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Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock  
Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement  
Costs and Asymmetric Information

Larry Karp \*

Jiangfeng Zhang †

\*University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation

†Asian Development Bank

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# Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information

## **Abstract**

Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.

# Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information

Larry Karp\* and Jiangfeng Zhang<sup>†</sup>

July 21, 2008

## Abstract

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JEL Classification numbers: C61; D8; H21; Q28.

Key Words: Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments.

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\*Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, karp@are.berkeley.edu

<sup>†</sup>Asian Development Bank, jzhang@adb.org The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asian Development Bank.

# 1 Introduction

The danger that greenhouse gas (GHG) stocks cause environmental damage has led to a renewed interest in the problem of controlling emissions when there is asymmetric information about abatement costs. Although hybrid policies, e.g. cap and trade with a price ceiling, are more efficient than either the tax or quantity restriction, the comparison of taxes and quotas remains an important policy question. Since GHGs are a stock pollutant, the *regulator's* problem is dynamic. Most of the current literature on this dynamic problem assumes that nonstrategic *firms* solve a succession of static problems. If, however, a firm's abatement costs depend on its stock of abatement capital, the firm makes a dynamic investment decision as well as the static emissions decision. We study the regulatory problem with asymmetric information when firms invest in abatement capital. Nonstrategic firms and the regulator solve coupled dynamic problems.

For a variety of pollution problems, capital costs comprise a large part of total abatement costs (Vogan 1991) and investment in abatement capital depends on the regulatory environment. In these cases, the endogeneity of investment is an important aspect of the regulatory problem. Several recent papers, (Buonanno, Carraro, and Galeotti 2001), (Goulder and Schneider 1999), (Goulder and Mathai 2000), (Norhaus 1999), assume that the regulator can choose emissions and also induce firms to provide the first-best level of investment, e.g. by means of an investment tax/subsidy.

We consider the situation where the regulator has a single policy instrument, either a sequence of emissions taxes or a sequence of quotas. This assumption is consistent with many regulations and proposals that involve an emissions policy but ignore endogenous investment (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol). In virtually any real-world problem, the regulator is likely to have fewer instruments than targets. Our model is an example of this general disparity between the number of instruments and targets, and therefore is empirically relevant. We identify a previously unrecognized difference between taxes and quantity restrictions, and we provide a simple means of solving the regulatory problem when a certain condition holds.<sup>1</sup> We now describe

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<sup>1</sup>Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2003) and Requate (2005) survey the literature on pollution control and endogenous investment. Many papers in this literature, including Biglaiser, Horowitz, and Quiggin (1995), Gersbach and Glazer (1999), Kennedy and Laplante (1999), Montero (2002), Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003), Moledina, Polasky, Coggins, and Costello (2003), Tarui and Polasky (2005) and Tarui and Polasky (2006) assume that firms behave strategically with respect to the regulator: firms believe that their investment decisions will affect future regulation. Several papers, including Malueg (1989), Milliman and Prince (1989), Requate (1998), Requate and Unold (2003) and Karp (2008) treat firms as non-strategic. Papers that discuss time-inconsistency arising because of the disparity between the number of targets and the number of instruments include Abrego and Perroni (2002) and Marsiliani and Renstrom (2002)

the problem in more detail.

In each period the representative firm observes an abatement cost shock that is private information. If this cost shock is serially correlated, the regulator learns something about its current value by observing past behavior. The firm knows the current value of the cost shock and therefore is better informed than the regulator. Both the regulator and firms obtain information over time. We assume that the regulator conditions the current emissions policy only on payoff-relevant information: (i) aggregate stock of abatement capital (which affects the industry-wide marginal abatement costs), (ii) the stock of pollution (which determines marginal damages) and (iii) the regulator's beliefs about the current cost shock (which also affects the industry's marginal abatement costs). The regulator cannot make binding commitments regarding future policies; that is, we restrict policies to be Markov Perfect. Firms have rational expectations; they take the current emissions policy as given and they understand how the regulator chooses future policies. The non-atomic representative firm is not able to affect the economy-wide variables that determine future policies. The representative firm therefore behaves non-strategically, but not myopically, and also uses Markov policies. In this representative firm model, all firms are identical in equilibrium, so their ability to trade emissions permits (under the quota) is unimportant; therefore, in our setting the quota is equivalent to a cap and trade policy. (In a later footnote we briefly discuss the case where firms are heterogeneous in equilibrium, so that emissions trading is important under quotas.)

The regulator understands that future emissions policies affect the current shadow value of abatement capital and thus affect current investment. For example, firms' anticipation that future emissions policies will be strict would increase the shadow value of abatement capital, thereby increasing the current level of investment. Therefore, the regulator might want to commit to future policies as a means of affecting current investment in abatement capital. This incentive is the source of the familiar time-consistency problem. Our setting has the usual ingredients that lead to this problem: the regulator with a second-best instrument (the emissions tax or quota) wants to influence forward-looking agents.

If the private level of investment under the equilibrium emissions policy is socially optimal, then the regulator has no desire to influence investment and no incentive to change a previously announced emissions policy. In that case, there is no time-consistency problem and we can obtain the equilibrium by solving an optimization problem that contains elements of the regulator's and the firms' problems. If, however, the regulator's emissions policy creates a secondary distortion at the investment stage, the time-consistency problem does arise. In that case, the Markov restriction is binding and we need to solve an equilibrium problem (a dynamic game between the regulator and non-strategic firms) rather than a relatively simple dynamic optimization problem. In other words, the type of problem that we need to solve – an equilibrium

problem or an optimization problem – depends on whether the Markov Perfect emissions policy (the tax or quota) causes a secondary distortion in investment.

There is another way of thinking about the time consistency problem. The only market failure is that firms do not take into account the social damages arising from emissions. If there were no cost shock, or if the regulator and firms had symmetric information, either the emissions tax or the quota would be sufficient to induce firms to emit at the optimal level. In that case, firms' investment decisions would be first best. Therefore, if in addition to the emissions policy the regulator were able to use an investment tax, the optimal level of that tax would be identically zero. However, when there is asymmetric information about abatement costs, there is no assurance that either the emissions tax or the quota leads to the first best level of emissions. Therefore, with asymmetric information, the equilibrium level of investment under the emissions policy might not be (information-constrained) socially optimal. In that case, the optimal level of an investment tax would be non-zero.

We can ask our basic question in two equivalent ways. 1. Is the optimal emissions tax or quota policy time consistent? 2. Would a regulator who uses either the emissions tax or the quota increase welfare by additionally using an investment tax/subsidy? (In other words: Is the optimal investment tax/subsidy identically 0?)

We provide a simple answer to these questions. The optimal quota policy is time consistent; equivalently, when the regulator can use both an emissions quota and an investment tax, the latter is identically 0. However, the optimal emissions tax policy is time inconsistent, unless a particular “separability condition” holds; if this condition does not hold, the optimal investment tax, when used with the emissions tax, is not identically 0.

This result is useful for two reasons. First, under plausible circumstances the separability condition does not hold. In these cases, an emissions tax creates a secondary investment distortion, whereas the emissions quota does not. Thus, we have identified a difference between taxes and quotas that has previously been unnoticed. Second, when the separability condition *does* hold, we can solve the dynamic game by solving a much simpler dynamic optimization problem that combines elements of the regulator's and the firms' optimization problems. The separability condition holds for an important special case (the linear-quadratic model) that has been used to study the problem of regulating both a flow and a stock pollutant under asymmetric information. We generalize this special case by including endogenous abatement capital, and discuss numerical results of a model of climate change.

The next section discusses a static problem that provides the intuition for the separability condition. Subsequent sections describe the dynamic model and show the role of the separability condition. When then discuss the linear-quadratic specialization, and explain how endogenous investment affects the comparison of taxes and quotas in that setting. In closing

the paper, we discuss other aspects of the tax versus quantity debate, as it applies to climate change policy.

## 2 The one-period example

This section uses a one-period model that demonstrates, in a simple setting, the difference between taxes and quotas when abatement costs are endogenous. We show that the emissions quota is always time consistent, and we obtain the separability condition that is necessary and sufficient for the emissions tax to be time consistent.

The non-strategic but forward looking representative firm's cost of investment is  $c(k)$  and the firm obtains benefits  $B(x, k, \theta)$  by emitting  $x$  units of emissions when its stock of abatement capital is  $k$  and the cost shock is  $\theta$ . We can think of the function  $B(\cdot)$  as a restricted profit function in which input and output prices are suppressed. Alternatively, we can interpret  $B(\cdot)$  as the amount of avoided abatement costs. For the latter interpretation, define  $x^b$  as the Business-as-Usual (BAU) level of emissions, i.e. the level of emissions under the status quo. Define  $a = x^b - x$  as the level of abatement, i.e. the reduction in emissions due to a new regulatory policy. The abatement costs associated with the new regulations are  $A = A(k, \theta, a)$ . If  $x^b$  is a function of  $(k, \theta)$ , we can rewrite the abatement cost function as  $A(k, \theta, a) = B(x, k, \theta)$ , with  $A_a(\cdot) = B_x(\cdot)$ : marginal abatement costs equal the marginal benefit of emissions.

The benefit function is increasing and concave in  $x$  and  $k$  and increasing in  $\theta$  ( $B_k > 0$ ,  $B_\theta > 0$ ,  $B_x > 0$ ,  $B_{kk} < 0$ ,  $B_{xx} < 0$ ). More abatement capital decreases the marginal cost of abatement and therefore lowers the marginal benefit of pollution, so  $B_{xk} < 0$ . A higher cost shock increases the marginal benefits of abatement capital and emissions:  $B_{k\theta} \geq 0$ ,  $B_{x\theta} \geq 0$ .

The damage from emissions (external to the firm) is  $D(x)$ . The regulator chooses either a tax  $p$  or an emissions quota  $\bar{x}$ . Throughout this paper, we assume that the emissions quota is binding for all realizations of  $\theta$ . Both the regulator and the firm have the same information about the distribution of  $\theta$  before the firm observes its value.

Each firm has measure 0, and by choice of units the mass of firms has measure 1. With this normalization, in a symmetric equilibrium  $k$  and  $x$  represent the industry-wide capital stock and aggregate emissions, as well as the firm level values. The non-strategic firm chooses its (possibly constrained) level of  $k$  and  $x$  but takes the industry-wide levels as exogenous. In this section it is clear from the context whether we mean firm or aggregate level variables, but in a later section we modify the notation to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding.

We consider the following two time-lines:

### Time Line A

1. The regulator chooses the policy level ( $p$  or  $\bar{x}$ ).
2. The firm chooses investment ( $k$ )
3. Nature reveals the cost shock ( $\theta$ )
4. The firm makes its emissions decision ( $x$ )

### Time Line B

1. The firm chooses investment ( $k$ )
2. The regulator chooses the policy level ( $p$  or  $\bar{x}$ ).
3. Nature reveals the cost shock ( $\theta$ ).
4. The firm makes its emissions decision ( $x$ ).

With Time Line A, the emissions policy can influence both the levels of investment and emissions. With Time Line B the emissions policy depends on the level of investment, and influences only the emissions level. In the one-period game, neither of the two time lines has a greater claim to plausibility, but the comparison of the two helps to understand the time consistency problem in the dynamic setting.

If the optimal policy for the regulator is the same under both time lines, then it is obvious that the regulator uses that policy only to affect the emissions decision, not to influence the investment decision. In this case, the emissions policy does not create a secondary distortion in the investment decision; if we were to add a “stage 2.5” to Time Line A, at which the regulator were permitted to revise the policy announced in stage 1, the regulator would not want to make a revision when policies are time-consistent.

We show that the emissions quota is always time consistent, but the emissions tax is time consistent if and only if a particular separability condition holds. Equivalently, if we were to add a “stage 0” to either time line, at which the regulator announces an investment tax, the optimal investment tax is always 0 when the regulator uses an emissions quota, but it is 0 when the regulator uses an emissions tax if and only if the separability condition holds. To establish this claim, we examine the four games, under the two time lines, for the emissions tax and the quota.

**Emissions Taxes** Consider Time Line A when the regulator uses a tax. The representative firm’s payoff in stage 2 is

$$E [B(x, k, \theta) - px - c(k)],$$

where the expectation is with respect to  $\theta$ . The firm chooses  $x$  in the last stage, conditional on  $k$  and  $\theta$ . It chooses  $k$  before it learns  $\theta$ . The first order conditions for  $x$  and  $k$  and the corresponding decision rules (denoted using  $*$ ) in stages 4 and 2 are

$$B_x(x, k, \theta) - p = 0 \Rightarrow x = x^*(k, p, \theta). \quad (1)$$

$$E [B_k(x^*, k, \theta) - c'(k)] = 0 \Rightarrow k = k^*(p). \quad (2)$$

Differentiating the first order condition (1) gives the comparative statics result

$$\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial p} = \frac{-1}{B_{xx}(x, k, \theta)} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k} = \frac{-B_{xk}(x, k, \theta)}{B_{xx}(x, k, \theta)}. \quad (3)$$

The regulator's problem under Time Line A is

$$\max_p E [B(x^*, k^*, \theta) - c(k^*) - D(x^*)],$$

leading to the first order condition

$$E \left\{ [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial p} + \left[ [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k} + B_k(*, \theta) - c'(k^*) \right] \frac{dk^*}{dp} \right\} = 0, \quad (4)$$

(using the notation  $* = (x^*, k^*)$ ).

With Time Line B the representative firm's investment decision depends on its point expectation of the emissions tax. This tax depends on the industry-wide level of abatement capital, which the non-strategic firm takes as given. Therefore, the assumption that the non-strategic representative firm has rational expectations regarding the policy implies that equations (1) and (2) are also the firm's first order conditions under Time Line B. Consequently, the functions  $x^*(k, p, \theta)$ , and  $k^*(p)$  are the same under the two time lines, although of course the values of  $p$  in the two scenarios (and therefore the equilibrium values of  $k$  and  $x$ ) might differ. Under Time line B the regulator takes  $k$  as given, so its first order condition for the tax reduces to

$$E \left\{ [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial p} \right\} = 0. \quad (5)$$

Denote the optimal tax under Time line B as  $\hat{p}$ . We assume that the regulator's problem is concave under both time lines, so that the solution to the respective first order condition is unique. Comparison of equations (4) and (5) shows that the optimal emission tax is the same under the two time lines if and only if

$$E \left\{ \left[ [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k} + B_k(*, \theta) - c'(k^*) \right] \frac{dk^*}{dp} \right\}_{|p=\hat{p}} = 0. \quad (6)$$

Since  $k^*(p)$  is not a function of  $\theta$ ,  $\frac{dk^*}{dp}$  is also independent of  $\theta$ ; moreover  $\frac{dk^*}{dp} \neq 0$ , as can be seen by differentiating equation (2) and using equation (3). Therefore, equation (6) is equivalent to

$$E \left\{ [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k} + B_k(*, \theta) - c'(k^*) \right\}_{|p=\hat{p}} = 0. \quad (7)$$

We refer to the following as the "separability condition" since (using equation (3)) it requires that  $\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} B_{xx} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} B_{xk} = 0$  when evaluated at the optimal level of emissions:

**Condition 1** (*Separability*)  $B_{xx}$  and  $B_{xk}$ , evaluated at the optimal  $x^*$ , are both independent of  $\theta$ .

**Remark 1** Equation (7) holds for all functions  $B(x, k, \theta)$  if and only if the separability condition holds.

**Proof.** In order to establish the sufficiency of Condition 1, note that it implies (using equation (3)) that both  $\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial p}$  and  $\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k}$  are independent of  $\theta$ . This independence, together with equation (5) and the fact that  $\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial p} \neq 0$  imply that  $\hat{p}$  (the optimal tax under Time line B) satisfies

$$E [B_x(x^*(k^*, p, \theta), k^*, \theta) - D'(x^*(k^*, p, \theta))] = 0, \quad (8)$$

i.e. the tax equates expected marginal benefits of emissions with marginal damages (under Condition 1). Evaluating the left side of equation (7) at  $\hat{p}$  and using equations (8) and (2) we obtain

$$E \left\{ [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k} + B_k(*, \theta) - c'(k^*) \right\}_{|p=\hat{p}} =$$

$$\left\{ \frac{\partial x^*}{\partial k} E [B_x(*, \theta) - D'(x^*)] + E [B_k(*, \theta) - c'(k^*)] \right\}_{|p=\hat{p}} = E \{ B_k(*, \theta) - c'(k^*) \}_{|p=\hat{p}} = 0.$$

Thus, Condition 1 is sufficient for equation (7) to hold. If either  $B_{xx}$  or  $B_{xk}$  are not independent of  $\theta$ , it is straightforward to construct examples under which the regulator's first order conditions for  $p$  differ under the two time lines. ■

It is also easy to show:

**Remark 2** *Suppose that the regulator uses an emissions tax. If we modify either time lines by adding a stage 0 at which the regulator is able to choose an investment tax/subsidy, the optimal level of this policy is identically 0 for all functions  $B(x, k, \theta)$  if and only if the separability condition holds.*

We omit the proof, which parallels the proof of Remark 1.

In summary, we see that Condition 1 is necessary and sufficient for the optimal emissions tax to be time consistent, when the regulator chooses the tax before investment. If this condition does not hold, the regulator would like to announce an emissions tax with a view to influencing investment as well as emission; but once the firm has made the investment decision, the regulator would then like to revise the tax, in order focus on only the emissions target. Section 5.3.2 discusses the economic logic behind Condition 1.

**Emissions quotas** If the regulator uses quotas (that by assumption are binding for all  $\theta$ ) the firm's emissions decision equals  $\bar{x}$ , and  $\frac{\partial x^*}{\partial \bar{x}} = 1$ . The firm's first order condition for the choice of  $k$  (for both of the two time lines) is

$$E [B_k(\bar{x}, k, \theta) - c'(k)] = 0 \Rightarrow k = k^*(\bar{x}). \quad (9)$$

Under Time line A, the regulator's first order condition for  $\bar{x}$  is

$$\begin{aligned} E \left\{ [B_x(\bar{x}, k^*, \theta) - D'(\bar{x})] + [B_k(\bar{x}, k^*, \theta) - c'(k^*)] \frac{dk^*}{d\bar{x}} \right\} \\ = E \{ [B_x(\bar{x}, k^*, \theta) - D'(\bar{x})] \} = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

where the first equality uses equation (9), the fact that  $k^*$  is independent of  $\theta$ , and  $\frac{dk^*}{d\bar{x}} \neq 0$ . The first order condition under Time line B is identical to the second equality in equation (10). Thus, when non-strategic firms have rational expectations, the optimal quota is the same under the two time lines. The regulator uses the quota to target only emissions, and the firm's investment decision is information-constrained socially optimal. There is no social value in using an investment tax when the regulator uses an emissions quota.

### 3 Basics of the dynamic model

The stock of pollution at the beginning of period  $t$  is  $S_{t-1}$  and the flow of emissions in period  $t$  is  $x_t$ . The fraction  $0 \leq \Delta \leq 1$  of the pollution stock lasts into the next period, so the growth equation for  $S_t$  is:

$$S_t = \Delta S_{t-1} + x_t. \quad (11)$$

The period  $t$  stock-related environmental damage equals  $D_t = D(S_{t-1})$ , with  $D' > 0$ ,  $D'' > 0$ .

At time  $t$  the representative firm's level of abatement capital is  $K_{t-1}$  and its cost shock is  $\theta_t$ ; when it emits at  $x_t$  its benefit is  $B_t = B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t)$ . At time  $t$  only the firm knows the value of the random cost shock  $\theta_t$ ; there is persistent asymmetric information. All agents know the stochastic process for the cost shock, which we assume is  $AR(1)$ :

$$\theta_t = \rho\theta_{t-1} + \mu_t, \quad \mu_t \sim iid(0, \sigma_\mu^2), \quad \forall t \geq 1, \quad (12)$$

with  $-1 < \rho < 1$ .<sup>2</sup> The sequence  $\{\mu_t\}$  ( $t \geq 1$ ) is generated by an i.i.d. random process with zero mean and common variance  $\sigma_\mu^2$ . At time 0 the regulator knows  $\theta_{-1}$ , so the subjective expectation and variance of  $\theta_0$  is  $(\rho\theta_{-1}, \sigma_\mu^2)$ . This assumption about the regulator's initial priors makes the problem stationary; it has no bearing on our results, but merely simplifies the notation. At time  $t \geq 1$  the regulator's variance for the current shock is  $\sigma_\mu^2$  provided that he has learned the value of the previous shock,  $\theta_{t-1}$ .

The representative firm invests in abatement capital to reduce future abatement costs, i.e. to increase future benefits from pollution. The flow of investment in period  $t$  is  $I_t$ . The fraction of abatement capital that lasts into the next period is  $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$ , so the growth equation for  $K_t$  is:

$$K_t = \delta K_{t-1} + I_t. \quad (13)$$

The cost of investment,  $C_t = C(I_t, K_{t-1})$ , is increasing and convex in  $I_t$ . This convexity means that abatement capital does not adjust instantaneously. A greater degree of convexity implies that capital adjusts more slowly.

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<sup>2</sup>Throughout the paper we refer to  $\theta$  as a "cost shock", as an abbreviation for "random cost parameter". In most economically meaningful circumstances, this parameter is positively serially correlated:  $\rho > 0$ .

The endogeneity of the investment decision means that the marginal abatement cost function,  $B_x(\cdot)$ , changes endogenously. Slower adjustment of abatement capital means that it is optimal to adjust emissions more slowly.

## 4 The Game

In this section it is helpful to distinguish between the representative firm's level of capital and the aggregate level of capital. We denote the former by  $k$  and the latter by  $k^A$ . Where there is no danger of confusion, we denote both using  $K$ . Since we normalize the number of representative firms to 1,  $k^A = k = K$  in a symmetric equilibrium. The representative firm understands that it controls  $k$ , and that this variable affects its payoff directly, via the function  $B(\cdot)$ . This firm takes the aggregate level of capital  $k^A$  as exogenous;  $k^A$  has no direct effect on the firm's payoff. However, in a Markov Perfect equilibrium, where the regulator conditions policies on payoff-relevant information,  $k^A$  affects the firm's beliefs about future policies.

In order to avoid a proliferation of notation, we do not distinguish between the firm's level of emissions and the aggregate level of emissions. However, it is important to bear in mind that the firm treats aggregate emissions, and therefore the aggregate pollution stock, as exogenous.

The regulator always uses taxes or always uses quotas. The period  $t$  policy is the tax  $p_t$  or the quota  $x_t$ . At time  $t$  the regulator knows the aggregate capital stock  $k_{t-1}^A$ , the pollution stock  $S_{t-1}$  and (as we explain below), the lagged cost shock  $\theta_{t-1}$ . These are the payoff-relevant variables for the regulator. In a Markov Perfect rational expectations equilibrium, the representative firm takes the current level of the regulatory policy (at time  $t$ ) as given; it understands that the policy at time  $\tau > t$  will be a function of  $(k_{\tau-1}^A, S_{\tau-1}, \theta_{\tau-1})$ . Since the firm takes these conditioning variables to be exogenous, it treats future policies as exogenous. This firm chooses investment  $I_t$  under both policies, and it chooses the level of emissions if the regulator uses a tax.

In view of the timing conventions in the model, the regulator's current (tax or quota) policy influences the firm's current emission, but not the current level of investment. Investment depends on the firm's beliefs about *future* policies (as was the case with Time Line B in Section 2).

### 4.1 The Firm's Emission and Investment Responses

The firm wants to maximize the expectation of the present value of the stream of cost saving from polluting ( $B$ ) minus investment cost ( $C$ ) minus pollution tax payments (under taxes). The constant discount factor is  $\beta$ , and we use the superscripts  $T$  and  $Q$  to distinguish functions and

variables under taxes and quotas.

**Taxes.** The firm's value function under taxes,  $V^T(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A)$ , solves the dynamic programming equation (DPE)

$$V^T(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A) = \max_{x_t, I_t} \{B(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - p_t x_t - C(I_t, k_{t-1}) + \beta E_t [V^T(k_t, \theta_{t+1}, p_{t+1}; S_t, k_t^A)]\},$$

subject to the equation of motion for the cost shock (12), the capital stock (13), and the pollution stock (11). The firm's expectation at  $t$  of  $\theta_{t+1}$  and  $p_{t+1}$  is conditioned on the payoff-relevant variables  $(k_{t-1}^A, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ .

The optimal level of emissions solves a static problem with the following first-order condition

$$B_x(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - p_t = 0. \quad (14)$$

Solving for  $x$ , we obtain the optimal emission response

$$x_t^* = \chi(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t) \equiv \chi_t. \quad (15)$$

The optimal level of investment equates the marginal cost of investment and the discounted shadow value of abatement capital. Setting  $k^A = k = K$ , the stochastic Euler equation is<sup>3</sup>

$$\beta E_t \{B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, \chi_{t+1}) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t)\} - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0. \quad (16)$$

This second-order difference equation has two boundary conditions, the current abatement capital  $K_{t-1}$ , and the transversality condition

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_t \{\beta^{T-t} C_I(I_T, K_{T-1}) K_T\} = 0. \quad (17)$$

**Quotas.** Firms are homogeneous and quotas are not bankable. Thus, under a quota policy, there is no incentive to trade permits.<sup>4</sup> The firm solves the DPE

$$V^Q(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A) = \max_{I_t} \{B(k_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - C(I_t, k_{t-1}) + \beta E_t V^Q(k_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}; S_t, k_t^A)\}.$$

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<sup>3</sup>For all of the control problems, we merely write the Euler equation since the derivations are standard. The first order condition of the DPE with respect to  $I_t$  provides one equation. In this first order condition, the firm's expectation of  $p_{t+1}$  is independent of its investment. This independence reflects the fact that the firm is unable to affect aggregate capital or pollution stock, and therefore cannot affect values of the variables that affect future regulation. We differentiate the DPE with respect to  $k_{t-1}$ , using the envelope theorem, to obtain a second equation. Combining these two equations gives the stochastic Euler equation.

<sup>4</sup>In a model without abatement capital, Karp and Zhang (2005) show how trade in permits amongst heterogeneous firms enables the regulator to learn the value of the cost shock. Without trade in permits (and in the absence of investment decisions), the regulator does not know the previous cost shock when choosing the current quota; in this case, taxes have an informational advantage, relative to quotas. As we point out in the text, when the firm invests in abatement capital, the regulator does not need tradeable quotas in order to learn the cost shock.

Again, the firm's beliefs about the quota in the next period depend on  $(k_{t-1}^A, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ .

The optimal level of investment solves the stochastic Euler equation

$$\beta E_t \{B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t)\} - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0, \quad (18)$$

and the transversality condition (17).

**The investment rule** Under both taxes and quotas, the current level of investment depends on the firm's beliefs about future policy levels, but it does not depend on the current policy level. The firm has rational expectations about future policies; we discuss this policy rule in the next section. Under either taxes or quotas, the representative firm's equilibrium investment rule at time  $t$  is a function of  $(k_{t-1}, \theta_t; S_{t-1}, k_{t-1}^A)$ . When there is no danger of confusion, we write the investment rule as  $I^j(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ ,  $j = T, Q$  (for tax or quota).

## 4.2 The Regulator's Problem

The regulator's payoff equals the payoff to the representative firm net of taxes, minus environmental damages. The regulator maximizes the expectation of the present discounted value of the flow of the payoff, i.e. the expectation of

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - C(I_t, K_{t-1}) - D(S_{t-1})).$$

His policy (always a tax or always a quota) can be a function of (only) payoff-relevant variables: the current stocks of pollution and capital, and the regulator's current information about the cost shock. Under taxes the regulator knows that equation (15) determines emissions. Under either policy, he knows that investment is given by  $I^j(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ ,  $j = T, Q$ .

The regulator takes as given the investment rule and (under taxes) the emissions rule. At time  $t$  the regulator observes the aggregate stocks  $S_{t-1}, K_{t-1}$ . If  $\rho = 0$ , the regulator learns nothing about the current cost shock by observing firms' past behavior. The past cost shock provides information about the current shock if and only if  $\rho \neq 0$ . Under taxes, the regulator learns the previous cost by observing the response to the previous tax (via equation (15)). Provided that  $B_{K\theta} \neq 0$  the regulator who uses quotas can learn the previous cost shock by observing the level of investment in the previous period, i.e. by inverting the investment function  $I^Q(\cdot)$ . From equation (18),  $B_{K\theta} \neq 0$  means that current investment depends on the firm's beliefs about future cost shocks. When  $\rho \neq 0$  these beliefs – and therefore current investment – depend on the current cost shock.

If  $B_{K\theta} \neq 0$ , as we hereafter assume, taxes and quotas give the regulator the same information about the previous cost shock, and thus about the current cost shock. Neither policy has an informational advantage. Of course, using observed emissions (under taxes) to infer

the past cost variable requires only that the regulator solve the first order condition of a static problem. Using observed investment (under quotas) to infer the past cost variable requires that the regulator knows the function  $I^Q(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ ; that requires the solution of the entire equilibrium. Thus, although both policies have the same informational content (unless  $\rho \neq 0$  and  $B_{K\theta} = 0$ ), this information is easier to extract under taxes.

The regulator's decision rule is a function  $z^j(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$ ,  $j = T, Q$  that determines the current tax ( $j = T$ ) or quota ( $j = Q$ ) as a function of his current information, given his beliefs about the firm's decision rules.

### 4.3 The Equilibrium

Both the regulator and the representative firm solve stochastic control problems; the exact problem that one agent solves depends on the solution to the other agent's problem. The rational expectations equilibrium investment rule for the firm depends on the regulator's policy rule, and that policy rule depends on the equilibrium investment rule. The investment and the regulatory decision rules generate a random sequence of pollution and capital stocks. Agents have rational expectations about these random variables.

An equilibrium consists of a (possibly non-unique) pair of decision rules  $I^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$  and  $z^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$  for  $j = T, Q$  that are mutually consistent; the superscript "\*" indicates equilibrium functions. Hereafter we refer to  $I^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ , and  $z^{j*}(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$  as Markov Perfect policy rules.

Modern computational methods make it possible to (approximately) solve these kinds of dynamic equilibrium problems, i.e. to find a fixed point in function space (Judd 1998), (Marcet and Marimon 1998), (Miranda and Fackler 2002). These fixed point problems are not trivial, especially when the state space has more than one dimension – it has three in our problem.

## 5 Finding the Markov Perfect Equilibrium

In many cases, the type of model described in the previous section must be solved as an equilibrium problem rather than as an optimization problem. The next subsection explains why this complication might arise. Using an auxiliary control problem in which the regulator has two policy instruments, we then identify conditions under which the model *can* be solved as a straightforward optimization problem.

## 5.1 The Time-Consistency Problem

In general, the regulator might want to announce a rule that would determine future levels of the tax or quota. The purpose of such an announcement would be to alter the firm's investment rule – as distinct from altering a stock that appears as an argument of the investment rule. The inability to make binding commitments, and the Markov assumption, exclude this possibility. In a rational expectations equilibrium, current investment depends on beliefs about future policies, and these beliefs and policies depend on the pollution stock. By choice of the current quota or tax level, the regulator affects the future pollution stock, which can affect future investment. Under our assumptions, the only means by which the *this period's* policy can influence future investment is by influencing the future level of the pollution stock.

Consider a simpler problem without asymmetric information, where a representative firm with rational expectations makes investment decisions. The firm's optimal decisions depend on its beliefs about future regulations, and the regulator wants to influence the firm's decisions. If the regulator has a first best policy (defined as one that does not cause secondary distortions), he can induce the firm to select exactly the decisions that the regulator would have used, had he been in a position to choose them directly. In that case, the regulatory problem can be solved as standard optimization problem. If, however, the regulator has only a second-best policy, the familiar time-consistency problem arises. (See Xie (1997) and Karp and Lee (2003) for discussions of this problem, and references.) The Markov restriction is binding in this setting, so finding the equilibrium requires solving an equilibrium problem rather than a standard optimization problem.

The presence of asymmetric information in our model leads to the possibility of time-inconsistency of the optimal emissions tax or quota. We know from the literature on principal-agent problems that with asymmetric information, non-linear policies are generally superior to either the linear tax or the quota: neither the linear tax nor the quota is typically the information-constrained first best policy. We noted in Section 4.1 that the firm's investment depends on its beliefs about future policies. Since the regulator has two targets, (emissions and investment) and only one instrument (which might not be information-constrained first best), it appears that the regulator *might* want to use future emissions taxes or quotas to influence the firm's current investment decision. In that case, the information-constrained first best tax or quota would be time-inconsistent: the ability to make commitments about future taxes or quotas would enable the regulator to achieve a higher payoff than under the Markov restriction. If this were the case, we would not be able to obtain a Markov Perfect equilibrium merely by solving a dynamic optimization problem, but would instead have to solve the equilibrium problem described in the previous section.

## 5.2 An Auxiliary Control Problem

This subsection describes an auxiliary control problem that helps identify conditions under which the Markov Perfect equilibrium can be obtained by solving an optimization problem. In this control problem, in each period the regulator sets an emissions tax or quota using the same information as in the game; later in the same period he observes the current cost shock and then chooses investment directly. (In contrast, in the game the regulator chooses only an emissions policy.) The ability to control current investment directly, knowing the current cost shock, eliminates any incentive to use future emissions policies to control current investment.

In this setting, it does not matter whether the regulator chooses investment directly (e.g. by command and control), or decentralizes this decision by means of an investment tax/subsidy. In the former case, firms make no investment decision, and in the latter case, firms merely carry out the optimal investment decision induced by the investment tax/subsidy.

As an aid to intuition, it is useful to think of decentralizing the optimal investment decision (from the auxiliary problem) using an investment tax/subsidy. The *optimal* investment tax/subsidy is identically 0 if and only if Markov Perfect rules are equivalent to the optimal policy rules in the auxiliary problem. With an identically zero investment tax, agents have exactly the same optimization problem as in the game. It is optimal to use a non-zero investment tax/subsidy if and only if the Markov Perfect policies do not solve the auxiliary problem.

The Markov Perfect equilibrium investment rule is conditioned on  $(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ , whereas the emissions tax or quota is conditioned on  $(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$ . Consequently, in the auxiliary problem we need to consider a two-stage optimization within each period. At the beginning of the period the regulator knows  $(K_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}, S_{t-1})$  and chooses the emissions policy (a tax or quota); the regulator then learns  $\theta_t$  and chooses the level of investment (equivalently, the investment tax/subsidy).

It does not matter whether this time-line is “plausible”. We use this problem only as a means of finding conditions under which the Markov Perfect rules can be obtained by solving a control problem. If the Markov Perfect investment rule is equivalent to the investment rule in the auxiliary problem, then a regulator who had to choose investment (or an investment tax/subsidy) *before* knowing  $\theta_t$  would obviously prefer to allow firms to choose investment. (Firms have better information – they know  $\theta_t$  whereas the regulator knows only  $\theta_{t-1}$  in the game – and firms choose the information constrained socially optimal level of investment.) That is, the regulator would use a zero investment tax/subsidy.

We describe the auxiliary control problem when the regulator uses an emissions quota, and then when he uses an emissions tax.

### 5.2.1 Quotas in the auxiliary problem

The regulator solves the following DPE:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^Q(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = & \max_{x_t} E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - D(S_{t-1}) \\ & + \max_{I_t} [-C(I_t, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathcal{J}^Q(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)]\} \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

subject to equations (11) and (13). The first order condition for the optimal quota is

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{B_x(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) + \beta \mathcal{J}_S^Q(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)\} = 0 \quad (20)$$

and the Euler equation for investment under quotas is

$$\beta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \{B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t)\} - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0. \quad (21)$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_{\theta_T|\theta_t} \{\beta^{T-t} C_I(I_T, K_{T-1}) K_T\} = 0. \quad (22)$$

### 5.2.2 Taxes in the auxiliary problem

Using the firm's emission response function (15), the regulator in the auxiliary problem solves the following DPE

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^T(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = & \max_{p_t} E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*) - D(S_{t-1}) + \\ & \max_{I_t} [-C(I_t, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathcal{J}^T(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)]\} \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

subject to equations (11), (13) and (15). We use the definition

$$H_t \equiv [B_x(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*) + \beta \mathcal{J}_S^T(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)],$$

and the abbreviation  $\chi_t \equiv \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t) = x_t^*$ . The function  $H_t$  is the social benefit of an additional unit of emissions. With this notation, we can write the first-order condition with respect to  $p_t$  as

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \left\{ H_t \frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial p_t} \right\} = 0, \quad (24)$$

and the stochastic Euler equation for investment as

$$\begin{aligned} \beta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \left\{ B_K(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}^*) - C_K(I_{t+1}, K_t) + \delta C_I(I_{t+1}, K_t) + H_{t+1} \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right\} \\ - C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) = 0. \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

The transversality condition is equation (22).

### 5.3 Social Optimality of the Markov Perfect Rules

We begin with the following:

**Lemma 1** *Condition 1 is equivalent to the following two conditions: (a)  $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial p_t}$  is independent of  $\theta_t$ . (b)  $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial K_{t-1}}$  is independent of  $\theta_t$ , where  $p_t$  is the time  $t$  emissions tax.*

**Proof.** Totally differentiating the first-order condition (14) gives

$$\frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial p_t} = \frac{1}{B_{xx}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)}, \quad \frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial K_{t-1}} = -\frac{B_{xK}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)}{B_{xx}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)}.$$

Condition (a) holds if and only if  $B_{xx}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)$  is independent of  $\theta_t$ . This independence means that Condition (b) holds if and only if  $B_{xK}(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t^*)$  is independent of  $\theta_t$ . ■

Our main result is the following

**Proposition 1** *(i) When the regulator uses emissions quotas, the solution to the auxiliary problem (19) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium to the original game. (ii) When the regulator uses emissions taxes, the solution to the auxiliary problem (23) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium to the original game if and only if the separability condition holds.*

The proof, contained in Appendix 1, verifies that the equilibrium conditions in the games and in the auxiliary problems are identical under the conditions stated in the Proposition.

#### 5.3.1 Significance of the proposition

When the regulator uses quotas to control emissions, the Markov Perfect investment rule is always (information-constrained) socially optimal. With emissions quotas, the ability to use an additional policy instrument to influence investment does not increase social welfare.

If the regulator uses emissions taxes to control emissions, the Markov Perfect investment rule is socially optimal if and only if Condition 1 is satisfied. This condition depends only on the benefit function  $B(\cdot)$ , not on the damage or the investment cost function. Under the separability condition, the investment tax that would support the optimal investment (from the auxiliary problem) is identically 0.

Proposition 1 identifies a previously unnoticed difference between taxes and quotas. When the separability condition does not hold, the regulator who uses an emissions tax to control pollution creates a secondary distortion in investment. In these circumstances, private investment is optimal under an emissions quota but not under an emissions tax. The emissions tax, but not the quota, create the need for an investment tax/subsidy.

The Proposition also provides a simple way of obtaining the equilibrium for the game when the separability condition holds. This method requires only solving a dynamic optimization problem rather than a dynamic equilibrium problem.

### 5.3.2 Interpretation of the Separability Condition

We first identify the secondary distortion under emissions taxes, and we explain why it vanishes if the separability condition holds. This discussion also explains why emissions taxes and quotas typically have different effects, as regards the secondary distortion.

In order to identify the secondary distortion, we follow the standard procedure of computing the investment tax/subsidy that supports the information-constrained first best investment policy. Suppose that firms face an investment tax  $s_t$ , so their single period payoff is  $B(\cdot) - C(\cdot) - s_t I_t - p_t x_t$ . We can write the Euler equation for the capital stock corresponding to this problem, and compare it to the optimal investment policy under an emissions tax, equation (25). We omit the details, but the comparison implies that the investment tax supports the socially optimal level of investment if and only if<sup>5</sup>

$$-s_t + \beta \delta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} s_{t+1} = \beta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \left\{ H_{t+1} \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right\}. \quad (26)$$

The left side of equation (26) equals the effect of the tax sequence on the marginal incentive to invest in the current period. Under the investment tax, an additional unit of investment costs the firm  $s_t$  in the current period, but reduces the cost of tax payments by  $\delta E_t s_{t+1}$  in the next period. The right side of equation (26) is the present value of the expectation of the secondary distortion.  $H_{t+1}$  is the marginal value to society of an additional unit of emissions in the next period, and  $\frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t}$  equals the change in emissions in the next period caused by an additional unit of investment in the current period. Thus, the term in brackets in equation (26) is the value to society of the lower future emissions caused by the additional investment. This benefit is external to the firm. The optimal investment tax sequence induces the firm to internalize the present value of the expectation of this additional social benefit of investment – i.e., to internalize the externality.

The optimal emission quota does not create a secondary distortion. Under the quota, the expected social benefit of an additional unit of emissions is zero in each period (equation (20)). The socially optimal rule for determining investment, equation (21), involves only the current and future expected marginal investment and abatement costs. The socially optimal balance of these costs is identical to the balance that firms choose.

The optimal emissions tax, in contrast, requires that a marginal change in the tax has zero expected social value (equation (24)). This condition is not, in general, equivalent to the requirement that the expected social marginal benefit of emissions ( $H_t$ ) is zero. The expected social marginal benefit of an additional unit of emissions is zero if and only if  $B_{xx}$  is independent of  $\theta$  (equivalently, if and only if  $\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial p}$  is independent of  $\theta$ ). This independence implies that  $E_t H_t = 0$ .

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<sup>5</sup>The right side of equation (26) equals the function  $\tau$ , used in the proof of Proposition 1.

Even if this independence holds,  $H_t$  is a random variable, a function of  $\theta$ . If  $\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial K}$  is also a function of  $\theta$  (i.e., if  $B_{xK}$  is not independent of  $\theta$ ), then the social marginal benefit of emissions is correlated with  $\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial K}$ . In that case, the expected marginal value to society of the lower future emissions caused by the additional investment (i.e., the secondary distortion, measured by the right side of equation (26)) is non-zero. Here, the investment externality is non-zero. Consequently, both  $B_{xx}$  and  $B_{xK}$  must be independent of  $\theta$  in order for the investment externality to vanish under emissions taxes.

## 6 The Linear-Quadratic Model

The static model with a flow pollutant shows that a simple comparison of taxes and quotas requires strong functional assumptions: quadratic abatement costs and quadratic damages and additive uncertainty (the linear-quadratic model) (Weitzman 1974). Without these assumptions, the ranking of taxes and quotas depends on parameters such as the variance of the cost uncertainty, for which we have very poor (if any) estimates. The major insight from the static linear-quadratic model is that taxes dominate quotas when the marginal abatement cost function is steeper than the marginal environmental damage function.

Analytical comparisons of the two policies in the climate change literature use the linear-quadratic model in which damages arise from the pollution stock, rather than the flow of emissions. Some commentators have claimed that for the regulation of GHGs, taxes obviously dominate quotas, because the marginal damage function for GHGs is so flat relative to the marginal abatement cost function. This reasoning is faulty, because in the dynamic setting the marginal abatement cost depends on the flow of emissions, while the marginal damage depends on the stock of pollution. The two slopes have different units in the dynamic problem, whereas they have the same units in the static problem.<sup>6</sup> In the dynamic setting it is not sensible to simply compare magnitudes of the two slopes. The dynamic optimization problem has to be solved in order to know how to compare these slopes, i.e. to know what constitutes a “large slope” and a “small slope” with GHGs.

This analysis has been undertaken, with and without serially correlated costs shocks, under the competing assumptions that the regulator announces the entire sequence of future policies today (the open loop assumption) or that the regulator conditions future policies on future information (the feedback assumption), and under the assumption that the regulator expects to

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<sup>6</sup>Suppose we measure stock  $S$  in tonnes and emissions  $x$  in tonnes/year. Suppose that single period environmental damage is  $a + bS^2$  and abatement cost is  $c + dx^2$  and both are measured in dollars per year. Then the units of  $b$ , the slope of marginal damages are  $\frac{\$}{\text{year} \cdot (\text{tonne})^2}$  and the units of  $d$ , the slope of marginal abatement costs are  $\frac{\$ \cdot \text{year}}{(\text{tonne})^2}$ .

learn about a damage parameter (Hoel and Karp 2002), (Newell and Pizer 2003), (Karp and Zhang 2005), (Karp and Zhang 2006). This analysis, together with available estimates of parameter values, supports the view that taxes dominate quotas. Numerical results that do not use the linear-quadratic model also support this conclusion (Pizer 1999), (Hoel and Karp 2001), (Pizer 2002).

In order to examine the effect of endogenous investment on policy ranking, we also use a linear-quadratic model, extended to include abatement capital. The representative firm's benefit function is

$$B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) = f_0 + (f_1 + \psi\theta_t)K_{t-1} - \frac{f_2}{2}K_{t-1}^2 + (a - \phi K_{t-1} + \theta_t)x_t - \frac{b}{2}x_t^2$$

with  $f_1 > 0$ ,  $f_2 > 0$ ,  $b > 0$ ,  $\psi \geq 0$ ,  $\phi \geq 0$ . The function  $B(\cdot)$  (which includes the rental cost of capital) satisfies the separability condition. The cost of changing the level of capital is<sup>7</sup>

$$C(I_t) = \frac{d}{2}(I_t)^2, \quad d > 0.$$

Environmental damages are also quadratic:

$$D(S_{t-1}) = \frac{g}{2}(S_{t-1} - \bar{S})^2$$

where  $\bar{S}$  is the stock level that minimizes damages.

The following Remark collects a number of useful facts about the comparison of policies. These results will be obvious to readers familiar with the linear-quadratic control problem, so we state them without proof:

**Remark 3** *In this linear-quadratic model with additive errors, the Principle of Certainty Equivalence holds. The expected trajectories of all stock and flow variables are the same under taxes and quotas. The higher moments of these trajectories differ under the two policies. Neither the policy ranking nor the magnitude of the payoff difference depends on the information state  $(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1})$ . The magnitude (but not the sign) of the difference in payoffs depends on the variance of cost,  $\sigma_\mu^2$ .*

In the static version of this problem, damages are caused by the flow of pollution, shocks are *iid*, and there is no abatement capital. The static linear-quadratic model has properties analogous to those listed in Remark 1. In both the static and the dynamic problems, these properties make it possible to compare policies using a minimum of information (e.g., without using information on the magnitude of uncertainty or stocks).

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<sup>7</sup>We can replace the investment cost function with a quadratic function of net rather than gross investment, so that adjustment costs are zero in the steady state. This slightly more plausible model does not lead to any interesting changes in analysis below. However, it complicates the problem of calibrating the model. Therefore we discuss only the model in which adjustment depends on gross investment.

## 6.1 Regulated Emissions and Investment

For the linear-quadratic model we obtain an explicit equation for the emissions rule (equation (15)) under taxes:

$$x_t^* = e_t - \frac{\phi}{b} K_{t-1} + \frac{\theta_t}{b}; \quad e_t \equiv \frac{a - p_t}{b}.$$

A higher cost realization increases current emissions, and a higher tax or a higher stock of abatement capital decreases emissions.

Using standard methods (e.g. Chapter 14 of Sargent (1987)) we can solve the firm's Euler equation ((16) under taxes and (18) under quotas) to write current investment as a linear function of current capital ( $K_{t-1}$ ) and the firm's expectations of the future cost variables and policies (taxes or quotas). The optimal investment under emissions taxes is

$$I_t^* = \frac{\lambda\beta f_1}{d\delta(1-\lambda\beta)} + (\lambda - \delta) K_{t-1} + \frac{\lambda\beta}{d\delta} E_t \left[ \left( \psi - \frac{\phi}{b} \right) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\beta)^j \theta_{t+1+j} - \phi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\lambda\beta)^j e_{t+1+j} \right] \quad (27)$$

where  $0 < \lambda < 1$  is the smaller root of the quadratic equation  $\lambda^2 + \frac{h}{\beta}\lambda + \frac{1}{\beta} = 0$  and  $h \equiv -\left[\frac{1}{\delta} + \frac{\beta}{d\delta} \left( f_2 - \frac{\phi^2}{b} \right) + \beta\delta\right]$ . A lower expected future tax (i.e., a higher value of  $e_{t+j}$ ) decreases current investment. A higher expected future cost shock increases (decreases) current investment if  $\psi - \frac{\phi}{b}$  is positive (negative). Since  $B_{K\theta} = \psi > 0$ , a higher expected cost shock increases the expected marginal benefit of capital – and thus increases the marginal shadow value of capital. This effect encourages investment. However, a higher expected cost shock increases expected emissions, reducing the expected marginal benefit of capital ( $B_{xK} = -\phi < 0$ ) and discouraging investment. These offsetting effects are exactly balanced if  $\psi = \frac{\phi}{b}$ , in which case the cost shock has no effect on investment, under emissions taxes.

The optimal investment under emissions quotas is

$$I_t^* = \frac{\mu\beta f_1}{d\delta(1-\mu\beta)} + (\mu - \delta) K_{t-1} + \frac{\mu\beta}{d\delta} E_t \left[ \psi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\mu\beta)^j \theta_{t+1+j} - \phi \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\mu\beta)^j x_{t+1+j} \right] \quad (28)$$

where  $0 < \mu < 1$  is the smaller root of the quadratic equation  $\mu^2 + \frac{w}{\beta}\mu + \frac{1}{\beta} = 0$  and  $w \equiv -\left(\frac{1}{\delta} + \frac{\beta f_2}{d\delta} + \beta\delta\right)$ . Higher expected quotas decrease investment, and higher expected cost shocks increase investment. With quotas, cost shocks have an unambiguous effect, because the firm treats future emissions quotas as exogenous.

## 6.2 A Limiting Case: Flow Externality

If  $\Delta = 0$  all of the pollution stock decays in a single period, and the model collapses to the case of a flow externality. In this case, emissions in the current period cause damages only

in the next period:  $D(S_{t-1}) = D(x_{t-1})$ .<sup>8</sup> By defining  $\tilde{D}(x_t) = \beta D(x_t)$  we can write the difference between the benefits and costs of current emissions as  $B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - \tilde{D}(x_t)$ . This simplification eliminates a state variable ( $S$ ), making it possible to obtain some analytic results. We can solve the dynamic programming equations under taxes and quotas and compare the payoffs. (Details of the calculations are available on request).

We noted in Section 3.2 that both policies enable the regulator to acquire the same information about the current cost variable if either of these conditions hold: (a)  $\rho = 0$ ; or (b)  $\rho \neq 0$  and  $\psi \neq 0$ . The last inequality implies that the regulator learns the lagged value of  $\theta$  by observing investment under quotas – see section 3.2 and equation (28). We show that in either of these two cases, the policy ranking does not depend on the parameters associated with abatement capital. If, however, neither of these two conditions hold (and if in addition quotas are not traded) taxes have an informational advantage. In that case, the policy ranking does depend on the parameters associated with abatement costs.

If  $\rho = 0$ , or if  $\rho \neq 0$  and  $\psi \neq 0$ , the payoff difference under taxes and quotas, is

$$\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q = \frac{\sigma_\mu^2}{2b(1-\beta)} \left(1 - \frac{\beta g}{b}\right).$$

This expression reproduces a result in Weitzman (1974)'s static model and in two dynamic models ((Hoel and Karp 2002) and (Karp and Zhang 2005)).

If  $\rho \neq 0$  and  $\psi = 0$ , and quotas are not traded, the regulator learns the past cost variable under taxes but not under quotas.<sup>9</sup> Here the payoff difference equals

$$\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{2b(1-\beta)} \left[ \Gamma + \left(1 - \frac{\beta g}{b}\right) \right] \quad (29)$$

The function  $\Gamma > 0$  (see appendix) embodies the informational advantage of taxes;  $\Gamma$  depends on  $f_2$ ,  $d$  and  $\delta$  (among other parameters).

We summarize the implications of these expressions in the following:

**Remark 4** *For a flow pollutant ( $\Delta = 0$ ): (i) When taxes and quotas have the same informational content (i.e., if (a)  $\rho = 0$ , or if (b)  $\rho \neq 0$  and  $\psi \neq 0$ ), the policy ranking depends only on the relative slopes (appropriately discounted) of the marginal benefit and damage functions. (ii) When taxes have an informational advantage (i.e., when neither conditions (a) or (b) in part (i) hold and quotas are not traded) the policy ranking also depends on the parameters associated with abatement capital.*

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<sup>8</sup>The specialization in this section simplifies the the stock pollution problem, and it is also of independent interest, because it shows how to compare taxes and quotas for a flow pollutant when abatement costs are endogenous.

<sup>9</sup>This is one case where the assumption of symmetric firms is important. If, instead, firms receive firm-specific cost shocks in addition to the common cost shock, and are able to trade permits, the permit price enables the regulator to acquire the same information as under emissions permits (Karp and Zhang 2005).

The next section considers the problem of a stock-related pollutant. There, even when neither policy has an informational advantage, the policy ranking does depend on the parameters associated with abatement capital – in contrast to Remark 4.i. Here we explain why stock and flow pollutants have this qualitative difference.

As Remark 3 notes, the expected levels of emissions and of investment are the same under taxes and quotas. The first order condition for investment (using equation (19) or (23)) is

$$-C_I(I_t, K_{t-1}) + \beta \mathcal{J}_K^i(K_t, S_t, \theta_t) = 0, \quad i = T, Q.$$

The linear-quadratic structure with additive uncertainty implies that  $\mathcal{J}_K^T(K_t, S_t, \theta_t) \equiv \mathcal{J}_K^Q(K_t, S_t, \theta_t)$ : the investment rules under taxes and quotas, conditional on  $(K_{t-1}, S_t, \theta_t)$ , are identical.

For a stock pollutant,  $\mathcal{J}_{K,S}^i \neq 0$ , so investment at time  $t$  depends on the pollution stock at the beginning of the next period,  $S_t$ . That pollution stock depends on current emissions; therefore, emissions in period  $t$  affect investment in period  $t$ . Conditional on the regulator's information at the beginning of a period, the current level of emissions is random under taxes and is a choice variable under quotas. Therefore, conditional on the information at the beginning of a period, the distribution function for the current level of investment differs under the two policies. The expected payoff difference therefore depends on the parameters associated with abatement capital.

In contrast, with a flow pollutant, the current level of emissions has no effect on future payoffs. The shadow value of capital  $\mathcal{J}_K^i$  depends only on  $(K_t, \theta_t)$ . With a flow pollutant, the *current* investment and *current* emissions decisions are decoupled. Therefore, the value to the regulator of the difference in emissions under taxes and quotas does not depend on investment costs.

## 7 An Application to Climate Change

With a stock externality problem such as greenhouse gasses, we have three state variables (greenhouse gasses, the capital stock, and the expected cost shock) and therefore cannot obtain an analytic solution. However, using Proposition 1, it is straightforward to solve the tax and quota problems numerically. The resulting control problem is almost standard, except that new information arrives within a period, so there are two stages of optimization within a period. This fact accounts for the nested maximization in equations (19) and (23). For the linear-quadratic model, we can solve each of these dynamic programming problems by solving a matrix Riccati equation. (Details are available upon request.)

1. Pollutant stock growth	$S_t - \bar{S} = \Delta (S_{t-1} - \bar{S}) + x_t.$
2. Environmental damage	$D(S_{t-1}) = \frac{g}{2} (S_{t-1} - \bar{S})^2.$
3. Abatement capital growth	$K_t = \delta K_{t-1} + I_t.$
4. Investment cost	$C(I_t) = \frac{d}{2} I_t^2.$
5. “Business as usual” emissions	$x_t^b = m_0 - m_1 K_{t-1} + \tilde{\theta}_t.$
6. Abatement cost	$A(x_t) = \frac{b}{2} (x_t^b - x_t)^2.$
7. “General” benefit function	
	$B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) = f_0 + (f_1 + \psi \theta_t) K_{t-1} - \frac{f_2}{2} K_{t-1}^2 + (a - \phi K_{t-1} + \theta_t) x_t - \frac{b}{2} x_t^2.$
Parameter restriction:	
$0 \leq \Delta \leq 1, g > 0, 0 \leq \delta \leq 1, d > 0, m_0 > 0, m_1 \geq 0, b > 0.$	
Relation of parameters:	
$\theta_t = b \tilde{\theta}_t, f_0 = -\frac{b}{2} m_0^2, f_1 = b m_0 m_1, f_2 = b m_1^2, a = b m_0, \phi = b m_1, \text{ and } \psi = \frac{\phi}{b} = m_1.$	

Table 1: The Model of Global Warming.

## 7.1 Model Calibration

Table 1 describes the model. In order to calibrate the general linear quadratic model described in the previous section, we assume that benefits are equal to the value of abatement cost that the firm avoids by increasing emissions. Abatement costs are a quadratic function of abatement,  $x_t^b - x_t$  (row 6), where the BAU emissions  $x_t^b$  is a decreasing linear function of abatement capital (row 5). A higher level of abatement capital makes it cheaper to reduce emissions, and also decreases the marginal abatement costs. The cost variable  $\tilde{\theta}$  (which is proportional to the random variable  $\theta$  used above) changes the level of BAU emissions and therefore changes marginal abatement costs. Row 7 of Table 1 repeats the general linear quadratic model; the final row gives the parameter restrictions under which this general model reproduces the special model described in the rows 2- 6 of the table.<sup>10</sup> If  $m_1 = 0$ , capital does not affect abatement costs. This limiting case reproduces previous linear-quadratic models of a stock pollutant (Karp and Zhang 2005).

Table 2 lists baseline parameter values. In presenting the simulation results, we use the parameter  $\pi$ , defined as the percentage loss in Gross World Product due to a doubling of greenhouse gasses. This parameter is linearly related to  $g$ , the slope of marginal damages. Our

<sup>10</sup>We ignore the effect of  $\tilde{\theta}$  on the constant term since the constant has no effect on the regulator’s control.

baseline parameters assume that  $\pi = 1.33$ , an estimate that has been widely used. For comparison, we also discuss results when  $\pi = 3.6$  (the average of expert opinions, reported in Nordhaus (1994a)) and  $\pi = 21$  (the maximum of these expert opinions).

Appendix 3 explains our calibration of the abatement costs (rows 3-6 of Table 1). Our companion paper (Karp and Zhang 2006)<sup>11</sup> describes the calibration of the growth and damage functions (rows 1 and 2 of Table 1) and of the equation for the random shock (equation (12)).

Parameter	Note	Value
$\beta$	a continuous discount rate of 5%	0.9512
$\Delta$	pollutant stock persistence	0.9917
$\delta$	capital stock persistence	0.85
$\pi$	the percentage loss in GWP from doubling $\bar{S}$	1.33
$g$	slope of the marginal damage billion \$/(billion tons of carbon) <sup>2</sup>	0.0022
$b$	slope of the marginal abatement cost, billion \$/(billion tons of carbon) <sup>2</sup>	26.992
$d$	slope of the marginal investment cost, billion \$	703.31
$m_0$	intercept of the BAU emissions, billion tons of carbon	12.466
$m_1$	slope of the BAU emissions, (billion tons of carbon)/(billion \$)	0.7266
$\rho$	cost correlation coefficient	0.90
$\sigma_\mu$	standard deviation of cost shock, \$/(ton of carbon)	1.7275
$x_0^b$	current CO <sub>2</sub> emissions into the atmosphere billion tons of carbon	5.20
$\bar{S}$	preindustrial stock, billion tons of carbon	590
$S_{-1}$	current pollutant stock, billion tons of carbon	781
$K_{-1}$	initial capital stock, billion \$	10

Table 2: Parameter Values for the Baseline Model.

<sup>11</sup>That paper studies the problem in which the regulator learns about the relation between pollution stocks and environmental damages; there we ignore abatement capital. Since performing this calibration, more recent estimates of climate-related damage have been published (including (Stern 2006) and (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007)) but these are within the range of estimates in our calibration. For this reason, and in order for the results here to be comparable to those in our earlier paper, we use the same calibration.

## 7.2 Numerical Results

We begin by summarizing results from earlier static and dynamic models that exclude abatement capital. We then discuss new results – those directly related to abatement capital.

### 7.2.1 Previous results

Previous papers study the relation between the policy ranking and parameters in the linear-quadratic model with additive errors (Hoel and Karp 2002), (Newell and Pizer 2003), (Karp and Zhang 2005), . Those papers show that the difference in payoffs under optimal taxes and quotas,  $\mathcal{J}^T - \mathcal{J}^Q$ , is decreasing in  $\frac{g}{b}$ . The intuition is the same as in Weitzman (1974)'s static model. A larger value of  $g$  means that damages are more convex in  $S$ . In view of Jensen's inequality, as damages become more convex it becomes more important to control emissions exactly (as under a quota) rather than to choose only the expected value of emissions (as under a tax). A higher value of  $b$  makes it more important for the firm to be able to respond to changes in the cost variable by changing emissions. It is able to respond under a tax but not under a quota.

There is a critical value of  $\frac{g}{b}$  above which quotas are preferred. This critical value is decreasing in both  $\beta$  and  $\Delta$ . When more weight is put on future costs and benefits (higher  $\beta$ ), or when the stock is more persistent (higher  $\Delta$ ), it is more important to control the exact level of emissions (as under quotas) rather than the first moment of emissions (as under taxes).

The previous papers calibrate models using parameter values that are consistent with published estimates of the abatement costs and environmental damages associated with greenhouse gasses. These studies find that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses.

These qualitative results also hold for our parameterization of the model with endogenous abatement capital. This robustness is worth noting, but our analysis adds nothing to the intuition for these results, and therefore we do not discuss them further. Instead, we emphasize the comparative statics and dynamics associated with endogenous abatement costs.

### 7.2.2 The role of abatement capital

There are three important parameters related to abatement capital:  $\delta$ ,  $d$ , and  $m_1$ . We consider the first two briefly, and then concentrate on the third. In all cases, we perform the obvious experiment of varying one of these parameters, holding all others constant. This experiment has a shortcoming that we discuss later, where we consider a second type of experiment.

We explained why a more durable pollution stock (higher  $\Delta$ ) decreases the preference for taxes. However, a more durable capital stock (higher  $\delta$ ) increases the preference for taxes. Under taxes, the firm responds to a cost shock by changing the level of emissions. Under both




Figure 1: Dependence of expected payoff difference on cost-related parameters

taxes and quotas, the firm responds to a cost shock by changing the level of capital, provided that  $\rho \neq 0$ .<sup>12</sup> The adjustment mechanism via capital provides a partial substitute for the inability to change emissions under quotas. A large value of  $\delta$  means that current investment has long-lasting effects, tending to make capital less flexible. The decreased flexibility associated with larger values of  $\delta$  increases the value of being able to respond to cost variables by changing emissions. A larger value of  $\delta$  therefore increases the advantage of taxes.

A lower value of  $m_1$  (a decrease in the marginal effect of capital on BAU emissions) or a larger value of  $d$  (an increase in the adjustment cost for abatement capital), favors quotas. Figure 1 shows the relation between the difference in payoffs (the value of using taxes minus the value of using quotas) and the parameters  $d$  and  $m_1$  for three values of  $\pi$ , holding all other parameters constant. (Recall that  $\pi$  is the percentage loss in global world product due to a doubling of greenhouse gasses.) When environmental damages are moderate ( $\pi = 1.33$  or  $\pi = 3.6$ ) the difference in payoffs is insensitive to changes in  $d$  and  $m_1$ ; for large environmental damages ( $\pi = 21$ ) the change in either parameter has a noticeable affect on the payoff difference. Pre-

<sup>12</sup>If  $\rho = 0$ , the current cost shock provides no information about the future cost shocks. Since current investment reduces abatement costs only in future periods, the firm's investment does not depend on the current cost shock if  $\rho = 0$ .

vious linear-quadratic models that do not include investment capital are a special case of the model here, obtained by letting  $d \rightarrow \infty$  or  $m_1 \rightarrow 0$ . Those models tend to understate the advantage of using taxes.

As  $d$  increases, capital increasingly resembles a fixed input; as  $m_1$  decreases, abatement capital has less effect on the marginal benefit of pollution. A larger value of  $d$  or a smaller value of  $m_1$  both imply less flexibility of marginal abatement costs. This diminished flexibility favors quotas, just as does the diminished flexibility in marginal abatement costs associated with a smaller value of  $b$  (the slope of  $B_x$ ).

In all cases, the present discounted value of the payoff difference under taxes and quotas is approximately 1 billion dollars, implying an annualized cost of about 50 million dollars. Our parameterization of abatement costs assumes that the annualized cost of stabilizing emissions is about 1 percent of income, or 290 billion dollars. Thus, the payoff difference of the two policies is less than 0.02% of the estimated costs of stabilizing emissions.

The small difference in the expected payoffs may be due largely to the Principle of Certainty Equivalence, mentioned in Section 5: the expected stock trajectories are identical under taxes and quotas – only higher moments differ. Uncertainty in our calibrated model (but not in the general formulation) arises only because BAU emissions are uncertain. Given the (small) magnitude of this particular type of uncertainty, the higher moments of stocks simply are not very important. Models that do not satisfy the Principle of Certainty Equivalence find a larger payoff difference under taxes and quotas (Pizer 1999), (Hoel and Karp 2001).

The relations between the equilibrium decision rules and levels of the state variables are as expected. The optimal quota (which equals the expected level of emissions under the optimal tax) decreases with the level of pollution and with the capital stock and increases with the lagged cost shock (for  $\rho > 0$ , as in our calibration). Equilibrium investment is an increasing function of the stock of pollution and a decreasing function of capital stock. Firms understand that a higher pollution stock will lead to lower future equilibrium emissions, increasing the marginal value of investment. A higher aggregate capital stock encourages the regulator to reduce future emissions, increasing the value of investment. However, the representative firm's level of capital equals the aggregate level. For a given quota or tax, a higher capital stock reduces the marginal value of investment. The net effect of higher capital stocks is to reduce investment.

As we mentioned above, the comparative dynamics associated with a change in a single parameter value might be misleading. For example, when we decrease  $m_1$  holding other parameters constant, we change the BAU level of emissions and the abatement costs associated with a particular emissions trajectory, in addition to changing the marginal effect of capital on abatement costs. Here we consider a slightly different experiment: When we vary  $m_1$  we make




Figure 2: Changes in expected pollution flows and stocks relative to BAU levels

offsetting changes in  $m_0$  in order to maintain current BAU emissions at 5.2, and we require that the year 2100 BAU emissions are consistent with a particular IPCC scenario.

Our baseline calibration ( $m_1 = 0.7266$ ) makes our model consistent with the *IPCC IS92a* scenario that projects BAU CO<sub>2</sub> stocks of 1500 GtC in the year 2100 – an approximate doubling of stocks relative to pre-industrial levels. For comparison we also choose parameters that are consistent with the *IS92c* scenario of a 35% increase in CO<sub>2</sub> concentration ( $m_1 = 0.0416$ ) and with the *IS92e* scenario of a 170% increase in CO<sub>2</sub> concentration ( $m_1 = 1.6622$ ).

Figure 2 graphs optimal abatement levels, i.e. the difference in the BAU and the optimal levels of emissions (the left panel) and the difference between BAU and the regulated pollution stock (the right panel), as a function of time. The three graphs in each panel correspond to the three values of  $m_1$ . In all cases, abatement increases over time. Both the level and the change over time of abatement is greatest when abatement capital has a large effect on marginal abatement costs ( $m_1$  is large). This result is further evidence that the consideration of endogenous investment in abatement capital increases the optimal level of abatement.

## 8 Discussion and Conclusion

The previous literature that compares taxes and quotas assumes that firms solve a sequence of static problems. Our paper recognizes that firms also make investment decisions which affect their future abatement costs. The value of this investment depends on the severity of future environmental restrictions, so the policymaker might have an incentive to announce future environmental policies in order to influence current investment. When this incentive arises, the firms' investment decisions are not constrained optimal, so the regulator would increase welfare if he were able to use an investment tax/subsidy together with the emissions policy. We showed that for general functional forms, when the regulator uses a quota (cap and trade), the competitive firms' investment policy is information-constrained efficient. In contrast, for general functional forms, when the regulator uses an emissions tax, the firms' investment policy is not information-constrained efficient. In this sense, there is an advantage to quotas, relative to emissions taxes, that had not previously been recognized.

This particular advantage disappears under a "separability condition" on the primitive functions. The linear-quadratic model, generalized to include endogenous investment, satisfies this condition. Using a calibrated model and a numerical solution, we found that making capital more durable or more effective in reducing the cost of abatement, or reducing the marginal cost of capital, all favor the use of taxes rather than quota. These numerical results and the previously described analytic result lead to a mixed message for the comparison of policies. Within the functional assumptions that most previous studies have used, we find that the inclusion of endogenous investment increases the advantage of taxes. However, for more general functional forms, quotas have an entirely different type of advantage. We do not know anything about the magnitude of the latter advantage; its measurement would require a more complicated (i.e. non-linear quadratic) model, which presents problems of calibration, and it would also require the solution to a dynamic game rather than an optimization problem.

We close by discussing several other views of the relative efficiency of taxes and quotas. One view is that the risk of extreme environmental damages, associated with high GHG stocks, means that over some range damages are likely to be very convex in stocks, i.e. the slope of marginal damages is actually very large. In addition, over a long enough time span, given the opportunities for the development and adoption of new technologies, the marginal abatement cost curve is actually rather flat. Based on these (in our view, plausible) observations, and reasoning from the standard static model, Dietz and Stern (2007) conclude that quantity restrictions are more efficient than taxes for climate policy. We have three reasons for doubting this conclusion. First, the use of the static framework (or the open loop assumption in a dynamic setting) is not appropriate for studying climate policy, because the current policymaker cannot

choose policy levels decades into the future. More rapid adjustment of policy, i.e. a decrease in the length of period between policy adjustments, favors the use of taxes. Second, even if the possibility of extreme events makes the marginal damage function much steeper than current estimates suggest, the magnitude of the slope of damages would have to be implausibly large to favor quotas. (Hoel and Karp (2002) demonstrate both of these claims.) Third, the current paper shows that endogenous investment in abatement capital is likely to increase the advantage of taxes, given the linear quadratic framework.

A second view, which we have heard propounded orally but not in writing, is that the existing models inaccurately describe the abatement problem and are therefore simply inappropriate for comparing policies. The objection is that firms will first undertake the cheapest abatement opportunities, which will not be available in the future. There are (at least) two ways to respond to this objection. First, a stationary upward sloping marginal abatement cost curve (used in most previous analyses) is obviously consistent with the claim that firms first use the cheapest way of reducing emissions, and then use more expensive means when regulation becomes stricter. However, because abatement is a flow decision, the fact that the cheap abatement opportunities were used early in the program does not mean that they are unavailable later in the program. The firms move up their marginal abatement curves as the policy becomes stricter. A second response interprets the objection as a call to use a model in which abatement is a stock rather than a flow decision – specifically, a model with endogenous investment in abatement capital, in which there is a sequence of increasingly expensive technologies that reduce emissions. It would be fairly straightforward to produce that kind of model, using a slight modification of the model in this paper. We assumed that the cost of investment is a function of gross investment. To address the objection, we could modify the cost function so that the cost of an additional unit of capital increases with the current level of capital. With this formulation, the firms's level of capital is a proxy for it's stage of technology. Because it first adopts the cheapest (most efficient) technologies, it becomes increasingly expensive to make further reductions in abatement costs. It is not clear how this change affects the policy ranking.

There are several other model variations that would address other interesting questions. For example, network externalities may cause the productivity of a firm's capital to increase with the level of aggregate capital. There may be intra-firm increasing returns to scale. There might also be learning by doing, so that an increase in cumulative abatement decreases abatement costs. The inclusion of intertemporal trade (banking and borrowing) under quantity restrictions would be even more interesting. Because GHGs are a stock pollutant, the stream of damages can be sensitive to the cumulative emissions over a long period of time without being sensitive to the precise timing of emissions. Intertemporal trading allows firms to optimally allocate over time a given cumulative level of emissions. The introduction of banking and borrowing

(under the quantity restriction) would likely significantly erode the advantage of taxes. The effect of banking and borrowing on the incentive to invest is not clear. These questions, and the model variations that they entail, are the subject of current research.

## 9 Appendix

The appendix consists of four parts. Section 1 contains the proof of Proposition 1. Section 2 provides the formulae for  $\Gamma$  used in equation (29). Section 3 contains information on calibrating adjustment costs. Section 3 contains other calibration information similar to that used in Karp and Zhang (2006). Section 4 is not intended for publication, but is included here to enable the referee to evaluate the calibration.

### 9.1 Proof of Proposition 1

We use  $\mathbb{J}^j(\cdot)$  ( $j = T, Q$ ) to denote the regulator's value function in the dynamic game (where the regulator chooses only an emissions policy), and  $\mathcal{J}^j(\cdot)$  ( $j = T, Q$ ) to denote the regulator's value function in the corresponding auxiliary problem (where the regulator chooses an emissions policy and then chooses investment after observing the current cost variable). We want to find conditions under which the equilibrium capital and pollution stocks are identical in the Markov Perfect equilibrium to the game and in the auxiliary problem. Equivalently, we want to find conditions under which the optimal investment tax/subsidy is identically 0 in the auxiliary problem.

(i) *Quotas* When the regulator uses an emissions quota, the Euler equations for investment in the Markov perfect equilibrium (equation (18)) and investment in the auxiliary problem (equation (21)) are identical, as are the corresponding transversality conditions. We need to confirm that the Euler equations for the pollution stock are also identical in the two settings.

In the Markov Perfect equilibrium with quotas the regulator solves the following DPE:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{J}^Q(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = \max_{x_t} E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{ & B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - D(S_{t-1}) - C(I_t^Q, K_{t-1}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{J}^Q(\delta K_{t-1} + I_t^Q, \Delta S_{t-1} + x_t, \theta_t) \}, \end{aligned}$$

subject to the private investment rule  $I_t^Q \equiv I^Q(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ , which is independent of the current quota level  $x_t$ . The stochastic Euler equation for pollution stock is:

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} B_x(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, x_t) - \beta D'(\Delta S_{t-1} + x_t) - \beta \Delta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_{t-1}} B_x(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) = 0.$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_{\theta_T|\theta_{t-1}} \{ \beta^{T-t} B_x(K_{T-1}, \theta_T, x_T) S_T \} = 0.$$

A straightforward calculation confirms that the corresponding Euler equation and transversality condition in the auxiliary problem are identical to the last two equations. (To obtain the Euler equation in the auxiliary problem we differentiate the DPE (19) with respect to  $S_{t-1}$ , using the envelope theorem; we combine the resulting equation with the first order condition equation (20).)

(ii) *Taxes* We first consider the equations that determine the evolution of capital stock. Inspection of the Euler equations for capital (equation (16) in the Markov Perfect equilibrium and equation (25) in the auxiliary problem) establishes that these are identical if and only if the function  $\tau$ , defined as

$$\tau_t \equiv \beta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \left\{ H_{t+1} \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right\},$$

is identically 0. We therefore find necessary and sufficient conditions for  $\tau_t \equiv 0$ . Note that the assumptions that  $B_{xK} < 0$  and  $B_{KK} < 0$  imply that  $\frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \neq 0$ .

By Lemma 1, the separability condition is equivalent to

**Condition 2** (a)  $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial p_t}$  is independent of  $\theta_t$ . (b)  $\frac{\partial \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)}{\partial K_{t-1}}$  is independent of  $\theta_t$ .

We therefore need only show that Condition 2 is necessary and sufficient for  $\tau_t \equiv 0$ . We first consider sufficiency. If Condition (2a) holds, the first-order condition (24) implies

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{H_t\} = 0, \quad \forall t. \quad (30)$$

If Condition (2b) also holds, we can write  $\tau_t$  as

$$\tau_t \equiv \beta \left( \frac{\partial \chi_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} \right) E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_t} \{H_{t+1}\}.$$

Using equation (30), the last equality implies that  $\tau_t \equiv 0$ . Clearly the transversality conditions in the two problems are the same.

The necessity of the separability condition follows from the previous argument. If either part of Condition 2 does not hold the function  $\tau$  is not identically 0. (Of course the equality  $\tau = 0$  might hold for some values of the information state, but we need the stronger condition that the equality hold identically, i.e., for all possible values of the information state.)

To complete the proof, we need only check that the Euler equations and transversality conditions for the pollution stock are also the same in the two problems. In the Markov Perfect equilibrium with taxes, the regulator solves the following DPE:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{J}^T(K_{t-1}, S_{t-1}, \theta_{t-1}) = \max_{p_t} E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \{ & B(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, \chi_t) - D(S_{t-1}) - C(I_t^T, K_{t-1}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{J}^T(\delta K_{t-1} + I_t^T, \Delta S_{t-1} + \chi_t, \theta_t) \}, \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

subject to emissions  $\chi_t$  given by equation (15), and the private investment rule  $I_t^T \equiv I^T(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, S_{t-1})$ .  $I_t^T$  is independent of the current tax level  $p_t$  as discussed in Section 4;  $\frac{\partial \chi_t}{\partial p_t}$  is independent of  $\theta_t$  because of Condition 1. Thus the first order condition for the optimal tax is

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \left\{ B_x [K_{t-1}, \theta_t, \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)] + \beta \mathbb{J}_S^T [K_t, \Delta S_{t-1} + \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t), \theta_t] \right\} = 0. \quad (32)$$

Differentiating the DPE (31) with respect to  $S_{t-1}$ , using the envelope theorem, and combining the resulting equation with the first order condition (32) gives the stochastic Euler equation for the pollution stock in the dynamic game:

$$E_{\theta_t|\theta_{t-1}} \left\{ B_x [K_{t-1}, \theta_t, \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)] - \beta D' [\Delta S_{t-1} + \chi(K_{t-1}, \theta_t, p_t)] \right\} - \beta \Delta E_{\theta_{t+1}|\theta_{t-1}} B_x [K_t, \theta_{t+1}, \chi(K_t, \theta_{t+1}, p_{t+1})] = 0 \quad (33)$$

The transversality condition is

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_{\theta_T|\theta_{t-1}} \left\{ \beta^{T-t} B_x [K_{T-1}, \theta_T, \chi(K_{T-1}, \theta_T, p_T)] S_T \right\} = 0.$$

Again, it is straightforward to obtain the Euler equation for pollution stocks in the auxiliary problem. We differentiate equation (23) with respect to  $S_{t-1}$ , using the envelope theorem. Combining the resulting equation with the first order condition (30) leads to the stochastic Euler equation for the pollution stock in the auxiliary problem. This equation is identical to equations (33). The transversality conditions are also the same. *QED*

## 9.2 Formulae for $\Gamma$

The function  $\Gamma$  used in equation (29) is

$$\Gamma = \frac{\beta^2 \rho^2 \phi^2 \frac{(d-\beta h)}{b(1+\frac{\beta g}{b})^2 (d-\beta h-d\beta \rho)^2} + \frac{\beta \rho^2}{1+\frac{\beta g}{b}}}{1-\beta \rho^2} > 0$$

with

$$\Xi \equiv \left( f_2 - \frac{\phi^2}{b+\beta g} \right) \beta - d(1-\beta \delta^2)$$

$$h = \frac{-\Xi - \sqrt{\Xi^2 + 4\beta d \left( f_2 - \frac{\phi^2}{b+\beta g} \right)}}{2\beta} < 0$$

## 9.3 Calibration of Abatement costs and the shock

We assume that abatement capital depreciates at an annual rate of 16.25%, the mean of capital stock depreciation rates in 14 OECD countries (Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard 1996). This depreciation rate implies that  $\delta = 0.85$ .

A higher unit of abatement capital decreases the BAU emissions by  $m_1$  units. When  $m_1 = 0$ , BAU emissions are constant, and abatement capital has no effect on the marginal benefit of pollution (i.e., on marginal abatement costs). In this special case, the firm's emission decision and investment decision are decoupled, and the firm's capital stock has no effect on the regulator's optimal policy. The restriction  $m_1 = 0$  therefore reproduces the linear-quadratic models of global warming in Karp and Zhang (2006).

The dependence of adjustment costs on gross rather than net investment leads to a simple method of calibration. In the absence of additional regulation – i.e., under Business as Usual – firms never invest:  $I_t^b = 0, \forall t \geq 0$ . If the initial level of abatement capital is positive, the level monotonically decreases over time, so BAU emissions monotonically increase:

$$K_t^b = \delta^{t+1} K_{-1}, \quad x_t^b = m_0 - m_1 K_{t-1}^b + \tilde{\theta}_t = m_0 - m_1 \delta^t K_{-1} + \tilde{\theta}_t,$$

where  $K_{-1} > 0$  is the abatement capital at the beginning of the initial period ( $t = 0$ ). Our assumptions provide a simple way to include endogenous investment, and also to reproduce the stylized fact that BAU emissions will increase. The model is “incomplete”, since it does not explain why  $K_{-1} > 0$ . The expected future BAU atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> stock is:

$$S_t = \Delta^{t+1} S_{-1} - m_1 K_{-1} \frac{\delta^t \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{\Delta}{\delta} \right)^{t+1} \right]}{1 - \frac{\Delta}{\delta}} + [m_0 + (1 - \Delta) \bar{S}] \frac{1 - \Delta^{t+1}}{1 - \Delta}, \quad (34)$$

where  $S_{-1}$  is the pollutant stock at the beginning of the initial period.

The current anthropogenic fluxes of CO<sub>2</sub> into the atmosphere is 5.2 GtC<sup>13</sup> so we set  $Ex_0^b = m_0 - m_1 K_{-1} = 5.2$  to obtain one calibration equation. The *IPCC IS92a* scenario projects BAU CO<sub>2</sub> stocks at 1500 GtC in 2100 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1996), page 23. This estimate, equation (34), and the estimate of current atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration at  $S_{-1} = 781$  GtC (Keeling and Whorf 1999), gives a second calibration equation. The two equations imply

$$m_0 = 12.466, \quad m_1 K_{-1} = 7.2661.$$

We have no data on abatement capital, so we choose an arbitrary value for  $K_{-1}$ .<sup>14</sup> We set  $K_{-1} = 10$ .

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<sup>13</sup>We use “current” to mean the year 2000. The current total anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are about 8.12 GtC, which equals the sum of 6.518 GtC of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production (Marland, Boden, Andres, Brenkert, and Johnston 1999) and 1.6 GtC annual average net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from changes in tropical land-use (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1996). We obtain the current anthropogenic fluxes of CO<sub>2</sub> into the atmosphere 5.20 GtC by multiplying the total anthropogenic emissions by 0.64, the marginal atmospheric retention ratio.

<sup>14</sup>Even for pollution problems that have been studied in more detail, data on abatement capital is difficult or impossible to obtain. For example, Becker and Henderson (1999) note the absence of estimates of abatement capital stocks associated with U.S. air quality regulation.

We choose the baseline values of  $d$  (the slope of the marginal investment cost) and  $b$  (the slope of the marginal abatement cost) to satisfy a scenario in which firms are required to maintain emissions at the current level in each period. Firms begin with the initial abatement capital and solve an infinite horizon investment problem to minimize the present discounted sum of investment and abatement cost under emission stabilization. In order to determine the two unknown parameters, we assume:

- The annualized discounted present value of firms' total (abatement-related) costs is about 1% of 1998 GWP (Manne and Richels 1992).<sup>15</sup>
- In the steady state the ratio of investment costs to total abatement costs is about 0.5 (Vogan 1991).

These two assumptions lead to the baseline parameter values:  $d = 703.31$ , and  $b = 26.992$ .

## 9.4 Calibration material not intended for publication

Row 1 in Table 1 is pollutant stock growth equation. We measure  $S_t$ , the CO<sub>2</sub> atmospheric concentration, in billions of tons of carbon equivalent (GtC).  $\bar{S}$  equals 590GtC, the preindustrial CO<sub>2</sub> concentration (Nefel, Friedli, Moor, and Lötcher and H. Oeschger and U. Siegenthaler and B. Stauffer 1999). Let  $e_t$  be total anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in period  $t$ . The proportion of emissions contributing to the atmospheric stock is estimated at 0.64 (Goulder and Mathai 2000), (Nordhaus 1994b). This fraction accounts for oceanic uptake, other terrestrial sinks, and the carbon cycle (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1996). The linear approximation of the evolution of the atmospheric pollutant stock is

$$S_t - 590 = \Delta (S_{t-1} - 590) + 0.64e_t.$$

This equation states that 64% of current emissions contribute to atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>, and that CO<sub>2</sub> stocks in excess of the preindustrial level decays naturally at an annual rate of  $1 - \Delta$ . We take  $x_t \equiv 0.64e_t$ , the anthropogenic fluxes of CO<sub>2</sub> into the atmosphere, as the control variable. The stock persistence is  $\Delta = 0.9917$  (an annual decay rate of 0.0083 and a half-life of 83 years) (Goulder and Mathai 2000), (Nordhaus 1994b).

We assume that the preindustrial CO<sub>2</sub> concentration has zero environmental damage. Damages from higher CO<sub>2</sub> concentration are  $\frac{g}{2} (S - \bar{S})^2$ . (Row 2 in Table 1). For ease of interpreting the numerical values, we use  $\pi$  to denote the percentage loss in GWP (Gross World Product)

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<sup>15</sup>Manne and Richels (1992) estimate that the total global costs of stabilizing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions at the 1990 level are about 4,560 billions of 1990 US dollars, or 20.25% of the 1990 GWP. We take the same percentage loss and use the annualized value  $(1 - \beta) \times 20.25\% = 1\%$ .

from a doubling of the preindustrial CO<sub>2</sub> concentration. With the 1998 GWP of 29,185 billion dollars (International Monetary Fund 1999) we have

$$\pi\% \cdot 29185 = g/2 \cdot 590^2 \implies g = 0.0017\pi.$$

For example,  $\pi = 1.33$  which is widely used corresponds to  $g = 0.0022$ . For the sensitivity analysis we consider two other damage parameters,  $\pi = 3.6$  and  $\pi = 21.0$ , the mean and the maximum of expert opinions.

Using maximum likelihood, we fit the following data generating process for global carbon emissions over the 50 year period 1947-1996 from Marland, Boden, Andres, Brenkert, and Johnston (1999).

$$e_t = e_0 + nt + \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t = \rho\varepsilon_{t-1} + \nu_t, \quad \nu_t \sim iid N(0, \sigma_v^2).$$

The estimates are  $\rho = 0.9$  and  $\sigma_v = 0.1\text{GtC}$ . We convert the emission uncertainty  $\sigma_v$  into cost uncertainty  $\sigma_\mu$  by multiplying it by 0.64 (because  $x_t \equiv 0.64e_t$ ), and then by the slope of marginal abatement cost  $b = 26.992$  (because  $\theta_t \equiv b\tilde{\theta}_t$ ). The result is  $\sigma_\mu = 0.1 \times 0.64 \times 26.992 = 1.7275\$/(\text{ton of carbon})$ .

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