )</th>
<th>( \pi({2},\kappa) )</th>
<th>( \pi({3},\kappa) )</th>
<th>( \pi({4},\kappa) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( k = 4 )</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( k = 3 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(free-riders with high costs)</td>
<td>272.25</td>
<td>240.25</td>
<td>175.56</td>
<td>105.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(free-riders with low costs)</td>
<td>248.06</td>
<td>217.56</td>
<td>138.06</td>
<td>90.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( k = 2 )</td>
<td>386.91</td>
<td>348.20</td>
<td>277.56</td>
<td>214.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 The benefits of free-riding.

If only two countries form a coalition (i.e. \( k = 3 \)) then, relative to the noncooperative situation a free-rider country, for example, country 4, gains 90.25 − 49 = 41.25 (84%) in the low cost cases, i.e. coalition structures \( \{13,2,4\} \) or \( \{1,23,4\} \), and 105.06 − 49 = 56.06 (114%) in the high cost case, i.e. coalition structure \( \{12,3,4\} \). In a similar vein, country 1 gains 248.06 − 196 = 52.06 (27%) in coalition structure \( \{1,24,3\} \) and 272.25 − 196 = 76.25 (39%) in coalition structure \( \{1,23,4\} \).

In Example 4.1, although country 4 with the highest marginal cost has the smallest net benefit in the noncooperative situation (Corollary 3.1), it will gain

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14Coalitions mean both individuals and groups of individuals in a given coalition structure.
such that the lowest cost coalition materializes (because it reduces the total cost). Coalitions with two coalitions will increase if country 4 forms a coalition, since the equal sharing rule (see section 3) is feasible under the equal sharing rule. The total benefit with gains of 56.06 (114%) for country 4.

Moreover, in coalition structure {123, 4} country 4 gains more than in coalitions with two free-riders (c.f. {1, 4, 23} or {13, 2, 4}) with gains 56.06 (114%) and {12, 3, 4} with gains 41.25 (84%) for country 4.

Observe that although all coalition structures with two coalitions in Example 4.1 are feasible under the equal sharing rule (see section 3), the total benefits of coalition structures with two coalitions will increase if country 4 forms a coalition such that the lowest cost coalition materializes (because it reduces the total cost of the coalition structure). For example, consider \( \kappa_1 = \{12, 34\}, \kappa_2 = \{14, 23\}, \kappa_3 = \{13, 24\}, \kappa_4 = \{123, 4\}, \kappa_5 = \{124, 3\}, \kappa_6 = \{134, 2\} \) and \( \kappa_7 = \{234, 1\} \). From the last column in Table 3.1, it follows that for coalitions \( \kappa_2 \) and \( \kappa_3 \) there is free-riding by countries 4, 3, 2 and 1, respectively.

The smallest effort (29) and highest net benefit (841) materialize for the grand coalition only. Therefore, although there exist some feasible partial coalition structures, the grand coalition is optimal.

The question arises what sharing rule of the net benefits should be adopted to stimulate the fishing nations to join the grand coalition. If a coalition structure is feasible, the equal sharing rule can be applied for each coalition. However, the equal sharing rule does not take into account the contributions of each player to the grand coalition.

The Shapley value (1953) is defined and considered an appropriate device of distributing the gains of cooperation among the players in cooperative games with transferable utility (characteristic function forms or TU games). Therefore, it can not be applied for partition function form games. In the remainder of this section we use the modified Shapley value for partition function form games, introduced by Pham Do and Norde (2002). Particularly, we will show that a country with higher costs has higher gains from the cooperation under this modified Shapley value.

Pham Do and Norde (2002) show that modified Shapley value (see Appendix) is a unique and efficient solution for a FGPFF. Moreover, they point out that for a class of oligopoly games in partition function form such as a FGPFF \( \pi \), where \( \pi \) is derived by competitive equilibrium of coalition structures from (11), the modified Shapley value keeps the same ordering for every player in the Nash situation. Applying this result to a fishery game in partition function form, the following proposition is obtained.

**Proposition 4.2** Let \( \psi \) be the modified Shapley value for a FGPFF \( \pi \), where \( \pi \) is derived in (11) from competitive equilibrium of coalition structures. It follows

15 Note that \( \pi(e^*(2, \kappa_2)) = \pi(e^*(2, \kappa_3)) \) and \( \pi(e^*(2, \kappa_7)) = \pi(e^*(2, \kappa_6)) \) since the total cost of \( \kappa_2 \) and \( \kappa_3 \) as well as \( \kappa_7 \) and \( \kappa_6 \) are equal.

16 It is a reason why the full cooperation may not stable if a distribution of benefits can not be accepted by several countries.

17 The reader is referred to the chapters 53-58 by Aumann and Hart (2002) for the introduction to the Shapley value, its extensions and applications.
that if $c_1 \leq c_2 \leq \ldots \leq c_n$ then

(i) $\pi(1, [N]) \geq \pi(2, [N]) \geq \ldots \geq \pi(n, [N])$,

(ii) $\psi_1(\pi) \geq \psi_2(\pi) \geq \ldots \geq \psi_n(\pi)$, and

(iii) $\pi(N, \{N\}) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_i(\pi)$.

**Proof.** See section 6 in Phamdo and Norde (2002).

The following example will illuminate the modified Shapley value as a division rule and show that a country with higher costs has higher gains from the cooperation under this rule.

**Example 4.2** Consider the fishery game in partition function form $(N, \pi)$ in Example 3.1, where $w$ is defined as $(G3.1)$. In this game, we have

$\pi(1, [N]) = 196 > \pi(2, [N]) = 169 > \pi(3, [N]) = 100 > \pi(4, [N]) = 49$.

Using the Appendix the modified Shapley value is obtained as

$\psi(\pi) = (271.18, 238.86, 184.94, 146.02)$.

This value allocates the payoffs according to the different contributions of each player in the grand coalition in the following order:

$\psi_1(\pi) > \psi_2(\pi) > \psi_3(\pi) > \psi_4(\pi)$, and

$\pi(4, \{4\}) = \sum_{i=1}^{4} \psi_i(\pi) = 841$.

The different payoffs due to the different costs of the players, and the surplus gained from the full cooperation is $(75.18, 69.86, 84.94, 97.02)$. Thus, each country has a different gain in the grand cooperation due to its distribution of marginal cost. Moreover, this distribution differs from the values that are obtained by applying other division rules such as the equal sharing rule. For example, the transition from the noncooperative to cooperative situation yields the surplus $327 (= 841 - 514)$ and the equal sharing rule gives the outcomes $(277.75, 250.75, 181.75, 130.75)$, where each player gains equally $81.75$.

This example indicates that although the equal sharing rule can be applied for any feasible coalition structure, the modified Shapley value has more potential in avoiding free-riding behaviour. To make it clearly, consider again Table 4.1 for a situation where countries 1, 2, 3 are CSs and country 4 is a DWFN. Moreover, regarding to the member problem of a RFMO, we assume CSs are members of a RFMO who may or may not accept a new entrant (i.e DWFN) to join its organization. According to Article 8 of the 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement, only member of a RFMO and the countries that apply the fishing restrictions adopted by it, shall have access to the regulated fishery resource. Therefore, it is argued that a free rider behaviour of the DWFN, undermining the efforts of CSs, is not feasible under the legal framework (Pintassilgo, 2002). This situation implies that there are possibility of free rider behaviour by CSs, and a DWFN is not allowed to free rider (although a DWFN gains more benefit in such situation). The net benefits of free rider of CSs seems to persist under the legal framework setting by the UN Conservation on the Law of the Sea.

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18 Kaitala and Munro (1995) argue that there exists a situation where some members of a RFMO leaving its RFMO and cooperating with a DWFN (i.e. a new coalition). Thus, the possibility of free rider of CSs seems to persist under the legal framework setting by the UN Conservation on the Law of the Sea.
riders in these situations are presented in row 4 of Table 4.1. It is showed that the benefits of free rider 248.06, 217.56, 138.06 and 90.25 (for countries 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively) are smaller than the Shapley value 271.18, 238.86, 184.94, and 146.02.

**Remark** Table 3.1 shows that if country 4 free rides (excluding the noncooperative situation \([N]\)) then the total cost will increase more than the other free-riders and as a consequence, the total net benefit will reduce. For example, the coalition structure \{123,4\} has the total cost 11 and the total benefit 684.51 which is largest and smallest for any other coalition structures consist of only a free rider. Furthermore, there are two situations where the total effort are smaller than others which is either the grand coalition \([N]\) or the coalition structure \{123,4\} as the result of the negative relationship between the total cost and total effort as well as the total coalitions (Corollaries 3.1, 3.2). The natural question arises whether one may expect reasonable compromise alternatives: no cooperation with less net benefit or partial cooperation? One may choose either to reduce efforts and less its net benefit by partial cooperations (i.e feasible coalitions) or to accept the new member as expanding to the grand cooperation.

In Example 4.1 the modified Shapley value is applied as a solution avoiding the free-ridding. For instance, consider the coalition structure \(\kappa_6 = \{134,2\}\) in which the total cost is 5 and total effort is 36.33. Using the modified Shapley value as the division rule for a feasible coalition \(\{1,2,4\}\), then countries 1, 3, and 4 receive the net benefits are 210.17, 107.17 and 69.57 (sharing the total net benefit 386.91), respectively. The gains are 14.17 for country 1, 7.17 for country 3 and 20.57 for country 4.

Finally, we observe that although each country is better off in the grand coalition than in the competitive outcome, individual countries can do even better by free-riding under certain circumstances, as illustrated in the last row of Table 4.1. This implies that application of the modified Shapley value is not sufficient to discourage free riding. Therefore, additional measures are needed to deter free riding; e.g. linking a fishery problem to another problem in which the countries are involved (see Folmer et al., 1993 and Kroeze-Gil, 2003 and the references therein).

### 5 Concluding remarks

The objective of regional fishery agreements is to develop rules for joint decision making to use common fishery resources efficiently, particularly to avoid inefficient outcomes and the collapse of fish stocks resulting from noncooperative behaviour. Furthermore, a better balance must be reached between fishing effort and the quantities of fish that can be removed from the sea without endangering the future of the fish stocks or ecosystems.

This paper has addressed the formation of coalitions smaller than the grand coalition to intensify an achieved efficient cooperation. Particularly, attention has been paid to the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on reducing harvest levels. We have shown that for every coalition structure in a competitive equilibrium a coalition with lower marginal cost has a higher effort level, and total fishing effort is an increasing function of the number of coalitions. Moreover, the lower the marginal costs, the higher the net benefits in the coalition structures.

In order to induce countries to cooperate the modified Shapley value adopted to games in partition function form has been considered. This is a unique and efficient division rule of gains from cooperation that preserves the ordering of players in the Nash outcome. This device can be applied to develop profit allocation schemes such as a reasonable compromise alternative for both the potential entrants and
the charter members in the terms of no cooperation with less net benefits. The main conclusion of this paper is that the analysis of partial cooperations is as an alternative set in motion a process leading more cooperation and ultimately full cooperation.

References


Appendix

In order to introduce the modified Shapley value for games in partition function form, we need some additional notations. Let $\Pi(N)$ be the set of all bijections $\sigma: \{1,2,...,n\} \rightarrow N$ of $N$. For a given $\sigma \in \Pi(N)$ and $i \in I([N])$ we define $S^\sigma_i = \{\sigma(1),\sigma(2),...,\sigma(i)\}$, and $S^\sigma_0 = \emptyset$. For a given $\sigma \in \Pi(N)$ and $i \in I([N])$, we define the coalition $\kappa^\sigma_i$ associated with $\sigma$ and $i$, by $\kappa^\sigma_i = \{S^\sigma_i\} \cup [N\setminus S^\sigma_i]$. So, in $\kappa^\sigma_i$ the coalition $S^\sigma_i$ has already formed, whereas all other players still form singleton coalitions. Furthermore, we define $\kappa^\sigma_0 = [N]$.

Let $(N,w)$ be a partition function form game, and $\sigma \in \Pi(N)$. We define the marginal contribution of the $i^{th}$ player $\sigma(i)$ to coalition $S^\sigma_i$ such as $m^\sigma_{\sigma(i)}(w) := w(S^\sigma_i, \kappa^\sigma_i) - w(S^\sigma_{i-1}, \kappa^\sigma_{i-1})$.

Based on these marginal vectors $\{m^\sigma(w)\}_{\sigma \in \Pi(N)}$, we define the modified Shapley value $\Phi$ of the partition function form game $(N,w)$ as the average of the $n!$ marginal vectors$^{19}$,

$$\Phi(w) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\sigma \in \Pi(N)} m^\sigma(w).^{20}$$

$^{19}$Details can be found in Phamdo and Norde (2002).

$^{20}$Observe the similarity to TU-games (c.f. Shapley, 1953).
Example  Consider the partition function form game \((N, w)\) defined by
\[
\begin{align*}
\overline{w}(1,2,3) &= (0,0,0), & \overline{w}(12,3) &= (2,0), & \overline{w}(23,1) &= (3,2), & \overline{w}(13,2) &= (2,1), \\
\overline{w}(123) &= 10.
\end{align*}
\]

The marginal vectors associated with \(\sigma\) are:
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{if } \sigma_1 &= (1,2,3) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_1}(w) &= (0,2,8) \\
\text{if } \sigma_2 &= (2,1,3) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_2}(w) &= (2,0,8) \\
\text{if } \sigma_3 &= (1,3,2) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_3}(w) &= (0,8,2) \\
\text{if } \sigma_4 &= (2,3,1) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_4}(w) &= (7,0,3) \\
\text{if } \sigma_5 &= (3,1,2) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_5}(w) &= (2,8,0) \\
\text{if } \sigma_6 &= (3,2,1) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_6}(w) &= (7,3,0).
\end{align*}
\]
So, the modified Shapley value \(\Phi(w) = (3,3.5,3.5)\).

\[\text{21} \quad \text{For example, the marginal vector of } \sigma_2 \text{ is computed as follows. As } \sigma_2 = (2,1,3) \text{ then } m_{\sigma_2}^{(1)}(w) = w(21,\{21,3\}) - w(2,\{N\}) = 2, \quad m_{\sigma_2}^{(2)}(w) = w(2,\{N\}) = 0, \quad m_{\sigma_2}^{(3)}(w) = w(213,\{N\}) - w(21,\{21,3\}) = 10 - 2 = 8. \text{ Hence, } m_{\sigma_2}(w) = (2,0,8).\]