Meat Traceability: Are U.S. Consumers Willing to Pay for It?

David L. Dickinson and DeeVon Bailey

This article reports the results from a series of laboratory auction markets in which consumers bid on meat characteristics. The characteristics examined include meat traceability (i.e., the ability to trace the retail meat back to the farm or animal of origin), transparency (e.g., knowing the meat was produced without added growth hormones, or knowing the animal was humanely treated), and extra assurances (e.g., extra meat safety assurances). This laboratory study provides non-hypothetical bid data on consumer preferences for a sample of consumers in Logan, Utah, for traceability, transparency, and assurances (TTA) in red meat at a time when the United States currently lags other countries in development of TTA meat systems. Results suggest these consumers would be willing to pay for such TTA meat characteristics, and the magnitude of the consumer bids reveals that a profitable market for development of TTA systems in the United States might exist.

Key words: auctions, experiments, red meat, traceability, willingness to pay

Introduction

There are huge gaps from the farm to the processing plants. No one knows where the cows are coming from.... Trace forward from the processing plant is supposed to be accurate, but no one knows for sure.

— Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety Director Center for Science in the Public Interest

Recent research suggests the U.S. red-meat system is falling behind many of its major competitors and trading partners in terms of traceability, transparency, and other quality assurances (TTA) (Liddell and Bailey). In fact, Liddell and Bailey report the U.S. pork system ranks last when compared against the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand for TTA. They note that the U.S. red-meat inspection system is designed principally to control pathogens, while some competitors' inspection systems are designed not only to control pathogens but also to trace meat back to its origin and provide information on other “extrinsic” characteristics.

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1 Extrinsic characteristics refer to meat characteristics that neither affect food safety nor traditional government grading, but which are still valued by some consumers. Examples include assurances about animal welfare, social responsibility, or environmental responsibility.
Traceability is sometimes called “identity preservation,” and is defined by Liddell and Bailey as the ability to track the inputs used to make food products backward to their source at different levels of the marketing chain. Transparency refers to the public disclosure and availability of information on all of the rules, procedures, and practices used to produce a food product at each level of the marketing chain (Baines and Davies 1998; Early; Liddell and Bailey).

Quality assurance is comprised of three key elements: (a) managing hygiene to ensure food safety, (b) ensuring quality through grading and other measurements, and (c) providing mechanisms for product recalls (Early; Baines). For example, the processes for ensuring hygiene in the European Union (EU) red-meat system have focused on Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems beginning at the farm level.

Ensuring quality in red-meat systems includes measurements of the intrinsic quality of a carcass or product (tenderness, back fat, curing, etc.). Intrinsic quality measurements are common to most government grading systems, including those of the United States, its trading partners, and competitors. However, the EU system also provides measures of the extrinsic qualities of red meat. An example would be assurances of the absence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in a product. TTA is different from typical quality assurances and standardization in its scope (tracing throughout the market chain) and focus (certification of more than just food safety). Because some competitors do include extrinsic quality assurances in their red-meat products and the United States typically does not, we include extrinsic quality characteristics as part of our analysis.

An examination of the evolution of the red-meat inspection system in the EU in recent years is essential to understanding why TTA is an important issue. The emphasis on TTA in the EU evolved in response to the perceived regulatory failure of EU governments to provide adequate information to consumers during the EU bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis (Baines and Davies 1998). As a result, the EU has developed systems enhancing the credibility of assurances about certain attributes such as animal welfare, and even food safety issues such as BSE, by filling the perceived information void inherent in standard government grading practices with TTA. The EU demands accountability at all stages of the marketing chain, not only for red meat but also for other products (Jones). However, because of the BSE issue, red meat probably has been the most economically important, or at least the most politically important, application of TTA.

Although little direct red-meat trade takes place between the EU and the United States, the EU is a competitor in world trade for other markets, especially for pork in Japan (Liddell and Bailey). Perhaps more importantly, the EU system is influencing change by other major competitors such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay, all of which are developing trace-back, red-meat systems (Liddell and Bailey; Lewis; Early; Baines and Davies 2000; Abbatemarico).

Because TTA systems in the EU were implemented primarily in response to the BSE crisis, TTA was not used directly as a value-adding marketing strategy. Consequently, willingness to pay (WTP) for characteristics like traceability was not a primary consideration when requirements for providing traceability were imposed on market participants, but rather became a requirement to gain access to markets. Conversely, discussions in the United States about TTA have focused on consumers’ WTP. For example, at a recent conference discussing genetically modified crops, jointly sponsored by the Pew Initiative

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3 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy is commonly known as “mad cow” disease.
Dr. John Wiemers, chairman of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) Interagency Committee on Animal Identification, has stated that red-meat traceability systems will only be implemented in the United States if consumers are found to be willing to pay for the additional costs to produce traceable products—suggesting evidence of consumer WTP for TTA products is essential if TTA systems are to be developed in the United States. However, some TTA products have been developed by private U.S. companies. For example, Farmland Foods and Premium Standard Farms have developed TTA pork products. This recent exploitation of TTA systems by large U.S. firms clearly demonstrates the emerging importance of TTA systems and products in the United States, and emphasizes the need for study of this topic.

This article presents initial evidence on U.S. consumers’ WTP for TTA characteristics in beef and pork. We report the results from a series of controlled laboratory experiments in which consumers bid in a (theoretically) demand-revealing auction on meat sandwich upgrades. These WTP auctions generate non-hypothetical data on consumer valuation of TTA attributes in meat and are a first step toward identifying the potential U.S. market(s) for meat produced through a TTA system (Shogren et al. 1994b).

A limited amount of research has been conducted on characteristics that could be verified using traceability. For example, Lusk, Roosen, and Fox have examined consumer willingness to pay for beef products not treated with growth hormones or fed genetically modified grain. In a related study, Lusk and Fox also investigated the effect of mandatory labeling of hormone-treated beef, or beef that had been produced with genetically modified grains, on beef products. Other work by Grannis, Hooker, and Thilmany measured consumer preferences for selected characteristics in beef marketed as “natural.” However, to our knowledge, no study has directly examined consumer WTP for TTA in the United States.

Because very limited information is available on WTP for red meat with TTA characteristics, our results can help lower the risk of retail trials of TTA meat products. Our findings show consumers are willing to pay significant amounts of money to upgrade a sandwich to an otherwise identical sandwich containing meat with TTA attributes. Furthermore, our results suggest the market for TTA beef may be broader than the market for TTA pork, as auction market valuation of the latter is more sensitive to the specific demographic characteristics of consumers. Part of the focus of our analysis is on what consumers are willing to pay for extrinsic quality assurances because extrinsic characteristics are beyond the typical assurances of food safety and intrinsic qualities provided by public sector inspection and grading in the United States (Baines and Davies 2000).

**Background on TTA**

TTA is obtained through a system of records and certifications allowing a product to be traced and certified back to different points in the food chain. Currently, most U.S. red meat is traceable from retail back to the distributor or processor but not to the farm or animal level. Establishing TTA prior to processing would require a system currently not generally in place in the United States.

Red-meat producers and processors in the United States should be concerned that the U.S. system is lagging in terms of TTA, for at least three reasons. First, consumers have
become increasingly concerned about the processes (inputs and methods) used to produce food (e.g., Dorey; Nakamoto). Second, if competitors are able to differentiate their red-meat products as being superior to U.S. red-meat products in terms of TTA, the United States may lose market share in its export markets for red meat. For example, increased food safety concerns in Japan, including the recent discovery of BSE in beef, could potentially lead to heightened import restrictions and regulations (Nakamoto). Japan is the United States’ principal export market for red meat, and such concerns could eventually lead to a loss of U.S. market share if competitors such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Denmark are successful in convincing Japanese buyers their products are “safer” than U.S. products because their system provides more TTA than the U.S. system. Finally, consumers may simply be willing to pay for red-meat products with TTA characteristics, and a market opportunity may be lost to U.S. producers if such products are not developed in the United States.

Large investments will be needed to make significant changes in the U.S. red-meat system to address TTA concerns. Recapturing these investments will require capturing a significant market share of the red-meat market for products featuring TTA characteristics. This challenge will probably warrant a significant penetration of domestic red-meat markets as well as foreign markets. Consequently, measuring WTP is a critical component of the market potential for TTA products. A large-scale field experiment would be an effective but prohibitively costly way of conducting such research. As an alternative, the small-scale controlled laboratory experiments described in the next section offer a cheap way of generating initial data on domestic consumer attitudes about WTP for TTA.

Economic research on issues relating to TTA is quite limited because these systems have been evolving only within the past few years. The economic literature dealing with TTA focuses primarily on the aftermath of the BSE crisis in the United Kingdom. For example, Palmer, and Loader and Hobbs document the economic devastation to the British beef industry resulting from the BSE scare. Hobbs used transaction costs economics to examine the perceived value of tracing beef cattle from the farm to the packer level (1996a), and between beef suppliers and retail outlets in the United Kingdom (1996b). Her findings indicate traceability is the most important characteristic desired by large UK beef processors when purchasing cattle from farmers (1996a). Hobbs (1996b) also found that the ease of traceability ranked ahead of prices paid to processors as an important characteristic to consider when supermarkets in the UK purchased meat.

Latouche, Rainelli, and Vermersch reported that consumers in the Rennes area of France were willing to pay for traceability. However, their study focused entirely on the issue of BSE, and did not address more general issues relating to TTA. Verbeke et al. examined the attitudes of Belgian meat consumers about pork, and argue traceability systems would work best when coupled with efforts to improve intrinsic qualities such as leanness, taste, tenderness, and the extrinsic quality of healthiness. None of these studies provide information or data for U.S. consumers and all are narrowly focused, typically dealing with only one issue such as BSE.

One recent study suggests that improving animal tracking systems in the United States may be economically justified for beef because of the added efficiency these systems provide. Initial estimates suggest the investment at a single supply chain to implement TTA would be into the millions of dollars, depending on the level of TTA desired to be achieved (Buhr; Coe).
would provide in tracking animal diseases alone (Disney et al.). While the same study found that tracking systems for pork in the United States could not be justified solely for their benefit in controlling animal diseases, it suggested other benefits, such as consumer acceptance, could justify the implementation of tracking systems. These findings again point to the importance of information on consumer WTP if TTA systems were to be implemented in the United States.

**Experimental Design**

Data on TTA systems in the United States are not publicly available. Thus a laboratory market approach is used for eliciting individuals’ WTP for food traceability and related characteristics. Our experiments follow the design utilized in Shogren et al. (1994b) for eliciting bids to “upgrade” a meat sandwich. Subjects in the experiments are given a free lunch, which includes a meat sandwich, along with $15 cash at the beginning of a one-hour experiment. Subjects are allowed to bid on what they would be willing to pay to exchange or upgrade their existing sandwich for a sandwich with meat described as having one or more extra verifiable attributes. Subjects are informed their baseline sandwich meets current standards enforced by the USDA, but the baseline sandwich does not have the extra verifiable attributes provided in the upgrade sandwiches.

The upgrades considered are based on each of the elements of TTA: (a) transparency, which in the experiments is given by extra assurance or information relating to the processes used to produce meat, including animal treatment (humane treatment procedures and no added growth hormones used in production of the meat); (b) assurance, which in the experiments is given by extra assurance of food safety (extra tests conducted for *E. coli* or *Salmonella* for beef or pork, respectively); (c) traceability, which in the experiments is stated as the ability to trace the meat back to the farm of origin; and (d) all three upgrades combined. The respective auction sandwiches corresponding to these TTA elements are numbered as Sandwich 1, Sandwich 2, Sandwich 3, and Sandwich 4.

While it is apparent that much of the value of a TTA system is likely to be in the verifiable attributes of the product, and not just the fact the product can be traced back to the farm or origin, our use of an auction sandwich verifying only traceability is useful for two purposes. First, in valuing traceability by itself, we gain initial insights on consumer WTP just for this information net of the attributes which can be verified because of the traceability system. Second, the comparison of traceability bids to bids on other sandwiches will then provide insights into the perceived value of adding assurances about certain characteristics along with the traceability information.

Subjects were recruited from four different Utah State University demographic cohorts for the experiments. At the time of their recruitment, subjects were informed either beef or pork would be consumed as part of the free lunch. Each experimental group consisted of 13 or 14 individuals, on average. Eight experiments were conducted, with four experiments using ham sandwiches and four using roast beef sandwiches. Experiment participants were classified into four distinct demographic groups, such that the experimental

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4 Even though the beef used in the experiment was traceable to the animal level and the ham to the farm level, for consistency the participants were simply told for both ham and beef that Sandwich 3 contained meat traceable to the farm level.

5 The precise auction sandwich descriptions provided to experiment participants are available from the authors on request.
groups could be categorized as follows: (a) students, (b) faculty, (c) professional staff (e.g., accountants, administrative personnel, etc.), and (d) classified staff (e.g., maintenance workers, buildings and grounds keepers, etc.).

Experiments were conducted in groups of similar individuals for two reasons. First, it is often the case that individuals of similar sociodemographic populations shop in similar locations, and so this approach may help engage subjects in the auction process by lowering socioeconomic status barriers in the lab. Second, ex post controls for the experimental group can help uncover the potential importance of consumer demographics in estimating the market potential for traceable food products.

Subjects were recruited from a pool as diverse as possible from within the university population. The recruitment process was conducted either by classroom visit (for soliciting students), e-mail advertisement (for faculty and professional staff), or flyer (for classified staff). Recruitment methods for the various cohort groups reflect the peculiarities of contacting each group for notification of the experiment opportunity. Although classroom visits imply most subjects comprising the student experiment came from a small number of classes, advertisements for the faculty and staff experiments reached campuswide. To the extent individuals who respond to such recruitment methods may be different from others, our sample is likely not a pure random sample. However, this criticism would equally apply to a field experiment because those responding and participating may be distinct from those who do not participate.

Because the sample consists of individuals all affiliated with the university, some sample statistics from our overall subject pool are provided in table 1 to demonstrate the sample is representative. In addition to the information in table 1, the level of education completed by our sample ranges from high school to post-graduate degrees, though most had completed at least some college. Finally, 67% of the subjects reported they are personally responsible for making most of the food purchase decisions for their household.

Once the subjects arrived at the experiment site, they were seated with the free lunch in front of them, given the $15 cash, and told to await instructions before unwrapping the lunch sandwich. While subjects were given written instructions for the experiment, the instructions also were explained orally by the same experimenter in all experiments, and all clarification questions were answered prior to commencement of the experiment.  

Based on the auction format, subjects would place an anonymous bid to upgrade their existing sandwich to an auction sandwich, and the auction rules were those of a (theoretically demand-revealing) second-price sealed-bid auction. The sandwiches were constructed to have the same appearance and were visually inspected by each subject during the experiment instruction phase prior to bidding. The instructions clearly explained the different verifiable meat attributes in each auction sandwich.

After all the subjects’ questions were answered, bids from each subject were taken first for Sandwich 1, then Sandwich 2, then Sandwich 3, and finally Sandwich 4 (this constituted one round of the auction). Ten total rounds were conducted with each group.

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6 We chose not to include a pre-test auction with a candy bar (Shogren et al. 1994b) in our experimental sessions. Two additional experiments were later conducted using a pre-test candy bar auction for three rounds. The sandwich effects we report in this article are not altered by these additional experiments, showing the results reported in this study are not an artifact of excluding a pre-test candy auction. The results of the candy pre-test are available from the authors on request, as are all instructions related to the experiment.

7 The auction sandwiches were truly and verifiably different in the meat they contained. Imported ham from Denmark was used for the traceable (and related characteristics) ham, and one of the Utah State University farms was used to trace the roast beef (as well as to conduct extra safety tests and verify humane animal treatment.)
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the United States, Utah, and Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Utah</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Income*</td>
<td>$672 (median-males)</td>
<td>$544 (mean)</td>
<td>$588 (mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$511 (median-females)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Median Household Incomeb</td>
<td>$42,151</td>
<td>$46,094</td>
<td>$43,369 (mean)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Femalec</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Householdd</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


to allow for bid stabilization (see Hayes et al.; Shogren et al. 1994b; Shogren et al. 2001). Market price information (i.e., the second highest bid) for each sandwich was announced after each round and prior to eliciting the next round's bid for that sandwich. Subjects were aware that a random draw at the end of the 10th round would determine which of the four simultaneous auctions would be binding. A second random draw determined which of the 10 rounds would be binding. Consequently, only one of the auction sandwiches was actually auctioned in each experiment.

Subjects were fully aware prior to commencing the first round that there was a uniform chance of any round for any auction sandwich being the binding auction, and the subjects reported no confusion regarding their understanding of these procedures. At the end of the experiment, after the binding auction was randomly drawn, the appropriate auction was consummated by the winning subject paying the second highest bid amount to exchange his/her original sandwich for the auction sandwich. Thus, only one auction winner per experimental group consumed an auction sandwich. All subjects were then required to consume their sandwiches prior to leaving with their experiment cash.

Unlike the auctions reported in Shogren et al. (1994b), subject bids were not truncated at zero, although we expected individuals would place positive value on the attributes studied in this experiment. The benefit of this approach is that full demand revelation is allowed even if a TTA characteristic is considered a “bad.” The drawback is that subjects may submit negative bids strategically rather than to reveal true WTP (or, in such cases, willingness to accept).

Shogren et al. (2002) examine demand-revealing properties of the Vickrey auction when both positive and negative values are induced upon subjects and negative bids are allowed. While subject bids were demand revealing on average, results found by Shogren et al. indicate subjects who negatively value an item tend to overbid their true value for the item—i.e., they do not fully reveal the extent of their negative valuation of the item. As seen in the discussion of our results, negative bidding is rare in our experiments, and is found more often in early rounds—rounds not examined in our later regression analysis.

The auction format used in WTP experiments is an important consideration. While this study is not meant to test auction theory, one would hope the auction format

8 While some may find elicitation of bids on four products at once cumbersome and/or confusing for the subjects, Melton et al. elicit simultaneous bids on eight different pork chops after noting that consumers regularly evaluate from six to eight packages of a particular cut of meat on display at once.
employed does elicit true valuations from subjects. Some researchers report Vickrey auctions are demand revealing on average (e.g., Shogren et al. 2001), while others conclude bidders engage in strategic bidding (e.g., Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler). Some observe similarity in bids across auction mechanisms (Shogren et al. 1994a), and others do not (Rutstrom). To the extent bidding may be influenced by the particular auction design, there is well-justified concern over the validity of data from any particular study. It is not our intent to resolve this issue in the present study, but we note some useful guidelines in evaluating the data generated.

First, regardless of the particular auction mechanism used, the experiments provide valuable comparative data on WTP for different TTA attributes because the same auction mechanism is used to elicit values for each sandwich type. Therefore, valuable insights may be gained about the characteristics being tested. For example, the results can indicate whether or not individuals value additional food safety more or less than additional animal treatment guarantees.

Second, although the current research is an initial investigation of WTP for TTA attributes and is meant as a lower cost alternative to expensive retail trials, others may choose a more in-depth study at the outset. For example, Shogren et al. (1999) generate data from retail, survey, and auction markets to examine preferences for irradiated meat. It is noteworthy that their results offer support for the WTP information obtained from experimental auctions.

Ultimately, researchers are faced with the choice of whether to go beyond experimental data generation in the initial research stage, or in latter stages. Nevertheless, what is learned from experimental food auctions appears to be a useful input for the design of broader retail trials. As noted by Hayes et al., the most prudent approach is to view our WTP estimates as upper bounds on any retail WTP.

Results

The main results of average bid behavior for beef and pork are highlighted in figures 1 and 2, respectively. While the magnitudes of the average bids are important, our primary discussions involve comparisons of bids for different attributes of the same type of meat and for the same attribute for different types of meat. The comparisons across meat types are reasonable because the value of the sandwich in both the beef and ham auction is roughly the same. As stated previously, the magnitudes of the average bids are considered more as an upper bound on bids due to the nature of the one-day experiment (Hayes et al.). Nonetheless, it is apparent the average subject is willing to pay nontrivial amounts of money to upgrade the meat in a sandwich valued at approximately $3. Average WTP (averaged across all subjects and all rounds) to upgrade the roast beef sandwich is $0.23 to add basic traceability, $0.50 to add assurances on animal treatment, $0.63 to add extra assurances of food safety, and $1.06 to upgrade the sandwich to one in which the roast beef contains all three upgrades. For pork, the corresponding upgrades were valued, on average, at $0.50, $0.53, $0.59, and $1.14.9

9 Minor differences in the verifiable food-safety characteristic—e.g., Salmonella (ham) versus E. coli (beef) safety—imply the beef/ham results may not be entirely comparable, and therefore should be considered separately. These differences are consistent, however, with how extra safety assurances are implemented in existing TTA systems of other countries.
Figure 1. Average bids for beef (data averaged across all individuals and experiments, $N = 220$)

Figure 2. Average bids for ham (data averaged across all individuals and experiments, $N = 212$)
Although traceability for beef products is valued to some extent, subjects placed an even larger value on specific attributes which might be verified by a traceable meat system (figure 1). Bids for beef traceability are statistically lower than bids for both animal treatment assurances and increased food safety \( (p = 0.05 \text{ and } p = 0.01, \text{ respectively, for the two-tailed nonparametric Friedman test}) \). Similarly, a comparison between the specific attributes of food safety and animal treatment reveals higher bids for food safety than for animal treatment, although the significance of this comparison is marginal \( (p = 0.11) \). Subjects are also willing to pay significantly more for beef combining all three of these meat attributes in a single product \( (p < 0.01 \text{ for each comparison except all attributes compared with food safety, where } p = 0.05) \) than they were for the base sandwich. However, the average bid for the “everything” beef sandwich is less than the sum of the bids for individual meat attributes, suggesting subjects display a decreasing marginal WTP for additional attributes.

Figure 2 presents the comparable average bidding data for the ham sandwich upgrade. The bid data for each auction sandwich are not as neatly ordered for ham as they are for beef, but subjects are still willing to pay significantly more for animal treatment and food safety than for traceability \( (p = 0.10 \text{ and } p = 0.05, \text{ respectively}) \). As with beef, subjects are willing to pay significantly more for all attributes together in the sandwich meat \( (p = 0.05, 0.05, \text{ and } 0.01, \text{ respectively, for average bid comparisons of Sandwich 1 and Sandwich 4, Sandwich 2 and Sandwich 4, and Sandwich 3 and Sandwich 4}) \) compared to the base ham sandwich, but the average bid for the “everything” ham sandwich upgrade is less than the sum of the individual meat attributes.

Figures 3 and 4 show the average bid frequencies for beef and ham, respectively. As seen from figures 3 and 4, while the average subject is willing to pay significant amounts of money for meat with these attributes, a significant number of subjects—anywhere from 15% (food safety) to 55% (traceability) in beef, and from 21% (food safety) to 40% (traceability) in pork—place a zero value on some of the individual food attributes. As such, the conditional mean WTP for TTA attributes in ham and beef is even higher than for the overall sample, and is a better measure of WTP for the relevant market segment than the overall sample mean. The parametric regression results reported next help highlight whether the positive WTP of certain consumers is general across the demographic groups or specific to one or more demographic group.

Table 2 reports the results of random-effects estimates of average bids for ham and beef attributes. The dependent variable is the average of the final five rounds of bids for each sandwich for a given subject (i.e., average subject bids after bid stabilization in the auction trials). This modeling of the data treats each individual as the cross-sectional unit in our panel data (i.e., bids on several sandwich types for each of many individuals). As such, we take into account the potential non-independence of error terms for a given individual’s bids across sandwich types. Group-specific effects are also accounted for with group dummy variables for different demographic market groups. Differences in bidding

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10 The Friedman test is conducted using average bids across all rounds and all subjects as the unit of observation. The test assumes that bids across experiment groups are independent, but it also assumes some ranking can be assigned for bids across sandwich types (i.e., ranking of WTP in our case). As we show later, the basic results from this nonparametric test are consistent with the parametric regression results shown in table 2.

11 We have yet to find a satisfactory explanation for the apparent initial upward trend in ham bidding data versus the initial downward trend in the beef bidding data. The parametric regression results in table 2 avoid this issue by focusing on the average bid in the final five rounds of the experiment as the dependent variable. Recall also that the purpose of a 10-round auction is to allow for bids to stabilize, which they apparently do in both cases.
Figure 3. Average bid frequencies for beef (average individual bids from final 5 rounds, $N = 220$)

Figure 4. Average bid frequencies for ham (average individual bids from final 5 rounds, $N = 212$)
Table 2. Random Effects Estimation Results (dependent variable in ham and beef regressions = Average Subject Bid in Final 5 Rounds of Auction)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item/Independent Variable</th>
<th>Ham</th>
<th>Beef</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Observations</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.260</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market Price</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demographic Respondent Type:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.541</td>
<td>0.305</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.925***</td>
<td>0.230</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Classified Employees</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.566**</td>
<td>0.345**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meat Characteristic(s):</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sandwich 1 (animal treatment)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.151**</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sandwich 2 (food safety)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.163**</td>
<td>0.383***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sandwich 4 (combined characteristics)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.803***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
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</table>

Notes: Double and triple asterisks (*) denote significantly different than zero at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*a Base is Professional Staff.

*b Base is Sandwich 3 (traceability).

behavior are therefore separated into those resulting from group effects of the subject group and those resulting from the particular meat attribute of the auction sandwich. Each coefficient estimate for a subject group and a TTA characteristic reflects the marginal increase or decrease in bids estimated for that variable, relative to the baseline of bids by professional staff for the traceability sandwich (#3). Because strategic bidding—in a general sense, bidding higher or lower based on market price announcements—may be a concern in any WTP auction (Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler), a market feedback variable, Market Price, is also included which measures the average market price for a particular sandwich in the first five rounds of bidding. Note that Market Price is predetermined with respect to the dependent variable which measures average bids from the last five rounds of bidding.

Both students and faculty made significantly lower bids for ham than professional staff (although the result for students is only significant at the 10% level), while classified employees bid higher for ham than did professional staff (table 2). For beef, each of the other three subject groups placed higher average bids than the professional staff group, but the difference is only statistically significant for the classified employees. These group-specific effects could be a function of educational differences present in our cohort groups. Education levels are likely to affect the level of awareness of issues related to TTA, such as BSE or Salmonella outbreaks. Note the classified staff cohort in the experiments—the group possessing the lowest average education level in the sample—was willing to pay the highest premium for meat attributes in both the ham
and beef regressions. This result is not a function of differences in average income levels across cohorts because the student cohort has the lowest average income.

Table 2 also shows that students and faculty bid lower premiums on meat attributes for ham than classified employees and professional staff, but not so for beef, suggesting some demographic groups respond differently across meat types. Also, the range of the demographic group effects on average bid prices is narrower for beef than for pork in table 2, implying WTP for TTA pork may be more influenced by consumer demographics than for beef (assuming occupation is a key demographic variable). In either case, these results suggest significant demographic effects likely exist and are larger in magnitude for pork. Consequently, marketing strategies for TTA characteristics should perhaps not be uniform across meat types.

Subjects in both the ham and beef sandwich experiments would pay significantly more for animal welfare than for traceability alone, and significantly more for extra food safety than for traceability alone. The premiums for both animal welfare and food safety are larger for beef in comparison to pork. Subjects are also willing to pay significantly more for a beef or ham sandwich with the combined characteristics (Sandwich 4) than they would for a sandwich with only traceability (see table 2 and figures 1 and 2). The higher premiums on TTA attributes for beef compared to ham perhaps point to the existence of a higher degree of concern about the procedures used to produce and process beef than those for ham. A possible explanation for this finding may be the highly publicized food scares in recent years which have been more specifically related to beef.12

Finally, the coefficient on Market Price is statistically significant and positive for ham, but insignificant for beef (table 2). This finding implies there is some market feedback effect in our data for ham, and bids are increased as a result of market-price announcements in the Vickrey auction. Whether or not this is “strategic bidding” is unimportant. However, it is important that this effect be captured to ensure the remaining coefficient estimates remain unbiased in the ham model. The lack of significance of Market Price in the beef equation may be due to individuals initially possessing a better notion of their WTP for TTA attributes in beef. More publicized beef food scares in recent years may also explain this phenomenon.

Because average bid levels are also of interest, and not just the marginal effects of distinct groups or TTA characteristics, combinations of coefficients from the random-effects results are presented in table 3. As an example of how to interpret table 3, for the Classified Staff-Food Safety cell for ham, the coefficient of 1.095 is the sum of the individual coefficients from table 2 (0.366 + 0.566 + 0.163). Significance is tested using F-tests, and the null hypothesis is that the sum of the coefficients is equal to zero. As can be seen in table 3, the majority of average bid levels for distinct demographic groups and TTA characteristics are also significantly different from zero, though not all are positive. This perspective of the random-effects results corroborates the previous conclusions: A larger bid variance based on subject groups is apparent in the ham relative to the beef experiments, and bid levels are increased for combinations of TTA characteristics for all subject groups in both meat experiments.

How best to effectively communicate these experimental results about TTA or the results of broader studies, if they are conducted later, is an intriguing question. For
Table 3. Random-Effects Results: Average Bid Levels (combined coefficients)

A. HAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TTA Characteristic</th>
<th>Demographic Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Treatment</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Safety</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traceability</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>0.176</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

B. BEEF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TTA Characteristic</th>
<th>Demographic Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Treatment</td>
<td>0.551***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Safety</td>
<td>0.669***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traceability</td>
<td>0.286**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>1.089***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Double and triple asterisks (*) denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on results from $F_{1,204}$-tests of each linear restriction on combined coefficients.

Identifying the best method for verifying and communicating the information requires additional study, including retail trials. Retail trials will be especially critical for the promotion and labeling questions relating to TTA (e.g., how additional TTA characteristics should be labeled and how they should be valued, given other information is already provided on meat labels). The results presented here simply indicate some positive value is generally placed on these characteristics, and some TTA characteristics are more valued by consumers than others.  

Discussion

The experimental results presented here suggest many consumers, though not all, would be willing to pay for TTA characteristics in red-meat products. Average bids for each individual TTA characteristic as well as the combined characteristics were found to be positive in our subject sample. This finding suggests a significant marketing opportunity might be exploited if red-meat producers developed TTA products. Of course, these results apply only to the experimental group but, if verified with retail field trials, the

Another issue is what the "optimal level" of TTA is. However, this would require information about the marginal cost of providing each TTA characteristic. This information is not yet publicly available. For example, products can be traceable to the farm level or the animal level, but costs are quite different for these two levels.
results would imply a willingness by U.S. consumers to pay for TTA characteristics in red-meat products. Indeed, if these results are verified through retail trials, they would then meet the specific criterion suggested by John Wiemers of the USDA/FSIS for considering the implementation of these systems in the United States.

The implementation of some type of TTA system for red meat in the United States seems inevitable as our trading partners and competitors move rapidly to develop such systems. While possible TTA systems in the United States are being examined, and in some cases implemented, the USDA and producer groups in the United States have sought evidence that TTA systems would produce a net benefit to the industry.

Consumer WTP for TTA characteristics in pork and beef products was elicited in a non-hypothetical setting. Results indicate the experiment subjects would be willing to pay for TTA characteristics in red meat. The subjects seem to value specific TTA attributes or combinations of attributes more than just traceability in beef and pork, implying a system of meat traceability alone may not be valued enough by private consumers to justify its creation. Yet traceability itself could be a valuable public good in terms of limiting contamination outbreaks or even limiting the effects of potential terrorism strikes on the American food system. Moreover, systems offering traceability can provide additional information on TTA characteristic(s) that consumers value even more than traceability alone, based on the results from our experimental group. The characteristic most valued by subjects in our experiments was food safety. Consequently, safety guarantees are likely an important component of any profitable TTA system.

We also find some distinct results for beef and pork. Specifically, our subjects seem more willing to pay additional money for knowledge about animal treatment and additional food-safety assurances in beef than in pork; this is in addition to what subjects are willing to pay for meat traceability information alone. Therefore, markets for specific and distinct TTA guarantees in beef may be worth exploring more so than in pork. While subjects are willing to pay for TTA characteristics in pork, there is less evidence to show a difference in WTP for food safety and animal treatment guarantees versus traceability for pork than for beef. There is also evidence to suggest subjects’ occupations—a key indicator of consumer demographics—are less a determinant of WTP for TTA beef than TTA pork. This finding has important implications for any marketing strategy for TTA meat products because TTA pork may have to be targeted to more specific consumer demographic groups than TTA beef, which may have a broader potential market.

The results reported in this study are meant to be an initial step toward identifying the willingness to pay of U.S. consumers in retail markets for red meat with TTA characteristics. In the absence of such initial insights, there is a higher risk of proceeding toward retail field trials of TTA meat products, and so this study endeavors to provide valuable information for such field trials. These results not only need to be confirmed by field trials, but they also do not answer the question of how TTA systems would affect the cost structure for producing and processing red meat—the other important ingredient in determining market viability of TTA products. Nonetheless, these findings offer enough evidence to justify continued examination and determination of the most effective ways for implementing TTA in the U.S. red-meat system.

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References


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