Health-enhancing Activities and the Environment: How Competition for Resources Makes the Environmental Policy Beneficial

By Xavier Pautrel, Institut d’Economie et de Management de Nantes-IAE, Université de Nantes
Health-enhancing Activities and the Environment: How Competition for Resources makes the Environmental Policy Beneficial
By Xavier Pautrel, Institut d’Economie et de Management de Nantes-IAE, Université de Nantes

Summary
In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the relationship between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (level- and growth-output) becomes inverted-U shaped, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health are taken into account. Especially, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to promote (rather than to harm) output-level and –growth when health is very sensitive to pollution, the weight of health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the production technology is high and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low. The inverted-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the economic activity is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources between the final output sector and the health-enhancing activities that offsets the conventional detrimental “drag-down effect” for low values of the environmental tax. We also demonstrate that the link between the environmental tax and the lifetime welfare is inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.

Keywords: Growth, Environment, Health, Overlapping Generations

JEL Classification: Q5
Health-enhancing activities and the environment: How competition for resources make the environmental policy beneficial

Xavier Pautrel∗
xavier.pautrel@univ-nantes.fr
April 9, 2009

Abstract

In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the relationship between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (level- and growth-output) becomes inverted-U shaped, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health are taken into account. Especially, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to promote (rather than to harm) output-level and -growth when health is very sensitive to pollution, the weight of health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the production technology is high and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low.

The inverted-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the economic activity is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources between the final output sector and the health-enhancing activities that offsets the conventional detrimental “drag-down effect” for low values of the environmental tax.

We also demonstrate that the link between the environmental tax and the lifetime welfare is inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.

Keywords: Growth; Environment; Health; Overlapping generations.

∗address: Nantes Atlantique Université, Laboratoire d’Économie de Nantes (LEN), Chemin de la Censive du Tertre, BP 52231, 44322 Nantes Cedex 3, France.
1 Introduction

Is environmental policy harmful to economic activity, both in terms of output level and growth? Does the reduction of pollution imply a cost for economic activities so heavy that the gains from a better environment quality are not able to offset it? At the theoretical level, the answers are not clear-cut.

The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate focusing on one of the more striking features of pollution: its detrimental impact on health. Conversely to previous works in the field that take into account the impact of pollution on life expectancy (i.e. mortality), we focus our attention on the influence of pollution on illness and disability (morbidity). Indeed, a growing set of empirical evidence finds a link between pollution and chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, heart disease, pulmonary conditions and mental disorders, amongst others. Even if pollution is not the main source of these diseases, it contributes as a factor favouring their emergence or their worsening. Conversely to mortality that affects mainly the oldest old, illness and disability due to chronic diseases primarily impacts the working-age population, leading to important losses of productivity and rising health-expenditures mainly for the 30-50 old age people. Devol and Bedroussian (2007) from the Milken Institute estimate that the seven common chronic diseases represent for the United-States $277 billion spent annually on treatment and a lost productivity equals to $1.1 trillion per year.

The rising health-expenditures for working-age people and the time they have to devote in order to accommodate to their chronic disease creates a competition for resources that could be used in alternative ways, especially growth-led activities or final production activities. The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that such a resource competition is a channel of transmission between the environmental policy, economic activity and welfare, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health status of working-age population is taken into account.

To demonstrate this point and analyze its implications, we use a two-period overlapping generations model in the veins of previous articles which addressed intergenerational environmental issues, introducing an explicit link between the environment and health. Following empirical evidence, we assume that health is negatively influenced by pollution but is improved by the investment in health-enhancing activities made by each agent at her working-age. Pollution is a by-product of final output production and in the competitive

---

1 Competition for resources in the relation between health and growth has been already studied by several articles (see Dormont et al., 2007, for details and references). Nevertheless, most of these contributions view better health as an increase in life expectancy. Empirically, Dormont et al. (2006) find changes in morbidity that induce savings which more than offset the increase in spending due to population ageing.

2 For example, John and Pecchenino (1994) who analyze the potential conflict between economic growth and the maintenance of environmental quality when consumption degrades environmental quality while investment in environmental maintenance promotes it. See also John et al. (1995) who investigate the effects of environmental taxation distinguishing the horizon of the agents and the economy. For models with non-renewable resources, see Agnani et al. (2005), Kemp and Long (1979), Mourmouras (1991, 1993).

3 Because we consider that agents are suffering from chronic diseases that required medical care when they are young we do not assume that the poor health agents expend more on medical care when they are elderly like Gutiérrez (2008). And, conversely to Williams (2002, 2003), we do not assume that ill agents do not work.
economy the government taxes final output to limit pollution emissions.

Our first contribution is to demonstrate that if the detrimen tal effect of pollution on health-status and an endogenous investment in health by the working-age are taken into account, the link between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (final output level and growth) is inverted-U shaped. Indeed, a tighter environmental policy has two opposite effects. First, because the environmental tax is imposed on final output, it reduces the rewards to production factor: the conventional “drag-down effect”. Second, it reduces pollution and therefore improves health-status of the working-age. Agents reduce their investment in health-enhancing activities and the freed resources are used to increase consumption and production. This second effect, called “resource competition effect” is positive. Therefore, for low values of the environmental tax, the second effect offsets the first one, and the environmental policy promotes the level and the growth rate of output, as well as the global welfare.

Our second contribution is to show that the greater the room for an improvement in the health status, the more likely the environmental policy promotes economic activity and growth. That occurs when the rate of natural health decay is low, the efficiency of the health care spending is low, the weight of health in preferences is high, the part of labor in final output is high, the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low, the polluting capacity of production technology is high, the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution are high. Most of these criterions exist in the most developed countries, and because the detrimental impact of pollution on health is well-documented worldwide, our results show that an active environmental policy in these countries is highly probable to promote growth and output level: the positive gains in terms of health and growth should be higher than the losses from factor rewards.

Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the optimal environmental tax. We demonstrate that the higher the weight of health in preferences, the elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution, the detrimental impact of pollution on health and/or the part of labor in production, the higher the optimal environmental tax is.

The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 gives empirical evidence on the link between pollution illness and disability. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 studies the competitive equilibrium and the impact of the environmental taxation on the steady-state. Section 5 investigates the social optimum and the optimal environmental tax. Section 6 examines two extensions: AK endogenous growth and the introduction of the impact of health on labor productivity. Section 7 concludes.

2 Pollution, illness and disability

The major part of the environmental economic contributions integrating the detrimental impact of pollution on health focus on life expectancy. Nevertheless, pollution also affects

morbidity by favouring or worsening some chronic diseases that do not always lead to death but have durable detrimental impacts in terms of illness and disability.

These chronic diseases, that encompass cancer, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, heart disease, asthma, obesity are a growing burden because they represent 60% of all deaths worldwide and they are a major source of disability (see WHO, 2004, 2005). While they strongly strike down developing countries, they also represent a great burden for developed economies, like the United-States, England, Canada, Israel, and Australia, as reported by Suhrcke et al. (2006b) and Zhang et al. (2008) amongst others. For example, Devol and Bedroussian (2007) find that more than half of all Americans (55.8%) suffered from one or more chronic diseases in 2003.

The causes of increasing the risk to develop chronic diseases are well-established and well-known: mainly unhealthy diet, physical inactivity and tobacco use. Nevertheless, recent studies emphasize the importance of the environmental factors in the development and the worsening of some of these chronic diseases, especially in the developed countries. According to Briggs (2003) about 8-9% of the total disease burden may be attributed to pollution in developed countries.5

In the case of air pollution for example, it is well-established that particulate matter pollution, Nitrogen dioxide, Sulfur dioxide and ozone favour the onset of asthma crisis and aggravate respiratory diseases, that carbon monoxide affects mental function... (for a study on European countries see Katsouyanni, 2003). Furthermore, particulate matter air pollution plays a role as a cause of the development (pathogenesis in medical terms) of cardiovascular disease (Brook et al., 2004) or lung cancer (Pope et al., 2002), and it may be particularly harmful to high-risks people with diabetes and people with hypertension (Pope and al., 2004). Moreover, air pollution could be deleterious to vascular health especially for people with diabetes (Rajagopalan et al., 2005; O’Neill et al., 2005). Water pollution [Paulu et al. (1999), Valent et al. (2004)] and industrial pollution [Nadal et al. (2004), Chen and Liao (2005), Schuhmacher and Domingo (2006)] are also reported as detrimental for health.

Lang et al. (2008) recently found that higher urinary BPA concentration (chemical pollution) are associated with cardiovascular diagnoses and with diabetes for adults. Smink et al. (2008) show that children in the higher exposure group of HCB (a pesticide extensively used before it was banned from the United-States) had an increased risk of being overweight and obese, even if the mother is normalweight. The epidemiological association between persistent organic pollutants and diabetes has been also demonstrated by Rylander et al. (2005) and Porta (2006). Even if such an association does not prove necessarily a causal relation, as noted by Jones et al. (2008), such a causal link could be biologically explained (see Remillard and Bunce, 2002).

Furthermore, the link between obesity and diabetes seems to be related to pollution. Lee et al. (2007) find that the expected association between obesity and diabetes is absent in people with low concentrations of persistent organic pollutants in their blood. Furthermore, they find that the association between obesity and diabetes become stronger as

---

5The British Medical Bulletin gathers several studies on the impact of environmental pollution on health in the issue 1 of the volume 68, in 2003
the concentrations of such pollutants in the blood increase. Lockwood (2002) give further references on the association between exposure to dioxins and the development of diabetes or altered insulin metabolism. He notes that obesity may increase the risk of diabetes: because insulin is concentrated in body fat, obese individuals are likely to have an increased dioxin body burden that could explain the link between the rise in the prevalence of diabetes and the “epidemic” of obesity (see also Ando et al., 2002, for empirical evidences).

One important feature of chronic diseases is that they do not affect only the oldest people. It impacts working-age people through illness and disability: according to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2004) 56% of those who support the burden of disease are people age 15-59 in high-income countries. Lakdawalla et al. (2004) demonstrate that the disability increases more rapidly for the young while it decreases for the elderly. They find that one responsible is the growth in asthma which appears to be enough to explain the change in disability. This is confirmed by Bhattacharya et al. (2008): “Recent work has shown that rates of severe disability, measured by the inability to perform basic activities of daily living, have been rising in working age populations. At the same time, the prevalence of important chronic diseases has been rising, while others falling, among working age populations. Chronically ill individuals are more likely than others to have activity of daily living limitations.” Perlkowski and Berger (2004) study the influence of health on working conditions (wages and hours worked) making distinction between short-term and long-term illness and the age at each illness appears (because it implies different adjustments for young people at early stage and for old people closed to retirement). They distinguish between temporary and permanent illness and find that the adverse effects of permanent health problems peak with an age of onset in the 40s for men and in the 30s for women. The biggest decline in wages and hours worked are observed for individuals whose problems started at those ages.

That leads to major economic impact in terms of labor productivity, labor supply, education or savings, as shown by Suhrcke et al. (2006a). Chronic diseases mainly conduce to a reduction of the productivity of the labor-force (even if agents are not sick enough to stop working or even if he is not sick but it is the member of her family who is sick) and the increase in disability of working people. For the US in 2003, Davis et al. (2005) estimated that 55 million workers over 148 million ages 19 to 64 reported the inability to concentrate at work because of their own illness or that of their family and 69 million workers reported missing days due to illness. About the effects of chronic diseases on workers’ productivity, Blanc et al. (2001) demonstrate, with a sample of 125 adults in Northern-California that “Both asthma and rhinitis negatively affect work productivity. Those with asthma are less likely to be employed at all, while among those remaining on the job, rhinitis is a more potent cause of decreased work effectiveness. The economic impact of asthma and rhinitis and related conditions may be under-appreciated”. For Australia, van Leeuwen et al. (2006) estimate that “while the impact of reduced work effectiveness on days worked with pain on productivity is uncertain, it has the potential to account for the majority of lost productivity costs associated with chronic pain.”. Devol and Bedroussian (2007) from the Milken Institute estimate that the seven common chronic diseases represent for
the United-States lost productivity equals to $1.1 trillion per year.

The second important features of chronic illness comes from that it places a burden on health care and welfare systems. For the United States in 2003, Devol and Bedroussian (2007) estimate that $277 billion are spent annually on treatment. All these resources could be used in alternative activities promoting final (non health) consumption and growth. 6

Furthermore, chronic illness has major implications in terms of occupational choices, that can not be supported (or funded) by public health-care system or insurance contracts. Since the Grossman’s seminal work of 1972, time besides goods appears as an important input of the health production function by influencing the next period’s health capital level. More recently, time and time costs in health production become important in the economic analysis of obesity for example (see Cutler et al., 2003; Philipson and Posner, 2008, for example). As emphasized by Mullahy and Robert (2008), increasing level of physical activities is now viewed as a mean to improve health outcomes. In their study based on the Bureau of Labor Satistics’ American Time Use Survey Russell et al. (2007) noted that 11.3% of American adults (in 2003-2004) reported spending time (mean, 108 minutes) on activities related to health on their designed day and 5.6% (86 minutes) reported making medicine, giving self a shot, exercising or therapy for medical reasons. Physical activity has been shown to reduce the risk of developing or dying from heart diseases, diabetes, colon cancer and high blood-pressure. The US Department of Health and Human services gives some advice for being in good health to make each week 150 minutes of physical activities at moderate level or 75 minutes at vigourous level.

As a result, chronic illness force agents to allocate more time to health-enhancing activities, time they could use to home or market production. Therefore, both the increase in health-care expenditures and the rising investment in health-enhancing activities lead to a competition for resources that could be detrimental for economic activity, growth and/or welfare. And because pollution favours chronic illness and disability, this influence could be a new channel of transmission between the environmental public policy and the economy.

We investigate that point in the following sections.

3 The model

Let’s consider an overlapping generations model. A new generation is born at each date \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \), and lives for two periods. The number of individuals born at time \( t \) is \( L \). Population is constant. Individuals are non-altruistic: the old do not care for the young and the young do not care for the old. The preferences of an agent born in period \( t \) are represented by the following utility (from van Zon and Muysken (2001)):

\[
\log \left( c_{1t}^{\phi \frac{1}{1-\phi}} h_{1t}^{1-\phi} \right) + \theta \log \left( c_{2t+1}^{\phi \frac{1}{1-\phi}} h_{t+1}^{1-\phi} \right)
\]

6Here, we are reasoning for a given life expectancy and we do not consider that life expectancy may rise or decrease. As a result, we do not integrate the fact that additional years of life increases health-care expenditures (see Suhrcke et al., 2008, p.15).
where \(c_{1t}\) and \(c_{2t+1}\) are respectively consumption in young and in old age, \(h_t\) and \(h_{t+1}\) are respectively private health-status in young and in old age. Parameter \(\theta = (1 + \iota)^{-1}\) where \(\iota > 0\) is the subjective discount rate of the agent. Parameters \(\phi > 0\) (respectively \(1 - \phi\)) captures the relative importance of consumption (respectively health), in utility.\(^7\)

Each young agent is endowed with one unit of time. She supplies \(\nu_t \in [0, 1]\) of this unit of time in final production and uses her remaining time \(1 - \nu_t\) as an investment in health care activities to improve her health status.\(^8\) She earns a wage income \(\nu_t w_t\) where \(w_t\) is the wage rate.

The private health status of an agent born at period \(t\) evolves from period \(t\) and period \(t+1\) according to two opposite forces (Aisa and Pueyo (2004)). On the one hand, biological processes involve a natural decay of health simply as time passes. Following Grossman (1972) and Cropper (1981) we further assume that health depreciates over time with the stock of pollution (denoted \(S_t\)). On the other hand, the time invested in health-enhancing activities \((1 - \nu_t)\) fights against this deterioration. Therefore, for an agent born at \(t\), private health status evolves from period \(t\) to period \(t+1\) as:

\[
\begin{align*}
  h_{t+1} - h_t = \eta (1 - \nu_t) - \xi S_t^\gamma h_t
\end{align*}
\]

with \(\eta > 0\) is a productivity scalar of health-enhancing activities.\(^9\) Parameter \(\gamma \geq 0\) measures the influence of pollution stock on the natural decay \(\xi \in [0, 1]\).\(^10\)

A consumer, born at \(t\), works during the first period of her life, consumes an amount \(c_{1t}\) and saves the remainder of her revenue. The budget constraint of a young is

\[
\begin{align*}
  c_{1t} + s_t = \nu_t w_t
\end{align*}
\]

where \(s_t\) denotes saving in young. The budget constraint of an old is

\[
\begin{align*}
  c_{2t+1} = (1 + r_{t+1}) s_t
\end{align*}
\]

where \(r_{t+1}\) is the interest rate paid on saving held from period \(t\) to \(t+1\).

Firms operate through perfect competition using physical capital and labor to produce a final good with a constant return Cobb-Douglas technology:

\[
\begin{align*}
  Y_t = \tilde{A}_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}, \quad \alpha \in [0, 1]
\end{align*}
\]

\(^7\)We do not integrate green preferences because we will assume in the following that health status is affected by pollution.

\(^8\)We could assume that there exists a sector that produces health care services with labor and therefore a part \(\nu\) of labor is allocated to manufacturing production and a part \(1 - \nu\) is allocated to health-care production. We would find the same qualitative results (see Appendix A). Consequently, what we call investment in health-enhancing activities could be viewed as health-care expenditures. Our modelling has the advantage to lead to a simpler exposition of the model and the results. In Appendix E, we demonstrate that results are not modified when leisure time is introduced.

\(^9\)Note that here, we model a linear relationship between the health-enhancing activities and the evolution of health-status which could be not empirically relevant. As demonstrated by Skinner et al. (2001): “nearly 20 percent of total Medicare expenditures appears to provide no benefit in terms of survival, nor is it likely that this extra spending improves the quality of life”. Our assumption is made for simplicity.

\(^10\)We impose \(\gamma \geq 0\) to investigate the absence of a detrimental impact of pollution on health, that is \(\gamma = 0\). Nevertheless, it is expected that \(\gamma > 1\), that is the higher the stock of pollution, the higher the detrimental effect of pollution, even if there is no empirical evidence on such a linear relationship.
where $Y_t$ is the aggregate output, $K_t$ is the aggregate productive capital and $N_t$ is labor. $\tilde{A}_t$ is a productive scalar, assumed as constant for the moment: $\tilde{A}_t \equiv A$. Capital depreciates fully in the production process.$^{11}$

The stock of pollution $S$ from period $t$ to period $t+1$ increases because of the net flow pollution in the current period $t$ and decreases according to the rate of natural purification of pollutants $\mu \in ]0, 1[$. The net flow of pollution in period $t$ is the ratio between pollution emissions in period $t$, denoted $E_t$, and the abatement activities funded by the government, denoted $D_t$. We assume, as conventional, that polluting emissions arise from final production such that

$$E_t = zY_t, \quad z \in ]0, 1[$$

Parameter $z$ measures the polluting capacity of the technology. Consequently the stock of pollution in period $t+1$ is defined as:

$$S_{t+1} = \left(\frac{zY_t}{D_t}\right)^\chi + (1-\mu)S_t \quad (2)$$

where $\chi > 0$ is the exogenous elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution $E/D$.

### 4 The competitive equilibrium

The representative agent born in period $t$ maximizes her utility function taking wages, the interest rate and the stock of pollution as given. She chooses consumption at both ages $(c_{1t}, c_{2t+1})$ and the proportion of time $\nu_t$ she uses in production:

$$\max_{\{c_{1t}, c_{2t+1}, \nu_t\}} \log \left(c_{1t}^{\phi}h_t^{1-\phi}\right) + \theta \log \left(c_{2t+1}^{\phi}h_{t+1}^{1-\phi}\right) \quad \text{s.t.}$$

$$\begin{cases} c_{1t} + s_t = \nu_tw_t \\ c_{2t+1} = (1+r_{t+1})s_t \\ h_{t+1} = \eta(1-\nu_t) + (1-\xi S_t^\gamma)h_t \end{cases}$$

The first-order condition gives saving:

$$s_t = \left(\frac{\theta}{1+\theta}\right)\nu_tw_t \quad (3)$$

and the allocation of time into production:

$$\nu_t = \frac{\phi(1+\theta)}{\eta(1-\phi)\theta}h_{t+1} \quad \in ]0, 1[ \quad (4)$$

Because $\nu_t < 1$, the health status of the old $h_{t+1}$ is bounded to $\frac{\eta(1-\phi)\theta}{\phi(1+\theta)}$.\(^{12}\)

---

$^{11}$The production process is over the course of a generation. If the annual depreciation rate is 10% (which is empirically relevant), 96% of the capital stock is depreciated over the course of a 30 year generation. Therefore, we assume that capital is fully used up in the production process. Considering a positive depreciation rate would not change the qualitative results.

$^{12}$See van Zon and Muysken (1997, p.5) for a justification of the health status boundary.
We assume that abatement $D_t$ is provided by the government as a public good and financed by an environmental tax $\tau$ on the source of pollution $Y_t$ such that the public budget is balanced at each date: $D_t = \tau Y_t$. The low of motion of the stock of pollution, given by equation (2) becomes:

$$S_{t+1} = \left(\frac{z}{\tau}\right)^{x} + (1 - \mu)S_t$$

Firms maximize their profit $\pi_t = (1 - \tau)Y_t - (1 + r_t)K_t - w_t N_t$ and the demand for capital and labor is

$$(1 - \tau)\alpha Y_t / K_t = 1 + r_t$$

$$(1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha) Y_t / N_t = w_t$$

The good market clearing yields:

$$K_{t+1} = s_t L$$

and the labor market clearing equates labor demand $N_t$ to labor supply $\nu_t L$

$$N_t = \nu_t L$$

The competitive equilibrium may be summarized by the following relations:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \alpha)\left(\frac{\theta}{1 + \theta}\right)(1 - \tau)AK_t^{\alpha}(\nu_t L)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$\nu_t = \frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \nu_t = \left(\frac{(1 - \phi)\theta}{\phi(1 + \theta)} + 1\right)^{-1}\left(1 + (1 - \xi S_t^\gamma)h_t / \eta\right)$$

$$h_{t+1} = \eta(1 - \nu_t) + (1 - \xi S_t^\gamma)h_t$$

$$S_{t+1} = \left(\frac{z}{\tau}\right)^{x} + (1 - \mu)S_t$$

The steady-state is defined here as an equilibrium where physical capital, private health-status, pollution stock and the allocation of labor in production are constant at $K^\star$, $h^\star$, $S^\star$ and $\nu^\star$ respectively, defined as:

$$S^\star = S(\tau) \equiv \frac{(z/\tau)^x}{\mu}$$

$$h^\star = H(\tau) \equiv \eta \left[\frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{(1 - \phi)\theta} + \xi \left(\frac{(z/\tau)^x}{\mu}\right)^{\gamma}\right]^{-1}$$

$$\nu^\star = V(\tau) \equiv \phi \left[\frac{\xi(1 - \phi)\theta}{(1 + \theta)}\left(\frac{(z/\tau)^x}{\mu}\right)^{\gamma}\right]^{-1}$$

Consequently, the health status and the allocation of time in production are positively affected by the environmental tax $\tau$. 
From equations (5), (10) and (11), the steady-state value of the physical capital stock is:

\[ K^\star = A (1 - \tau)^{1/(1 - \alpha)} V(\tau) \]

with \( A \equiv (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} A \right)^{1/(1 - \alpha)} L. \) Because \( Y^\star = \frac{1 + \theta}{\theta(1 - \alpha)} (1 - \tau)^{-1} K^\star \), we obtain the steady-state value of final output as a function of the environmental taxation \( \tau \):

\[ Y^\star = A_1 (1 - \tau)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}} \left( B + \xi \left( \frac{z^Y}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right)^{-1} \]

with \( A_1 \equiv B \left( \frac{1 + \theta}{\theta(1 - \alpha)} \right) A \) and \( B \equiv \phi(1 + \theta) / (1 - \phi) \).

**Proposition 1.** When endogenous investment in private health-status and the detrimental impact of pollution on health are taken into account, the relationship between the steady-state output and the environmental taxation has an inverted-U shape.

Below (respectively above) an environmental tax-level denoted \( \hat{\tau} \) and defined as

\[ \chi^\gamma \xi \left( \frac{z^Y}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \hat{\tau}^{-1} - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \beta^\gamma \hat{\tau}^\gamma - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + \chi^\gamma \right) \xi \left( \frac{z^Y}{\mu} \right)^\gamma = 0. \]  

(12)

a tighter environmental taxation rises (respectively lowers) the steady-state level of output \( Y^* \).

**Proof.** See Appendix B

To understand the basic mechanism of this result, let us remember that

\[ Y^\star = A_1 (1 - \tau)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}} \left( B \right) \left( \frac{z^Y}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \]

The environmental tax influences the steady-state level of output through two channels: the direct impact of the environmental taxation on the rewards to labor (see overbrace \( Ia \) in equation 13) and the (indirect) impact on the allocation of labor into the manufacturing sector (see overbrace \( Ib \) in equation 13).

The first one (negative) is the conventional “drag-down” effect of the environmental tax that reduces factor rewards – captured by \( (1 - \tau)^{1/(1 - \alpha)} \). The second one (positive) is a new channel of transmission due to the “competition for resources” between health enhancing activities and production activities that affects the supply of labor into the final production sector \( \nu^\star = V(\tau) \). Because pollution has a detrimental impact on the evolution of private health-status, by reducing the net flow of pollution and therefore the stock of pollution, the environmental policy improves the private health-status of the agents. Consequently, each agent decides to reduce her investment in health enhancing activities \( (1 - \nu^\star) \) decreases.

\[ ^{13} \text{Note that } K_{t+1} = s_t L = \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) \nu_t (1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha)Y_t / \nu_t = \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) (1 - \tau)(1 - \alpha)Y_t. \]
and to rise her labor supply to productive activities ($\nu^\star$ increases). In this way, the tighter environmental tax frees resources that were allocated to health enhancing activities and that are now reallocated to production, leading to a higher level of steady-state output and a steady-state physical capital. Consequently the competition for resources between output production and health enhancing activities associated with the negative impact of pollution to health is a source of a new channel through which the environmental policy may promote economic activity.

When $\gamma = 0$, the evolution of health-status is independent from pollution and therefore the investment of each agent in health-enhancing activities is not affected by the environmental tax: $\nu^\star$ is independent from $\tau$. In such a case, the competition for resources is not affected by the environmental policy and only the “drag-down” effect remains: the environmental policy is detrimental for growth. In the same way, the “competition for resources effect” does no longer hold when there is no endogenous investment in health-enhancing activities.

**Proposition 2.** *The endogenous investment in health and the detrimental impact of pollution on health are two necessary conditions to obtain Proposition 1.*

**Proof.** See above and Appendix B. $\square$

Considering the influences of parameters on the environmental tax-level $\hat{\tau}$, enables to understand why these two opposite effects of the environmental policy leads to an inversed-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the steady-state output level. These influences are summarized in the following table (see equation (12) in Proposition 1 and Appendix B for the demonstration):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\xi$, $\eta$, $\phi$, $\theta$, $\alpha$, $\mu$, $z$</th>
<th>$-$</th>
<th>$+$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 1. Parameter Changes and Responses of $\hat{\tau}$

Because it is cumbersome to obtain analytically the influence of $\gamma$ and $\chi$ on the tax-level $\hat{\tau}$, we use a numerical application. We first calibrate the model assuming that the length of each period is 30 years, as usually in the literature. The first period covers ages 20 to 50, and the second period covers ages 50 to 80. We use the U.S. economy as benchmark. From De La Croix and Michel (2002), we choose $\alpha$ and $\theta$ following the standard choice in the RBC literature, that is $\alpha = 0.36$ and a quarterly psychological discount factor equal to 0.99. It implies that $\theta = 0.99^{(4\times30)} = 0.3$. We use the calibration by van Zon and Muysken (1997) for the values of $\xi$ and $\phi$. Finally, parameter $\eta$ is chosen to obtain a private health-status higher than unity to enable the welfare to be positive.

Benchmark value of parameters are summarized in Table 2:

| $\alpha$, $\theta$, $\phi$, $\xi$, $A$, $\eta$, $L$, $\chi$, $\mu$, $\gamma$ | 0.36, 0.3, 1/2, 0.2, 50, 0.8, 1, 1, 0.5, 1.5 |

Table 2. Benchmark value of parameters
and the results of the numerical application is reported in Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\hat{\tau}$</th>
<th>$Y^*$</th>
<th>$\hat{\nu}^*$</th>
<th>$\hat{h}^*$</th>
<th>$S^*$</th>
<th>$W^*$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>2.068</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 0.5$</td>
<td>7.77%</td>
<td>10.77</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.089</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>15.73%</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>2.065</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>25.97%</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>2.080</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2.5$</td>
<td>29.13%</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>2.094</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi = 1.25$</td>
<td>23.14%</td>
<td>9.769</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>2.099</td>
<td>1.667</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi = 1.5$</td>
<td>24.07%</td>
<td>9.821</td>
<td>0.921</td>
<td>2.125</td>
<td>1.515</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi = 1.75$</td>
<td>24.65%</td>
<td>9.875</td>
<td>0.930</td>
<td>2.146</td>
<td>1.387</td>
<td>1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi = 2$</td>
<td>25.01%</td>
<td>9.928</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>2.163</td>
<td>1.279</td>
<td>1.298</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Steady-state $\hat{\tau}$ for different values of $\gamma$ and $\chi$

The third proposition stems from the Table 1 and Table 3.

**Proposition 3.** When the negative impact of the environment on health and the endogenous decision of each agent to invest her resources into health enhancing activities are taken into account, we demonstrate that the environmental taxation will be more likely to improve the steady-state level of output if the rate of natural health decay ($\xi$) is low, the efficiency of the health care spending ($\eta$) is low, the weight of health in preferences ($1 - \phi$) is high, the part of labor in final output ($1 - \alpha$) is high, the rate of natural purification of pollutants ($\mu$) is low, the polluting capacity of production technology ($z$) is high, the detrimental impact of pollution on health ($\gamma$) and the elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution $\chi$ are high.

**Proof.** See Appendix B and Table 3. $\square$

When the detrimental effects of a dirty environment on health are important, the gains in terms of health status to reduce the emissions of pollutant are very important and the “competition for resources effect” that leads to an increase in labor supply runs beyond the “drag-down effect” that reduces factor rewards and as a consequence saving and physical capital accumulation. Nevertheless, these positive gains diminish with the increase in the tax rate because the possible improvements in health-status due to the tax are reducing. In the same time, the losses from the reduction of factor rewards increase in the tax rate such that for the environmental tax-level $\hat{\tau}$, they offset the gains, and a further increase in $\tau$ leads to a decrease in the steady-state output level.

Consequently, the greater the room for improving the environment and the private health-status through the environmental policy, the more beneficial the environmental policy is likely to be for the economy.

The numerical application also enables us to investigate the impact of the environmental taxation on the steady-state lifetime welfare, as well. As shown by Figure 1, there exists a relationship that is inverted-U shaped for similar reasons than the relationship between the steady-state output and the environmental tax is inverted-U shaped.
5 Social optimum and the optimal environmental taxation

The purpose of this section is to investigate the determinants of the optimal environmental taxation in the presence of endogenous investment in private health and detrimental impact of pollution on private health.

In the centralized economy, the central planner aims at maximizing the welfare of agents:

$$\max_{\{c_1, c_2, \nu, K, D\}} \log (c_1^{\phi} h^{1-\phi}) + \theta \log (c_2^{\phi} h^{1-\phi})$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned}
Y &= AK^\alpha(\nu L)^{1-\alpha} = Lc_1 + Lc_2 + D + K \\
h &= \eta(1 - \nu)/(\xi S^\gamma) \\
S &= (E/D)^{\chi}/\mu \\
E &= zY
\end{aligned}$$

As demonstrated in Appendix C, consumption at young and old age are related\textsuperscript{14}

$$\bar{c}_1 = \theta \bar{c}_2$$

with

$$\bar{c}_1 = \frac{(1 - \alpha)\phi}{\alpha(1 + \theta)} \left( \frac{A\alpha\phi}{(1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \phi) + \phi} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$$

The optimal allocation of time to production is:

$$\bar{\nu} = \phi$$

and the optimal stock of physical capital is

$$\bar{K} = \left( \frac{A\alpha\phi}{(1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \phi) + \phi} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} \phi L$$

\textsuperscript{14} A bar denotes optimal value.
Consequently, the optimal final output is
\[ \bar{Y} = A^{1/(1-\alpha)} \left( \frac{\alpha \phi}{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi) + \phi} \right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \phi L \]

Abatement activities is given by
\[ \bar{D} = \frac{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi)}{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi) + \phi} \bar{Y} \]

and the optimal stock of pollution in the steady-state is
\[ \bar{S} = \left( \frac{z}{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi)} \right)^\chi / \mu \]

Consequently, the optimal value of the environmental tax that enables the decentralized economy to attain the optimal stock of pollution in the steady-state is
\[ \bar{\tau} = \frac{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi)}{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi) + \phi} \]

(14)

It comes from this expression the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** The higher the weight of health in preferences \((1-\phi)\), the elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution \((\chi)\), the detrimental impact of pollution on health (captured by \(\gamma\)) and/or the part of labor in production \((1-\alpha)\), the higher the optimal environmental tax is.

**Proof.** From equation (14), it is straightforward that \(\partial \bar{\tau} / \partial \phi < 0\), \(\partial \bar{\tau} / \partial \chi > 0\), \(\partial \bar{\tau} / \partial \gamma > 0\) and \(\partial \bar{\tau} / \partial \alpha < 0\).

Nevertheless, the optimal environmental tax is not sufficient to enable the steady-state equilibrium to be optimal because in the decentralized economy the agents do not internalize the impact of their labor supply decisions on final output and the net flow of pollution. Consequently, agents supply not enough time to output production. That’s why, to obtain the optimal individual labor supply \(\bar{\nu}\), the government have to subsidize the health-enhancing activities at a rate (see Appendix D):
\[ \bar{\tau}^\nu = 1 - \frac{\xi \theta}{(1+\theta)} \left( \frac{z^\chi \chi / \mu}{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi)} \right)^\gamma \left( \frac{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi)}{(1-\alpha) \chi \gamma (1-\phi) + \phi} \right)^{-\gamma \chi} \]

The environmental tax \(\bar{\tau}\) associated with the subsidy \(\bar{\tau}^\nu\) make the steady-state decentralized equilibrium optimal.

**6 Extensions**

**6.1 AK endogenous growth**

In this section, we consider that there exists external learning by doing à la Romer (1986),\(^{15}\) such that the productivity scalar \(\tilde{A}_t\) evolves as physical capital:
\[ \tilde{A}_t = AK_t^\alpha \]

\(^{15}\)Following Romer (1986), production factors remain paid at their marginal after environmental tax cost.
to obtain an interest rate independent from physical capital. Consequently, the final output becomes

\[ Y_t = AK_t(\nu_tL)^{1-\alpha} \]

and the law of motion of physical capital is given by

\[ K_{t+1} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) (1 - \tau)AK_t(\nu_tL)^{1-\alpha} \]

At the steady-state, physical capital and output evolves at a constant positive rate of growth \( g^* \equiv K_{t+1}/K_t - 1 \), that is, using equation (11)

\[ g^* = A'(1 - \tau) \left[ B + \xi \left( \frac{z}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right]^{\alpha-1} \]

with \( A' \equiv (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) AL^{1-\alpha} B^{1-\alpha} \). The influence of the environmental taxation on the growth rate at the steady-state is given by

\[ \frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \tau} = -A' \left[ B + \xi \left( \frac{z}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right]^{\alpha-1} \left[ B + \xi \left( \frac{z}{\mu} \right)^\gamma (1 - (1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \tau^{-1})) \right] \]

Consequently \( \frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \tau} > 0 \) if the last term in the right-hand side of the previous expression is negative:

\[ B\tau^\chi\gamma + \xi \left( \frac{z}{\mu} \right)^\gamma (1 - (1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \tau^{-1})) < 0 \]

Because the left-hand side of the inequality is a monotonic increasing function of \( \tau \) with \( \lim_{\tau \to 0} = -\infty \) and \( \lim_{\tau \to 1} = B\tau^\chi\gamma + \xi \left( \frac{z}{\mu} \right)^\gamma > 0 \), there exists a unique \( \hat{\tau}_g \) defined as

\[ B\hat{\tau}_g^\chi\gamma + \xi \left( \frac{z}{\mu} \right)^\gamma (1 - (1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \hat{\tau}_g^{-1})) = 0 \]

such that for \( \tau < \hat{\tau}_g \) (respectively \( \tau > \hat{\tau}_g \)) we have \( \frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \tau} > 0 \) (resp. \( \frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \tau} < 0 \)).

**Proposition 5.** Under the assumption of a learning-by-doing source of growth à la Romer (1986), the introduction of an endogenous private health care expenditures and a detrimen-tal impact of pollution on health makes the environmental taxation policy good for growth when the level of taxation is not too high.

**Proof.** See above. \( \square \)
6.2 Health affects labor productivity

As emphasized in the introduction, chronic diseases affect the economy through the huge losses of productivity they create. As a result, it is expected that a tighter environmental taxation will reduce these losses of productivity by reducing pollution and increasing the health-status of workers. To investigate how the “productivity effect” associated with the “competition for resources effect” could improve further the beneficial impact of the environmental policy, we introduce the impact of health on the productivity of labor.

We continue to consider that the poor health agents expend more on medical care when they are young and not elderly like Gutiérrez (2008). We do not assume that ill agents do not work (Williams (2002, 2003)). We rather consider that a better health-status makes workers more productive and that absenteeism due to illness does not occur.\footnote{We take into account presenteeism, i.e. a worker present but with reduced productivity rather than absenteeism, i.e. a worker absent, because it accounts for not only worker health but also health of his family. For the US in 2003, Davis et al. (2005) estimated that 55 million workers over 148 million ages 19 to 64 reported the inability to concentrate at work because of their own illness or that of their family.}

The technology to produce final output becomes:

\[ Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha (h_0^\alpha, N_t) \]  

where \( \varepsilon \geq 0 \) measures the effect of health on labor productivity. The introduction of health-dependent labor productivity lets the model unchanged except for the law of motion of physical capital (equation 5):

\[ K_{t+1} = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) (1 - \tau) AK_t^\alpha (h_0^\alpha, N_t) \]  

As a result, the steady-state value of physical capital becomes:

\[ K^{**} = A (1 - \tau)^{\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}} V(\tau) H(\tau)^\varepsilon \]

and the steady-state expression of final output is now:

\[ Y^{**} = A_2 (1 - \tau)^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}} \left( B + \xi \left( \frac{Z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \tau^{-\chi \gamma} \right)^{(1+\varepsilon)} \]

with \( A_2 \equiv A_1 \eta^\varepsilon \).

**Proposition 6.** When the effect of health on labor productivity is taken into account, the positive effect of the environmental tax on output-level is enhanced and the tax level under which a higher environmental tax increases output level is higher. The environmental policy is more likely to promote final output.

**Proof.** The tax level, denoted \( \hat{\tau} \), for which \( \partial Y / \partial \tau = 0 \) is

\[ (1 + \varepsilon)\chi \gamma \xi \left( \frac{Z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \hat{\tau}^{\gamma - 1} - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} B \hat{\tau}^{\chi \gamma} - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + (1 + \varepsilon)\chi \gamma \right) \xi \left( \frac{Z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma = 0. \]

It is straightforward that for \( \varepsilon = 0, \hat{\tau} = \hat{\tau} \). Furthermore the LHS of the equation is increasing in \( \varepsilon \) because \( \hat{\tau} \in [0, 1] \). Therefore from the theorem of implicit function we find that \( \hat{\tau} / \partial \varepsilon > 0 \). Therefore \( \hat{\tau} > \hat{\tau} \) when \( \varepsilon > 0 \). \( \square \)
7 Conclusion

This paper investigated how the environmental tax affects the economy (output-level and -growth, welfare) when the detrimental impact of pollution on health is taken into account and working-age individuals have to invest in health-care activities to limit the deleterious influence of pollution.

In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the relationship between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (level- and growth-output) becomes inverted-U shaped, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health are taken into account. Especially, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to promote (rather than to harm) output-level and -growth when health is very sensitive to pollution, the weight of health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the production technology is high and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low.

The inverted-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the economic activity is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources between the final output sector and the health-care sector that offsets the conventional detrimental “drag-down effect” for low values of the environmental tax.

We also demonstrate that the link between the environmental tax and the lifetime welfare is inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.

This contribution shows that, besides life expectancy, there are other ways along which pollution may affect health and health affects economic activity. Those ways may be new channels of transmission of the environmental pollution to economic activity.

References


21
Appendix

A The basic model with a health sector

Let us consider in this section, that there exists in the economy a health sector that produces an amount $H_t$ of health-care services at period $t$, using labour and the following technology

$$H_t = A_H (1 - \nu_t)$$

where $A_H$ is a productivity scalar and $1 - \nu_t$ is the part of labour (normalized to unity) allocated to the health sector.

Firms in the health sector operate under perfect competition and maximize their profit $m_t H_t = w_t (1 - \nu_t)$ such that:

$$m_t A_H = w_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

The final output sector is always defined in section 2.

In the competitive equilibrium, besides her consumption of final good, the consumer buys when she is young $H_t$ units of health care services for an amount of health-care expenditures equal to $m_t H_t$. The private health status of the agent evolves between period $t$ and $t + 1$ as:

$$h_{t+1} - h_t = \eta H_t - \xi S_t^\gamma h_t$$

The program of the consumer consists in choosing consumption when young and old and health-care services $H_t$ in order to maximize her lifetime utility subject to her budget constraint when young and old and the evolution of her health-status:

$$\max_{\{c_{1t}, c_{2t+1}, H_t\}} \log \left( c_{1t}^{\phi} h_t^{1-\phi} \right) + \theta \log \left( c_{2t+1}^{\phi} h_{t+1}^{1-\phi} \right)$$

subject to:

$$\begin{align*}
    c_{1t} + m_t H_t + s_t &= w_t \\
    c_{2t+1} &= (1 + r_{t+1}) s_t \\
    h_{t+1} &= \eta H_t + (1 - \xi S_t^\gamma) h_t
\end{align*}$$

The first-order condition gives saving (using equation 17):

$$s_t = \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) (w_t - m_t H_t) = \left( \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \right) \nu_t w_t$$

Furthermore, $\nu_t$ is given by

$$h_{t+1} = \frac{\eta A_H (1 - \phi) \theta}{\phi (1 + \theta)} \nu_t$$

that is $\nu_t$ increases in $h_{t+1}$. These two expressions are similar to those find with health-care investment as time (see equations (3) and (4)) when $A_H = 1$. 
B Environmental taxation in the competitive equilibrium

The influence of the environmental tax on the steady-state level of output is given by:

\[
dY^*/d\tau = Y^*\tau^{-\gamma}(1 - \tau)^{-1} \left( B + \xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right)^{-1} \times \\
\left[ \chi\gamma\xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \tau^{-1} - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} B\tau^\chi - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + \gamma \right) \xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right].
\]

The influence of the environmental tax on the steady-state level of output is positive if and only if

\[
\chi\gamma\xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \tau^{-1} - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} B\tau^\chi - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + \gamma \right) \xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma > 0
\]

Because the left-hand side of the inequality is a decreasing monotonic function of \( \tau \) with \( \lim_{\tau \to 0} = +\infty \) and \( \lim_{\tau \to 1} = \frac{-\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \left( B + \xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right) < 0 \), there exists a unique \( \tau \in ]0,1] \) under which the inequality is verified. This \( \tau \) is denoted \( \hat{\tau} \) and is defined as:

\[
\chi\gamma\xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \hat{\tau}^{-1} - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} B\hat{\tau}^\chi - \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + \gamma \right) \xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma = 0.
\]

When \( \gamma = 0 \), the left-hand side of the inequality is independent from \( \tau \) and negative. Consequently, when \( \gamma = 0 \), we have \( dY^*/d\tau < 0 \).

To find how parameters affect the tax level \( \tau \), let rewrite the expression of \( \hat{\tau} \) as:

\[
\Gamma(\hat{\tau}; \alpha, \gamma, \xi, \mu, B, z, \chi) \equiv B\hat{\tau}^\chi + (1 - \alpha^{-1}(1 - \alpha)\chi (\hat{\tau}^{-1} - 1) \gamma) \xi \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma = 0.
\]

with \( B \equiv \eta \frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{(1 - \phi)\theta} \) and \( \hat{\tau}^{-1} > 1 \). Except for \( \gamma \) and \( \chi \), it is straightforward that \( \partial\Gamma(\cdot)/\partial\xi > 0 \), \( \partial\Gamma(\cdot)/\partial B > 0 \), \( \partial\Gamma(\cdot)/\partial\alpha > 0 \), \( \partial\Gamma(\cdot)/\partial\mu > 0 \), \( \partial\Gamma(\cdot)/\partial\phi < 0 \), \( \partial\Gamma(\cdot)/\partial\theta > 0 \). From the theorem of implicit function, we obtain

\[
\partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\xi < 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\eta < 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\phi < 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial(1-\phi) > 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\theta > 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\alpha < 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\mu < 0, \quad \partial\hat{\tau}/\partial\phi < 0.
\]

C The optimum

In the centralized economy, the central planner aims at maximizing the welfare of agents:

\[
\max \{c_1, c_2, \nu, K, D\} \log \left( c_1^\phi h^{1-\phi} \right) + \theta \log \left( c_2^\phi h^{1-\phi} \right)
\]

subject to

\[
\begin{aligned}
F(K, \nu, L) &= \tilde{A}K^\alpha (\nu L)^{1-\alpha} = Lc_1 + Lc_2 + D + K \\
\theta &= \eta(1 - \nu)/(\xi S^\gamma) \\
S &= (E/D)^\chi/\mu \\
E &= zY
\end{aligned}
\]
The Lagrangian may be written as:

\[ L = \phi (\log c_1 + \theta \log c_2) + (1 + \theta)(1 - \phi) (\chi \gamma \log D - \chi \gamma \log F(K, \nu, L) + \log(1 - \nu)) + (1 + \theta)(1 - \phi) \log \frac{\eta \mu \gamma}{\xi \zeta \chi} + \lambda (F(K, \nu, L) - Lc_1 - Lc_2 - D - K) \]

First-order conditions are

\[ \phi c_1^{-1} = \lambda L \] \hspace{1cm} (18)
\[ \theta \phi c_2^{-1} = \lambda L \]

that is

\[ c_2 = \theta c_1 \]
\[ \lambda (F_K'(\cdot) - 1) = (1 + \theta)\chi \gamma (1 - \phi)F_K'(\cdot)/F(\cdot) \] \hspace{1cm} (19)
\[ (1 - \phi)(1 + \theta) (\gamma \chi F_K'(\cdot)/F(\cdot) + (1 - \nu)^{-1}) = \lambda F_K'(\cdot) \] \hspace{1cm} (20)
\[ \lambda = (1 + \theta)\chi \gamma (1 - \phi)D^{-1} \] \hspace{1cm} (21)

Equations (19) and (21) give:

\[ D = Y(1 - 1/F_K'(\cdot)) = Y - \alpha^{-1}K \]

Furthermore, from (18), we obtain \[ \lambda = \frac{\phi}{c_1 L} \], consequently

\[ D = \phi^{-1}(1 + \theta)\chi \gamma (1 - \phi)c_1 L \]

and consequently the market equilibrium gives

\[ Y = c_1 L(1 + \theta) [1 + \phi^{-1}\chi \gamma (1 - \phi)] + K \]

that is

\[ c_1 L = \frac{Y - K}{(1 + \theta) [1 + \phi^{-1}\chi \gamma (1 - \phi)]} \]

In the same way, the market equilibrium may be written as

\[ Y = (1 + \theta)c_1 L + K + Y - \alpha^{-1}K \]

that is

\[ (1 + \theta)c_1 L = (\alpha^{-1} - 1)K \]

Consequently

\[ \frac{Y - K}{[1 + \phi^{-1}\chi \gamma (1 - \phi)]} = (\alpha^{-1} - 1)K \]
that is

\[ Y = \alpha^{-1} \phi^{-1} [(1 - \alpha) \chi \gamma (1 - \phi) + \phi] K \tag{22} \]

Finally, equation (20) gives

\[ (1 - \phi)(1 + \theta) \left( (1 - \alpha) \gamma \chi + \frac{\nu}{1 - \nu} \right) = \frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{(\alpha - 1)} (1 - \alpha) Y / K \]

that is

\[ \frac{\nu}{1 - \nu} = \frac{\phi}{1 - \phi} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \nu = \phi \]

From (22), we can obtain the express of the steady-state physical capital in the centralized economy, denoted \( K_c \):

\[ \bar{K} = \left( \frac{A \alpha \phi}{(1 - \alpha) \chi \gamma (1 - \phi) + \phi} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} \phi L \]

and from (22)

\[ \bar{Y} = A^{1/(1-\alpha)} \left( \frac{\alpha \phi}{(1 - \alpha) \chi \gamma (1 - \phi) + \phi} \right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \phi L \]

Finally

\[ \bar{c}_1 = \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{\alpha (1 + \theta)} \right) \left( \frac{A \alpha \phi}{(1 - \alpha) \chi \gamma (1 - \phi) + \phi} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} \phi \]

and

\[ \bar{D} = \frac{(1 - \alpha) \chi \gamma (1 - \phi)}{(1 - \alpha) \chi \gamma (1 - \phi) + \phi} \bar{Y} \]

### D Subsidy to health-enhancing activities

We re-write the competitive equilibrium assuming that the government subsidizes the health-enhancing activities by agent by paying a subsidy \( \tau^\nu \) to the opportunity cost of health-enhancing activities (that is the foregone wage \( (1 - \nu_t) w_t \)) that is funded by a lump-sum tax denoted \( a_t \).

The budget-constraint for the young born at period \( t \) becomes:

\[ c_t + s_t + a_t = \nu_t w_t + \tau^\nu (1 - \nu_t) w_t \]

The maximization of lifetime utility gives \( s_t = \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} (\nu_t w_t + \tau^\nu (1 - \nu_t) w_t - a_t) \) and because government budget constraint requires \( a_t = \tau^\nu (1 - \nu_t) w_t \), we obtain

\[ s_t = \frac{\theta}{1 + \theta} \nu_t w_t \]
and the individual labor supply is given by

$$\nu_t = \frac{(1 + \theta)\phi}{\theta(1 - \phi)}(1 - \tau^\nu)h_{t+1}$$

In the steady-state equilibrium, the private health-status remains constant at:

$$h^* = H(\tau) \equiv \eta \left[ (1 - \tau^\nu)\frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{(1 - \phi)} + \xi \left( \frac{(z/\tau)^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right]^{-1}$$

$$\nu^* = V(\tau) \equiv \phi \left[ \phi + \frac{\xi(1 - \phi)\theta}{(1 - \tau^\nu)(1 + \theta)} \left( \frac{(z/\tau)^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \right]^{-1}$$

The higher the subsidy to health-enhancing activities, the higher the health-status in the steady-state and the lower the individual supply of labor $\nu^*$.

The subsidy to health-enhancing activities that enables to replicate the optimal allocation of time between health-enhancing activities and production (denoted $\bar{\tau}^\nu$) is such that $\nu^* = \phi$, that is

$$\bar{\tau}^\nu = 1 - \frac{\xi\theta}{(1 + \theta)} \left( \frac{z^\chi}{\mu} \right)^\gamma \left( \frac{(1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \phi)}{(1 - \alpha)\chi\gamma(1 - \phi) + \phi} \right)^{-\gamma\chi}$$

### E The competitive equilibrium with leisure

Until here, we investigate the competition for resources assuming that the time unit at the disposal of the agent is divided between two different “occupational” activities: production which enables to earn an income and investment in health care which enables the agent to stay in good health.

In this section, we consider that each agent also values leisure-time and that he may adjust his leisure-time according to the level of his health-status: the healthier is the agent, the greater is the utility of one minute of leisure.

To do so, we continue to denote $\nu \in [0, 1]$, the part time the agent chooses in output production and we denote $u \in [0, 1]$ the part time spent as investment in health status. Consequently $1 - u - \nu \in [0, 1]$ represents the part-time.

To keep things simple, preferences are written as follows

$$\log \left( c_{1t}^{\phi}h_t^{1-\phi}(1 - u_t - \nu_t)^{\phi_1} \right) + \theta \log \left( c_{2t+1}^{\phi}h_{t+1}^{1-\phi} \right)$$

with $\phi_1 > 0$ captures the weight of leisure in utility.

The law of motion of the private health-status (equation 1) is modified as follows

$$h_{t+1} - h_t = \eta u_t - \xi S_t^\gamma h_t$$

and in the competitive equilibrium, the program of the agent is

$$\max_{\{c_{1t}, c_{2t+1}, \nu_t, u_t\}} \log \left( c_{1t}^{\phi}h_t^{1-\phi}(1 - u_t - \nu_t)^{\phi_1} \right) + \theta \log \left( c_{2t+1}^{\phi}h_{t+1}^{1-\phi} \right)$$

subject to

$$\begin{cases} c_{1t} + s_t = \nu_t w_t \\ c_{2t+1} = (1 + r_{t+1})s_t \\ h_{t+1} = \eta u_t + (1 - \xi S_t^\gamma) h_t \end{cases}$$
The expression of savings $s_t$ is the same than equation (3) and the part-time into output production $\nu_t$ is still given by equation (4). But now, the part-time in health care expenditures:

$$u_t = 1 - \frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1} - \frac{\phi_1}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1} = 1 - \frac{\phi(1 + \theta) + \phi_1}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1}$$

and the part-time to leisure is

$$1 - u_t - \nu_t = \frac{\phi_1}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1}$$

The competitive equilibrium may be summarized by the following relations:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \alpha)\left(\frac{\theta}{1 + \theta}\right)(1 - \tau)AK_t^\alpha(\nu_t L)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$\nu_t = \frac{\phi(1 + \theta)}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1}$$

$$h_{t+1} = \eta u_t + (1 - \xi S_t^\gamma)h_t$$

$$u_t = 1 - \frac{\phi(1 + \theta) + \phi_1}{\eta(1 - \phi)\theta}h_{t+1}$$

$$S_{t+1} = \left(\frac{z}{\tau}\right)^{\chi} + (1 - \mu)S_t$$

In the steady-state, $\nu$, $u$, $h$, $S$, $K$, $Y$ remain constant. Consequently, the stock of pollution in the steady-state $S^*$ is always given by (9), and the private health-status is

$$h^* = \eta \left[ B' + \xi \left(\frac{z^\gamma}{\mu}\right)^{1-\gamma} \right]^{-1}$$

with $B' \equiv \frac{\phi(1 + \theta) + \phi_1}{(1 - \phi)\theta}$. When leisure is taken into account, the health care expenditures is lowered and the steady-state health status too, but the influence of the environmental tax is not modified.

The part-time into the output production is:

$$\nu^* = B \left[ B' + \xi \left(\frac{z^\gamma}{\mu}\right)^{1-\gamma} \right]^{-1}$$

Finally, we obtain

$$Y^* = A_1' (1 - \tau)^{\alpha\alpha} \left( B + \xi \left(\frac{z^\gamma}{\mu}\right)^{1-\gamma} \right)^{-(1+\epsilon)}$$

with $A_1' \equiv B' \left(\frac{1 + \theta}{\theta(1 - \alpha)}\right)$. $A$.

Because $A_1' < A_1$, the steady-state level of output is lower when leisure is taken into account, but the effect of the environmental taxation in the steady-state level of output and the expression of $\tau$, the environmental taxation under which a higher tax promotes economic activities, are not modified.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SD 2.2009</td>
<td>Abay Mulatu, Reyer Gerlagh, Dan Rigby and Ada Wossink: Environmental Regulation and Industry Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 3.2009</td>
<td>Anna Alberini, Stefania Toini and Margherita Turvani: Rates of Time Preferences for Saving Lives in the Hazardous Waste Site Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 4.2009</td>
<td>Elena Ojea, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Maria Loureiro: Mapping of Forest Biodiversity Values: A Plural Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 5.2009</td>
<td>Xavier Pautrel: Macroeconomic Implications of Demography for the Environment: A Life-Cycle Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 6.2009</td>
<td>Andrew Ellis, Marco Pagano and Fausto Panunzi: Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 7.2009</td>
<td>Luigi Zingales: The Future of Securities Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 10.2009</td>
<td>Aude Pommeret and Fabien Prieur: Double Irreversibility and Environmental Policy Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 11.2009</td>
<td>Massimiliano Mazzanti and Anna Montini: Regional and Sector Environmental Efficiency Empirical Evidence from Structural Shift-share Analysis of NAMEA data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 13.2009</td>
<td>Andrea Bigano, Mariaastra Cassinelli, Fabio Sfera, Lisa Guerrera, Sobhe Karbuz, Manfred Hafner, Anil Markandya and Stale Navrud: The External Cost of European Crude Oil Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 14.2009</td>
<td>Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval, Alessandra Spobbi and Massimo Tavoni: The Role of R&amp;D and Technology Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives Using the Witch Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 15.2009</td>
<td>Andrea Beltratti, Marianna Caccavoio and Bernardo Bortolotti: Stock Prices in a Speculative Market: The Chinese Split-Share Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC 16.2009</td>
<td>Angelo Antoci, Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini: The Fragility of Social Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 19.2009</td>
<td>Irene Valsecchi: Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 20.2009</td>
<td>Dimitra Vouvakis and Anastasios Xeapapadeas: Total Factor Productivity Growth when Factors of Production Generate Environmental Externalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 22.2009</td>
<td>Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Fotak, William Megginson and William Miracky: Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns and Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 23.2009</td>
<td>Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 24.2009</td>
<td>Andrea Bastianin: Modelling Asymmetric Dependence Using Copula Functions: An application to Value-at-Risk in the Energy Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 25.2009</td>
<td>Frank Partnoy: Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM 27.2009</td>
<td>Frank Partnoy: Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 28.2009</td>
<td>Frank H. Page Jr and Myrna H. Wooders (lxxxv): Endogenous Network Dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 29.2009</td>
<td>Caterina Calsamiglia, Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn (lxxxv): Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 30.2009</td>
<td>Gilles Grandjean, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch (lxxxv): Connections Among Farsighted Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 31.2009</td>
<td>Antonio Nicoló and Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez (lxxxv): Feasibility Constraints and Protective Behavior in Efficient Kidney Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 32.2009</td>
<td>Rahmi İlkılıç (lxxxv): Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 33.2009</td>
<td>Luca Dall’Asta, Paolo Pin and Abolfazl Ramezanpour (lxxxv): Optimal Equilibria of the Best Shot Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 34.2009</td>
<td>Edoardo Gallo (lxxxv): Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 35.2009</td>
<td>Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson (lxxxv): How Homophily Affects Learning and Diffusion in Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 36.2009</td>
<td>Markus Knititteder (lxxxv): Team Formation in a Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 37.2009</td>
<td>Constanza Fosco and Friederike Mengel (lxxxv): Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD 38.2009</td>
<td>Berno Buechel and Tim Hellmann (lxxxv): Under-connected and Over-connected Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>80.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>81.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>82.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>83.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>84.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>85.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>86.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>87.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>88.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>89.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>90.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>91.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>92.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>93.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>94.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>95.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>96.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>99.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>100.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>101.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>102.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>103.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>105.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>106.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>107.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>109.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>110.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>111.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM</td>
<td>112.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>113.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>114.2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>115.2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(boo) This paper has been presented at the 14th Coalition Theory Network Workshop held in Maastricht, The Netherlands, on 23-24 January 2009 and organised by the Maastricht University CTN group (Department of Economics, http://www.feem-web.it/ctn/12d_maa.php).