Risk and De-Collectivisation: Evidence from the Czech Republic

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ABSTRACT

The replacement of wage-labour farms by family farms in Central and Eastern Europe during the transformation has been more limited than was initially expected. In this paper a formal framework is developed in order to analyse the behaviour of family farms and socialist-style farms in the presence of risk, given the typical post-socialist environment. Management incentives, ownership structure, lump-sum transfers and consumption choices are shown to have the potential to limit the size of family farms relative to socialist-style farms. The hypotheses are tested with survey data collected by the author in the Czech Republic.

Key words: transition, agriculture, structural change, risk, survey data

JEL classification: D21, D81, O18, Q12

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1. Introduction

A salient feature of the transformation process in post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries has been the relative persistence of socialist-era production structures in the agricultural sectors. Socialist farms were either collective or state farms. Both farm types had a separation between farm ownership, control over the production process and implementation of production tasks (they, and their successor organisations, will therefore be referred to as corporate farms). These were wage-labour farms, as distinct from the Western-type family farm, which are operated by an individual or a single household (here referred to as individual farms).

In the agricultural economics literature preceding the liberal revolutions of 1989-1991 in the region, socialist agriculture had long been identified as cost-inefficient due to incentive problems inherent in the governance structure of wage-labour farms (Pollak, 1985; Schmitt, 1993; IMF et al., 1991:157-158; Machness and Schnytzer, 1993:162; Mathijs, 1998:33). In consequence, privatisation, or the change in formal ownership titles, was expected to lead to structural change in agriculture, away from corporate and towards individual farms (World Bank, 1995:2; Csaki and Lerman, 1994:560; Sarris et al. 1999: 315-317); Mathijs et al. 1999:4-8; Swinnen, 1994:42,178). Also more recently, Lerman (2000:10) regards ‘individualization of former socialist agriculture as a valid goal, … since individual farms are the dominant organizational forms in market economies.”

However, as early as 1994 it could be noted that “already now it is clear that the process of farm restructuring … is taking a course which appears to be different from the original expectations of many Western European observers. … It is remarkable that farm enterprises … choose to reorganise as whole entities, without dismantling the collective structure” (Csaki and Lerman, 1994: 566, 573). In many Central and Eastern European countries, a considerable, and sometimes a majority share of agricultural land was, and still is worked by farming structures other than individual farms. This share is 92 % in Slovakia, 76 % in the Czech Republic, 72 % in Hungary, 48 % in Bulgaria, 37 % in Estonia, 35 % in Romania, 33 % in Lithuania, and 5 % in Latvia and Albania (Swinnen and Mathijs, 1999:24; Cungu and Swinnen, 1999:607)\(^1\).

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\(^1\) Figures are percentages of Total Agricultural Land. The year of measurement varies between 1996 and 1998, except
In the empirical literature, various reasons for the limited emergence of individual farms in most Central and Eastern European countries have been suggested, including malfunctioning factor markets and credit markets, asset incompatibility, land fragmentation, contract enforcement, and human capital problems (e.g. Sarris et al., 1999; Cungu and Swinnen, 1999; Mathijs et al., 1999).

The aim of this paper is to suggest another possible reason for the limited emergence of individual farming in the region: the presence of risk, and its differential impact on different farm structures. This argument, which would be complementary to the institutional issues mentioned, is based on the differences between individual and corporate farms with regard to the ownership-management-implementation division of labour, the relation between profit and income, the range of economic activities, and the interaction between household and farm business. The impact of these features on farm expansion in the presence of uncertainty is analysed theoretically and assessed with survey data.

2. Data

The data used in this paper were collected in two surveys conducted in the Czech Republic in 1999 by the author. These surveys were developed on the basis of interview work and a pilot study in Moravia (the eastern part of the Czech Republic) during 1997 and 1998. One survey was addressed to operators of individual farms, who were members of the Czech Association of Private Farmers (SSZ). The distribution of SSZ members over the administrative districts in the country was taken to be an approximation of the distribution of all Czech individual farmers. The survey among management of corporate farms in the Czech Republic was conducted in co-operation with regional representatives of the Czech-Moravian Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (representing co-operative farms and farm companies with limited liability and joint-stock structure. These are the for Albania (1995). Note that Poland and former Yugoslavia, while geographically in the Central and Eastern European area, are not relevant here. In both countries (and their successor states), family farms were dominant throughout the communist era, and de-collectivisation in the sense defined was not an issue in the transformation (see e.g. Pryor, 1992).

2 For interview findings, see Bezemer (1999)

3 The precise distribution was unknown due to the rapid growth of their number during the transformation and problems of definition.
successor organisations to socialist-era collective farms. Data on 193 individual farms and 69 corporate farms were collected.

Since detailed technical and financial information could not be collected in the survey, information from the Czech Research Institute for Agricultural Economics (VUZE) was used as a complementary source. This data set consists of a panel of 238 individual and 172 corporate farms and includes information on area, product mix, labour and wages, costs and revenues, production efficiency and regional location. The data from the VUZE data set and the two survey data sets were combined taking scale, scope and location into account.

3. Risk and Farm Organisation in Transition

Two observations are pertinent to the present account of why the individual farming sector remains limited. First, this is not so much due to the number of farms as to their size. In the case of the Czech Republic, in 1998 there were, according to the 'Register of Economic Subjects', 92,845 agricultural businesses with the legal form of 'physical person' (\textit{podniky fyzickych osob}), i.e. individual farmers. But the number of individual farmers also registered (this time in the 'Agricultural Register') as producing food (i.e. for the market) was only 32,365 (MACR, 1999: TA2.1/03; TA2.1/04). Of these 32,365 farmers there is area information for 22,971: over half (12,208) worked less than ten hectares and only 6 % (1,425) used over a hundred hectares. Between them they worked 24 % of agricultural land, with an average area of 26 hectares (MACR, 1999: TA2.1/05).

The bulk of the remaining land was occupied by 3,464 corporate farms (2,208 limited-liability or joint-stock farm companies and 1,256 co-operative farms). Of the 2,251 corporate farms for which area information is available, all worked over a hundred hectares, except for a minority of 232 farms, or about 10 %. The average area was 677 hectares for farm companies and 1,411 hectares for co-operative farms (MACR, 1999: TA2.1/03; TA2.1/04).

The same pattern can be observed in most other Central and Eastern European countries (see Sarris \textit{et al.}, 1999:309 for figures). Individual farms have been established in abundance, but most remain of marginal size relative to corporate farms. Explaining why individual farms stay small and

\footnote{Additionally, information in EBRD (1999), MACR (1994 -1999), and OECD (1995) was used to account for developments in productivity and for inflation. A detailed appendix describing the matching procedure is available on request.}
Corporate farms stay large is an important step towards explaining present agricultural sector structures in Central and Eastern Europe.

A second observation is that Central and Eastern European agricultural markets have been characterised by risk in the sense of variability of farm gate output prices\textsuperscript{5}. An illustration is presented in table 1, where price developments during the transformation in the Czech Republic and the European Union are compared. Especially in the years up to 1995, price fluctuations were large. These two observations may lead us to consider if there are mechanisms, inherent in the structure of individual as compared to corporate farms, that have constituted a larger disincentive to expansion for individual farms.

<insert table 1>

The implications of individual and corporate farming under risk are best studied by a formalisation of the production and income characteristics of the alternative farm types. Given a utility function $U(K,L)$ of the farm owner, a variable indirect utility function which is the dual of $U$ can be defined as $V(p,y)$, where $p$ denotes a stochastic output price, $y$ is income, $K$ denotes the quantity of capital and $L$ other factors of production used (an aggregate of land and labour). Abstracting from saving, utility depends on income and there is risk aversion so that $V_y > 0$, $V_{yy} < 0$. Consider the case of an individual-farm owner-operator. Expected total income depends directly on profit and can be defined as

$$E(y) = E(pF) - c(L,K) + B \quad (1)$$

$$F = F(L,K)$$

\textsuperscript{5} We analyse the implication of output price risk rather than fluctuations of input prices or of yields/productivity, since output prices appear to constitute the largest risk factor. Yet the same type of argument could be made for other risk sources.

\textsuperscript{6} Subscripts denote derivatives, superscripts refer to goods (or notes, as here). The basic assumption of this argument is a link between price fluctuations and utility of the farm operator. This may not always be valid. Price variability need not affect utility if wealth is sufficiently high to provide a buffer, if futures markets are used to hedge price risk, or if forward contracting is possible (e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982:99). However, farms in Central and Eastern European agriculture generally operate under none of these conditions. In the case of the Czech Republic, farm financial resources are typically limited, and hedging or forward contracting as risk-management tools have not yet started to develop in agribusiness (see e.g. MACR, 1999; Csaki \textit{et al.}, 1999:39).
\[ \mathbf{c} = \mathbf{p}^{K} \mathbf{K} + \mathbf{p}^{L} \mathbf{L} \]

where \( E \) is the expectation operator, \( B \) denotes non-stochastic, non-agricultural income, and \( c \) and \( F \) are the cost and production function, their values depending on prices and quantities of inputs\(^7\). This basic model can be used and adapted to show that there is a set of mechanisms that causes risk to have a larger impact on individual farm strategy than is the case in corporate farms.

**Investment under Uncertainty**

As Sandmo (1971) has shown, investment under price uncertainty is smaller than under price certainty\(^8\), inversely proportional to the sensitivity of the utility from income to price risk, which is \( \text{COV}(V_{y},p) \) in the present notation. Denoting the uncertainty case by a superscript asterisk, this can be shown by taking first derivatives of the utility functions under certainty and uncertainty:

\[
\begin{align*}
E(V_{y}y_{K})^{*} &= V_{y}y_{K} = 0 \\
E(V_{y}y_{K})^{*} &= E(V_{y}(pF_{K} - p^{K})^{*} + \text{COV}(V_{y}(pF_{K} - p^{K}) = V_{y}(pF_{K} - p^{K}) = 0 \\
\text{COV}(V_{y},p) < 0 \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (pF_{K} - p^{K})^{*} > (pF_{K} - p^{K}) = 0 \end{align*}
\]

A conventional focus in the production-under-uncertainty literature is on risk aversion of the decision maker, which is most often assumed an innate personal characteristic. In the present study the stress is on the sensitivity of utility from income to price risk, which is controlled both by risk aversion and by the extent to which price fluctuations translate into income fluctuations. The main analytical aim of this section is to show how, in the Central and Eastern European context, this extent may depend on farm organisation. Specifically, we will now analyse management incentives; ownership structures; lump-sum transfers; and production-consumption links.

**Management**

Corporate farms have a functional separation between labour, management, and ownership. Typically, owners of a part of the corporate farm have delegated most of the formulation of farm strategy to the farm management, who face a different incentive structure from the individual farm owner. Farm management income (denoted \( I \)) is not equal to farm profit \( y \), but usually for the larger

\[^{7}\text{In keeping with accounting conventions, the farmer is here assumed to value his own labour in monetary terms. This assumption can be relaxed without consequences for the subsequent analyses.}\]

\[^{8}\text{For conditions where exceptions may occur, see Newbery and Stiglitz (1982).}\]
part is a fixed wage \((w)\) and, possibly, a share \((1-t)\) of farm profit (which is normalised to 1). The simplest management income function that incorporates the above features is

\[
I = w + (1-t)y \\
s.t. \quad y = 1 \\
0 < t, I, w < 1
\]  

Under uncertainty, the optimisation problem for the individual-farm owner or corporate-farm manager is to set input levels such that \(E(V_y y) = 0\) and \(E(V_I I) = 0\), respectively. Assuming that \(V_y = V_i\), i.e. that a wealth difference between the corporate farm manager and individual farm operator owner does not affect the utility of income\(^9\), the above implies

**Proposition 1:** Employment of farm managers with a (partly) fixed wage results in lower investment in risk exposed production than in the certainty alternative, but higher than would be the case on owner-operated farms.

**Proof:** see Appendix

Since, as we have seen, under-investment is proportional to \(-COV(V, y)\), corporate farms under-invest less than individual farms, the difference being proportional to the fixed share of manager salaries \(t\) and inversely proportional to the marginal productivity of capital \(F_k\), corporate-farm over-investment (as compared to the individual owner-operated farm) will occur\(^{10}\). Other things equal\(^{11}\), the lower sensitivity of decision makers’ incomes to price risk in corporate farms as compared to individual farms is one possible reason for the fact that corporate farming continues to

\(^9\) Relaxing this assumption strengthens the argument if risk aversion is decreasing in wealth.

\(^{10}\) Note that Central and Eastern European farms are frequently loss-making, so that marginal costs are larger than marginal revenues and income \(y\) is negative. In such cases \((p^k-pF_k)\) is positive and \(COV(V_y F_k)\), \(COV(V_I p)\) still negative, while the same results obtain. The results suggest that both the usually completely fixed wages of managers and the low marginal productivity of factors of production (here: capital) in Central and Eastern Europe would cause the difference in investment and production to remain large.

\(^{11}\) The ceteris paribus condition captures other variables that affect price risk exposure such as the degree of diversification and location. The validity of these will be considered below.
be large-scale farming, relative to professional\textsuperscript{12} individual farms.

\textit{Multiple or Single Ownership}

Second, not only is the corporate governance structure characterised by the employment of management, also the farm is owned by many owners rather than one single owner. The farm feature of interest here is the number of owners relative to farm size. The individual farm is characterised as a small single-owner farm, the corporate farm as a large multiple-owner farm. Compare a single-owner farm of type \( s \) producing output \( F \) to a multi-owner farm of type \( m \) producing output \( kF \). Expected farm income is \( E(y) \) as in (1) for owners of farm type \( s \), but the \( n \) owners of type \( m \) have an income defined by

\[
E_{y_m} = (k/n)y_m + B_m
\]

s.t.
\[
k, n > 1
\]

Selecting output levels such that profit is optimised means \( E(V_{yF}) = 0 \) for both types\textsuperscript{13}. It follows that

\textit{Proposition 2: Multiple ownership causes corporate farm owners’ investment to increase with decreasing ratio of farm output level (k) to farm fragmentation (n).}

\textit{Proof:} see Appendix

The important observation is that, typically, \( k/n < 1 \) if Czech corporate farms in the sample are compared to professional individual farms (\( n=64 \) and \( n=184 \), respectively)\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{12} The restriction to only \textit{professional} rather than all individual farms is sensible, since other individual farmers typically do not market a considerable part of their produce, and to that extent are not subject to price risk. The present, and following arguments do not apply to such producers. Their position with regard to risk will be analysed below in proposition 4.

\textsuperscript{13} Since the cost function is here not relevant, we consider \( E(V_{yF}) \) rather than \( E(V_{yK}) \) which gives more algebra but the same result.

\textsuperscript{14} The average output level of corporate and individual farms in the sample was 330 and 1.5 million Czech Crowns in 1998. The average corporate farms had a management of 5 persons and a labour force of 95 workers, of whom 80 were
Lump-sum Transfers

There are four types of lump sum transfers (denoted $B$ in equation (1)) to those who decide over agricultural production levels (owners or managers) in corporate farms. These include subsidies; credit (both coming in periodical liquidity and postponement of ‘bad’ debts repayment); revenues from non-agricultural production (which, if non-stochastic, can be treated as lump-sum transfers); and non-agricultural wage income or allowances for owners. All of these are more important in corporate than in individual farms, and especially in professional\(^{15}\) individual farms (see e.g. Csaki et al., 1999 on differential access to credit and subsidies; Davis and Pearce (2000) on non-agricultural activities; and note that most owners of corporate farms have full-time non-farm jobs). This leads to

**Proposition 3:** Stable revenues from non-agricultural production, better access to credit and subsidies, and owners’ non-farm income are all lump-sum transfers that decrease sensitivity to risk and hence increase output level in corporate farms ($t$) relative to individual farms ($i$).

**Proof:** see Appendix

On-Farm Consumption

The above arguments all focus on exposure to price risk. As such, they were applicable to corporate and to professional individual farmers who actually market most of their produce, but not directly to the multitude of very small farms that are worked part-time or in addition to a non-farm income or allowance. On these small farms a significant share of farm output is consumed by the producer, used as gifts, or bartered (Tritten and Sarris, 2001). The behaviour of such producers differs in many aspects from that of market-oriented farmers (De Janvry et al., 1991).

As Roe and Graham-Tomasi (1986), Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) and Barrett (1996) have shown for family agriculture, home-consumption has the effect of income risk reduction.

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\(^{15}\) Professional individual farmers are here defined as people who derive over 75% of income from farming and devote...
Consumption of own production is equivalent to replacing part of money income from production with a stable, lump-sum in-kind transfer to it, valued at stable input costs. The difference with lump-sum transfers analysed above is that it is now endogenous, *i.e.* depending on output level.

Risk reduction through own consumption of produce occurs more often on small, individual than on large, corporate farms, for several reasons. For the majority of extremely small individual farms, increasing farm size reduces the effect of risk reduction from home consumption. Small individual farmers may therefore be caught in a ‘size trap’: they face an increase in income risk when they expand.

Also, very small individual farms are often worked in addition to a wage or allowance income that is large in comparison to professional individual farmers. Also this constitutes a relatively stable, non-agricultural lump-sum transfer to farming, with the effect of decreasing sensitivity to agricultural price risk, as shown above. Also this risk management advantage would decrease upon farm expansion, since total labour time is fixed on the owner-operated farm.

The implication of this analysis is that both large, multi-owner, manager-operated farms, and very small subsistence-type farms can diminish price risk for their owners’ incomes, while larger commercial family farms cannot. In this respect, transitional agricultural may be said to have a three-tier rather than the commonly posed dual structure (as in Sarris *et al.*, 1999).

In the formal analysis, we consider here only the effect of own consumption (we have already seen that exogenous lump-sum transfers decrease sensitivity to risk in proposition 3). Compare a professional to an ‘other’, i.e. small/hobby individual farm, denoting them by superscripts $a$ and $b$, respectively. Farms of type $b$ market a share $\alpha$ of their output $F$ and consume the rest. Consumed output is valued at certain price $p_v$, and equals a stable lump-sum transfer of quantity $B = p_v(1-\alpha)F$ to uncertain money income $E(y)_b$. If $\alpha$ is positive, some own consumption is preferred over marketing all of the output. Expected marginal utility from selling - equal to $E(p)$ - is

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16 These are, first, that the option to choose between buying and producing presumes one decision unit (the family) weighing both options. This is so in individual, but not in corporate farms, where decision making and co-ordination is more costly. Second, on wage-labour farms there are considerable transaction costs of allocating produce to workers. Third, the risk reduction effect is also less important for corporate farms since a considerable share of output must be consumed in order to effect appreciable risk reduction. Per-person consumption is limited physically, and given large output volumes (in relation to the number of potential consumers in the farm) there may simply not be enough consumers to effect a risk reduction that justifies the costs.
then apparently smaller than marginal utility from consumption (which is $p_v$). Thus, income for type $a$ is defined as in (1), while income for type $b$ is defined by

$$E(y)^b = \alpha E(pF) - c(L,K) + p_v(1-\alpha)F$$

(4)

where

$$0 < \alpha < 1$$

$$E(p) < p_v$$

The implication of the above is

**Proposition 4:** Consumption of own production and larger non-farm income shares in small individual farms decrease the sensitivity of income to risk and discourage farm expansion of smaller compared to larger individual farms.

**Proof:** see Appendix

**Does Diversification Matter?**

We will finally consider one possible objection to the relevance of the above arguments. These all aim to show that operators of corporate farms are less sensitive to price risk, and therefore less prone to reduce output levels in response to it. Alternatively, it could be argued that corporate farms indeed are less risk exposed because of their larger diversification. In that case, a smaller output-reducing response to risk would result from the farm output mix reducing *actual* risk exposure, not governance structures affection risk *perception*.

However, in the sample, diversification within agriculture was not important for risk reduction during transformation, for two reasons. First, in the actual variety in output mix was not much larger in corporate than in individual farms. In order to analyse the differences over farm types, diversification in the sample was measured by construction of a diversification index $D$. By definition, this should increase in the number of products and decrease in the share in revenues of a particular product. $D$ can then be defined as

$$D = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{r_i}{r} \right)^2$$

s.t.
\[ 0 < r_i, r < 1 \]

where \( r_i \) is the share of revenues from product or product group \( i \) in total revenues \( r \) from \( n \) products or product groups. If \( D \) is calculated including separately each of 10 main products in Czech agriculture (\( n=10 \)), its value is .74 for professional and .78 for other individual farms in the sample, but .84 for corporate farms, with negligible differences between corporate and co-operative farms. If crops and livestock are aggregated (\( n=2 \)), individual farms score .45 while corporate farms score .50, now with small differences within both groups of farm modes. So, while corporate farms are indeed more diversified, the difference is not large.

The second and most important reason why diversification was not very relevant is that, for diversification to effect risk reduction, there must be negative covariances between prices or price series of product or product groups. However, prices of the 10 main agricultural products moved largely synchronously during transformation (see table 2 in the next section). None of the bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients relating to all possible pairs of the 1989-1998 time series is negative and significant.

Whilst the effect of within-agriculture diversification on risk exposure of corporate relative to individual farms is thus limited in the period considered, this is not true for the other type of diversification, i.e. in activities outside the agricultural domain. These can be composed of relatively stable (i.e. non-stochastic) or of fluctuating revenues, which typically move in the opposite direction from agricultural revenues. Hence these incomes are equivalent to lump-sum transfers (of non-agricultural profit) to the agricultural activities of that farm, which decreases sensitivity to agricultural risk (proposition 3).

5. An Empirical Assessment

Testing the Theory
While the mechanisms proposed above are varied, they all have one implication, namely with regard to the sensitivity to risk of farm operators. Corporate farms operators (be they managers or owners) are assumed to be less sensitive to risk than are individual farm operators, while within the last group operators of professional farms are expected to have a larger sensitivity of income to risk than do ‘other’ individual farmers, if their output is valued at market prices.

The test is therefore: do corporate farm managers indeed exhibit a smaller reaction to changes in price risk than operators of professional individual farms, and will these in turn show a
larger reaction than other individual farmers? Ideally, one would like to track that reaction – which is an adjustment of output mix- for a sample of farms over a number of years, regressing, for instance, price risk for a given crop on hectares planted to that crop (as in Chavas and Holt, 1990 and Chavas et al., 1983). This ‘best practice’ approach relies on a sufficiently long time series for meaningful results, and the short transition period as well as the nature of the survey renders it unfeasible. Instead, in the present study it was considered that a lower sensitivity to risk implies, *ceteris paribus*, a higher exposure to risk. Hence a measure for risk exposure that could be applied to the survey data was constructed.

*Measuring Risk Exposure*

Price risk is commonly defined as the difference between expected and realised output prices (e.g. Tronstad and McNeill, 1989:631). Expected prices were defined as the average over the preceding 3 years plus a trend (cf. Lin, 1977; Hurt and Garcia, 1982; Chavas and Holt, 1990). Deviations of actual from expected price developments were calculated for each of the 10 main products in Czech agriculture. The per-product squared deviations in per cent terms\(^{17}\) were combined, in each farm observed in the survey, through a weighed summation. Since output price risk is studied, the weighting factor, for each of the 10 products, was the ratio of product revenues to total revenues. This share was calculated on the basis of production volumes as reported by the respondents. Thus the measure for price risk exposure \(R_y\) for each farm was:

\[
R_y = \sum_{i=1}^{10} \left( \text{rev}_{i,y} \cdot \text{risk}_{i,y} \right)
\]

where

\[
\text{rev}_{i,y} = \frac{r_{i,y}}{\sum_{j=1}^{10} r_{j,y}}
\]

\[
\text{risk}_{i,y} = \left\{1 - \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{3} (\theta_n p_{i, y-n}/p_{i, y})}{\Theta_3} \cdot \frac{\sum_{m=1}^{2} (\theta_m p_{i, y-m}/p_{i, y-m-1})^2}{\Theta_2} \right\}
\]

\(^{17}\) Price changes in per cent rather than in index points were used in order to avoid sensitivity of the risk measure to the base year of indexing.
where
\[ \text{rev}_{i,y} = \text{share in revenues of product } i \text{ in year } y \]
\[ r_{i,j,y} = \text{revenues of product } i,j \text{ in year } y \]
\[ \text{risk}_{i,y} = \text{price risk from product } i \text{ in year } y \]
\[ p_{i,y} = \text{real indexed price of product } i \text{ in year } y \]
\[ i = 1, 2, \ldots, 10 \]
\[ \theta_n, \theta_m > 0; \Sigma \theta_n, \Sigma \theta_m = 1 \]

In words, expected prices are defined as the average over the last three years plus the trend. For a given year \( y \) and a given product \( i \), the per cent deviations of actual from expected prices are squared. This squared deviation is product risk \( \text{risk}_{i,y} \). The 10 product risk measures are combined, for each farm, in a weighted summation on the basis of product shares in total revenues, to yield price risk exposure \( R_y \). Note that \( R_y \) is designed so as to capture not just general market risk (which is \( \text{risk}_{i,y} \)) but output price risk as experienced in each single farm; it increases with increasing variability in output prices, and does so more for products which are more important for total revenues in a farm.\(^{18}\)

We have noted that risk exposure and risk sensitivity vary inversely, \textit{ceteris paribus}. The most important of the ‘other’ factors is history, especially for corporate farms. The production structure in some year in the transformation, which controls the value of \( R_y \), may be an inheritance from the socialist era rather than (or in addition to) a variable at the discretion of managers and owners during transition. Corporate managers’ risk sensitivity and the risk reduction they effected during transition might have been as large as (or larger than) individual farmers’, while this need not show in corporate-farm production structures, and thus risk exposure in year \( y \).

This possibility could be taken into account, since respondents reported their production structures both in 1992 (the first effective post-reform year) and at the moment of surveying in 1998. This allows for a static comparison in risk exposure between the two years of observation (although it cannot reflect the response to risk experienced in the intervening years).

The survey data also allow for the calculation of risk exposure measures for each of the four types of farms in the survey. Two remarks on the farm subgroups are in order here. First, as noted, ‘professional’ individual farmers were defined as those who derived more than 75 per cent of

\(^{18}\) Different combinations of values for the weights \( \theta_n \) and \( \theta_m \) - which determine how important previous prices and price trends are in current price expectations - were tried. The findings reported below did not qualitatively change in the various combinations. Therefore the unweighted average (\( \theta_1 = \theta_2 = .5 \)) was used.
money income from farming and worked at least 40 hours weekly in their farm. This information was, however, available for 1998 only, and it is not valid to assume that 1998 professional farmers were already so in 1992. Consequently $R_{1992}$ is calculated without differentiation between professional and other individual farmers. This measure is therefore likely an over-estimation of individual farmers’ risk exposure, both because of the own consumption and the larger non-farm income of ‘other’ individual farmers.

Second, during the transformation, and especially after 1995, differences within the corporate-farming sector increased as profitable activities tended to become concentrated in the corporate rather than the co-operative farming mode. Often debts and activities with adverse prospects were left in the co-operative farm, while valuable assets and profitable farm activities were transferred to a (newly established) corporate farm. The co-operatives, although formally surviving, effectively became ‘empty shells’ (see Csaki et al., 1999:31,36,28). For our present analysis the important implication is that it were increasingly the corporate rather than the co-operative farms that reflected the strategy preferences of corporate farm managers. The decisions on changes in the product mix of co-operative farms were increasingly controlled by considerations other than the profit motive assumed in the analysis. Since the proportion of such ‘skeleton’ farms in the sample is naturally unknown, all co-operative farms will be included in the analysis, but their characteristics in 1998 can be expected to differ significantly from those of corporate farms. In particular, given the relation between profitability and risk, they can be expected to operate less risk exposed.

**Calculations and Findings**

In table 2 the development of prices of the 10 food products in the Czech Republic is shown, as well as the risk attached to production of each product, if quantified by the suggested formula.

<insert table 2>

It is shown that risk values differ considerably over products, in both years. Also the risk values were much lower in 1998 than in 1992, reflecting the greater price stability in 1998. With regard to the relevance of the arguments here presented, there are two observations. First, since these arguments relate to marginal adjustments in response to market prices, they are likely to have become more relevant during the transformation, since farm strategy became increasingly controlled by relative prices on established markets rather than by fundamental institutional change related to the creation of markets. At the same time, since the arguments rely on the presence of
price risk, increasing price stability during transformation implies a more modest role for these arguments in explaining farm size.

Turning from the relevance to the truth of this account, table 3 shows the values of risk exposure measures in 1992 and 1998 for both governance types and for their subgroups, if applicable.

<insert table 3>

The findings can be summarised as follows. First, both the 1992 and the 1998 risk exposure scores of corporate farms were, on average, higher than those of individual farms, the difference being statistically significant in both cases ($\alpha < 1\%$). Thus the main implications of the theoretical argument are corroborated: corporate farms are both larger and operate more risk exposed than individual farms. Second, the difference had increased in 1998 compared to 1992 in relative terms, from about a 3:4 to a 2:3 ratio. This means that, although larger risk exposure in corporate farms may still have resulted from production structures inherited from the socialist era, it was not reduced relative to individual farm exposure levels by their managers or owners during transformation. This is in line with their assumed smaller sensitivity to price risk. It appears justifiable to attribute the persistent difference to farm organisation and its impact on risk perception and exposure, rather than only to history.

Third, within the groups of the two farm types, professional individual farms produced less risk exposed in 1998 than other individual farms; and co-operative farms produced less risk exposed in 1998 than corporate farms. Although both observations are in line with expectations, the differences are too small to be statistically significant in this sample. This, in turn, implies that the overestimation of risk exposure in 1992 due to the inclusion of non-professional farmers in 1992 is probably not large$^{19}$.

6. Discussion

Methodological Limitations

In this paper an explanation for limited individual farming was offered that is theoretically tractable and consistent as well as empirically verifiable and corroborated by the available data. The

$^{19}$ Production structure in agriculture is obviously controlled by location as well as governance type, but this did not influence the conclusions. Risk exposure measures were also calculated after aggregation of farms by types and then by agricultural areas which differ in natural production conditions, as defined by the Czech Agricultural Research Institute. In each of these regions, higher risk exposure of corporate farms was observable, in both 1992 and 1998.
conclusion that risk may imply a larger incentive to under-produce for individual than for corporate farms stands, but should be qualified in several respects. First, several theoretically distinct mechanisms with one joint implication were empirically lumped together. It would be important to know which of these is the more relevant one. Although some indication of this has been given, there is room for more detailed empirical work here. Second, risk perception is just one factor controlling output mix and levels. While regional factors and history were accounted for, this could be more satisfactorily done in a regression approach. In addition, factors such as price level (rather than variability) and institutional factors affecting farm sizes (i.e. endogenous farm growth in the start-up phase; changes in support programs) would merit separate attention, both theoretically and empirically.

Since the conclusion of this study should be accepted with caution, there is a case for further research of the issue, also because of the possible implications for the effectiveness of agricultural policies. As better data and longer time series are becoming available in the future, this topic can be empirically investigated with the conventional regression approach (e.g. as in Chavas and Holt, 1990).

Risk Exposure and Survival

This account, while attempting to explain one phenomenon, also begs several new questions. In particular it would be strange that, while selection of production strategies that are systematically and excessively risk exposed is presumable punished in developed, competitive markets, corporate farms (having an innate tendency to overexposure to price risk) are apparently not weeded out by competition in favour of the supposedly more prudent individual farmers. Several answers to this puzzle may present themselves to readers familiar with the Central and Eastern European setting (see on the following e.g. Swinnen et al, 1997; Csaki et al, 1999; Sarris et al, 1999).

In the transitional economies, bankruptcy is often legally complex and rather easy to postpone. The underdevelopment of the legal and, especially, judicial system delays the exit of weaker firms. A related observation is that payment discipline is often still weak. Firms frequently operate in a situation of interdependencies inherited from the former economic system, which shows in such diverse phenomena as ‘bad’ debts to banks or excessive regional specialisation in agribusiness. Also legal enforcement of contract obligations is problematic and time consuming. Moreover the allocation of subsidies and credit is not generally towards the most efficient recipient. But often based on other rationales, e.g. networks and relations (Grabherr and Stark, 1997).

These circumstances hinder the development of normalised payment practices and financial transparency in farms. A crucial point is that they often advantage corporate farms, which are long
integrated in the economic system, more so than individual farms. Differential access to credit and subsidies, more ‘bad’ loans and more lenient payment practices may compensate the financial loss of overly risk exposed production. Such features of the transition economies may cause the tendency of corporate farms to stay large and operate risk exposed, to be perpetuated rather than punished.

Changes in Individual Farm Structures

A second question raised by the present argument and findings is that, while the main conclusion of this paper is that an increase in risk discourages individual farming, the sample information as well as official sources show that there was a surge in the establishment of individual farms in 1991-1995 (which were high - price risk years) and hardly start-ups afterwards (when risk had decreased considerably). Most individual farms in the sample were established in 1990 (27), 1991 (66), 1992 (48), or 1993 (24). In the 182 responses to the relevant survey question, only six farms were started after 1993. Official data show the same pattern. Between 1989 and 1994 the number of people working in what is classified as ‘natural person businesses’ (podniky fyzických osob) – comprising of mainly individual farms and practically equal to the number of businesses- rose from 2,000 to 31,217, and their share in total agricultural land (TAL) increased from virtually nothing to 22 %. In the second stage of the agricultural transformation, the number of people rose slightly to 34,000 in 1995, then fell back to 33,000 in 1996 and stabilised at 32,000 and 32,500 in 1997 and 1998; the share in TAL increased only slightly from 22 to 23 % (MACR 1999: TA2.2/03). At first sight, this could be interpreted as a contradiction of the present argument. But that would be to ignore two issues.

First, there are a number of differences between decisions on starting a farm and those on expanding or contracting farm size, notably with regard to reversibility of the decision and to welfare (income and lifestyle) consequences of it. The latter type of decisions is likely controlled by more, and more complex, factors than the former. This analysis refers exclusively to the relation between risk and farm size for existing farms.

A second point is that this is an explanation assuming established markets and attributing explanatory power to marginal changes in farm size in relation to marginal change in price variability. As such the explanation is better suited to account for the period after the institutional changes in the agricultural sector, i.e. the ‘second stage of the transformation’ starting in 1994-

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20 There was no series available for the number of individual farms businesses rather than people employed in it for the entire 1991-1998 period. In 1998 there were 32,500 people employed in 22,971 businesses, with the majority being single-family businesses.
1995. In earlier years, such adaptation processes were plausibly of marginal importance relative to many other factors. These factors include the more extensive individual-farm credit and subsidies support programs, and the initial enthusiasm for individual farming, no doubt partly based on ignorance regarding requirements for and hardships of family farming. In this period corporate farms were also forced to implement de-collectivisation procedures which implied decreasing in size.

It appears that after 1994/1995, de-collectivisation in the above sense was over and there was a roughly stable number of individual and corporate farms. If we analyse developments in this second stage (rather than compare 1989-1994 to 1995-1995), the development of individual farming does not seem to contradict the present account: it was the number rather than the size of farms that increased\(^\text{21}\).

**Policy Implications**

The policy implications of the suggested explanation differ from some and support other prescriptions implied by the conventional structure-efficiency approach (posing that, in competitive markets, ultimately those farm structures will emerge that are most efficient). In particular, it would follow that market liberalisation (in the sense of a decrease of price regulation) is not always a means to promote efficiency in post-socialist dual (in fact: three-tier) agricultural sectors. Market liberalisation proper would also imply a truly level playing field, *i.e.* the removal of differences in access to credit and subsidies, of ‘bad’ loans, and of payment arrears; and moreover the creation of a legal environment in which contracts are externally enforceable without excessive costs. If such a package of policies is applied, systematic overexposure to risk will bring its own punishment and the present argument becomes irrelevant. It is here that the analysis supports the consensus that reforms must be comprehensive, not partial in order to be effective.

Implementation of such ‘deep’ reforms is unfortunately a complex and long-term job, and a mere decrease in price regulation is often seen as a desirable first step towards a more efficient

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\(^{21}\) The increase in the number of individual farms between 1995 and 1998 (from 21,156 to 22,971) was larger than the increase in their share in Total Agricultural Land (22 to 24 %), and the average size of individual farms in 1995-1998 indeed decreased from 34 to 26 hectares (MACR, 1999:TA2.1/04). The increase in numbers was almost entirely due to an increase in the number of the very small, or ‘non-professional’ individual farms. The number of farms working between 10 and 50 hectares increased marginally from 7,985 to 8,102. Those in the 51-100 hectares size class decreased in number from 1,345 to 1,236. The number of farms working over a hundred hectares rose slightly from 1,379 to 1,425. But the number of farms smaller than 10 hectares increased considerably, from 10, 447 to 12,208.
allocation of resources. Yet in the absence of competition and effective institutions, mere price liberalisation may have perverse effects. Price liberalisation causes price risk to increase and introduces incentives for corporate farms to increase in size relative to individual farms. If corporate farms are less efficient than individual farms (see e.g. Mathijs et al., 1999), this implies, on average, an incentive to decrease efficiency on a sectoral level.

It may also be noted that the divergence between expectations and reality with regard to changes in farm structures towards a family farming sector is relevant for many transition countries, also outside Central and Eastern Europe (see, for instance, Prosterman et al., 1998 and OECD, 1998 for figures on Russia). High levels of uncertainty and risk have characterised these economies, both in the narrow sense of price fluctuation and in the wider sense of uncertainty arising from reforms, from the nature (or absence) of markets, and from the functioning of the administrative system. The argument made here would therefore possibly have a wider applicability to agriculture in the transition countries.

7. Conclusion

In this paper it was argued that one reason for the limited emergence of individual farming and the continued importance of corporate farming in Central and Eastern Europe may be the presence of price risk, in combination with differences between the alternative farm types. These include both differences in economic relations (access to credit and subsidies) and in internal farm features such as governance type and consumption behaviour. Given output price risk, these factors imply different incentives to the corporate farm manager and the individual farm operator and tend to facilitate a divergence in farm size. The theoretical conclusion is that individual farmers are likely to be more sensitive to risk and accordingly to under-produce to a larger extent than do corporate farm managers.

An empirical assessment showed that risk exposure is indeed smaller for individual compared to corporate farms. Although there are important qualifications to this conclusion, the suggestion is that consideration of risk and of governance structures may be fruitful in understanding structural change in agriculture during the transformation.
Appendix: Proofs

Proposition 1:
\[ E(V_y y_K) = E(V_I I_K) = 0 \]
\[ E(V_y (pF_K - p^K)) = E(V_I (1-t)(pF_K - p^K)) - tE(V_I(pF_K - p^K)) \]
\[ F_K E((V_y) p - \bar{p}) = F_K E((V_I) p - \bar{p}) - tE(V_I(pF_K - p^K)) \]
\[ COV(V_y,p) = COV(V_I,p) - (t/F_K)EV_I(pF_K - p^K) \]
Note that COV(V_y,p), COV(V_I,p) < 0 and pF_K > p^K and t>0
\[ \Leftrightarrow COV(V_y,p) < COV(V_I,p) \]

Proposition 2:
\[ E(V_y y_F) s = E(V_y y_F) m = 0 \]
\[ E(V_y p) s = E(V_y (k/n)p) m \]
\[ E(V_y p - \bar{p}) s = (k/n)E(V_y p - \bar{p}) m \]
\[ (k/n) < (> ) 1 \Leftrightarrow COV(V_y,p) s < (> ) COV(V_y,p) m \]

Proposition 3:
\[ E(V_y y_F)^i = E(V_y y_F)^t = 0 \]
\[ \wedge E(y)^i > E(y)^j \Leftrightarrow E(V_y)^i > E(V_y)^j \]
\[ \wedge \text{var } (y)^i > \text{var } (y)^j \Leftrightarrow COV(V_y,p)^i < COV(V_y,p)^j \]

Proposition 4:
\[ E(V_y y_F)^a = E(V_y y_F)^b = 0 \]
\[ E(V_y p)^a = E(V_y(\alpha p + p_v(1-\alpha)))^b = \alpha E(V_y p)^b + p_v(1-\alpha)E(V_y)^b \]
\[ E(V_y p)^a / E(V_y p)^b = \alpha + (p_v(1-\alpha)E(V_y)^b / E(V_y p)^b) = \alpha + (1-\alpha) (p_v/E(p)) \]
\[ p_v/E(p) > 1 \Leftrightarrow E(V_y p - \bar{p})^a > E(V_y p - \bar{p})^b \]
\[ COV(V_y,p)^a > COV(V_y,p)^b \]
References


Brussels: European Statistical Bureau


Wall at The Hague, The Netherlands, 11-15 October 1999. Organised by the Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS of the UNDP and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague, The Netherlands


### Tables

**Table 1: Food Price Indices in the European Union-12 and the Czech(o-Slovak) Republic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>EU-12</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Czecho-Slovak/Czech Republic</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>crops</td>
<td>livestock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Indices are based on real aggregate farm gate prices.


**Table 2: Prices and Price Risk in Czech(o-Slovak) Agriculture, 1989-1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>indexed real farm gate product prices</th>
<th>risk&lt;sub&gt;1992&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>risk&lt;sub&gt;1998&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rape seed&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rye</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar beet</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beef and veal</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Original prices are farm gate prices in current Czech Crown per ton for all products.
3. Potato figures refer to consumption potatoes.
5. A complete series of milk prices was available for class II milk only in 1994-1998. Price developments of class I milk deviate only a few percents from class II.


27
Table 3: Individual Farms Showed Less Risk Exposure Than Corporate Farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm type</th>
<th>value risk_{1992}</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Value risk_{1998}</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporate</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: corporate</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ co-operative</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>.185</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: professional</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ other</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a. = not applicable

Sources: Table 2 sources, survey findings and author’s calculations
Governance, Risk, and Restructuring in Transitional Agriculture