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# Does off-farm employment affect the choice of land rental Duration?

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## Does off-farm employment affect the choice of land rental

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### Introduction

- ♦ An increasing proportion of the rural labor force is working off farm with China's rapid urbanization(de Brauw et al., 2002; Parish et al., 1995; Rozelle et al., 1999). Off-farm labor participation in China depicts high geographical and temporal mobility. Rural migrants keep going back and forth between origin villages and destination areas(De La Rupelle et al., 2009).
- As more people working off-farm, the scope of land renting activity increases. However, land rental contract duration is generally ambiguous and short-term, potentially hindering land-related investment.

## **Objective**

This study examines whether temporary off-farm employment affects land rental decision and how does offfarm employment influences the duration of land rental contract.

## Data



- ♦ We focus on 1208 households that are representative of China's eight most important provinces for agricultural production (China's Rural Household Survey in 2012).
- In addition to information on land rental decision and contract duration choice, the data contains information on demographics, assets, land institutional arrangements, land use regulations, and land market restrictions.
- ◆ It also included detailed information on households' offfarm employment history from 2002 to 2012.

### Model


The model used is a two-part model. Define a binary indicator variable d=1 for households that participate in land rental market and rent out their farmland, and d=0 for households that didn't participate in land rental market. Suppose that the contract term T>0is observed for land rental market participants and T=0 is observed for nonparticipants. The **two-part model** for *T* is then given by:

$$f(\mathbf{T}|\mathbf{x}) = \begin{cases} \Pr[d=0|\mathbf{x}] & if \ \mathbf{T}=0 \\ \Pr[d=1|\mathbf{x}]f(\mathbf{T}|d=1,\,\mathbf{x}) & if \ \mathbf{T}>0 \end{cases}$$

Table 1. Distribution of Land Rental Decision

Land rental choice	Frequency	Percentage(%)
Households with land rented out	190	15.7
Households didn't rented out land	1018	84.3
Total	1208	100

Figure 1. Distribution of Land Rental Contract Duration



## **Estimation Results**

	Probit	OLS
Household Head's off-farm Characteristics		
Local nonfarm employment (yes=1 no=0)	0.00897	-0.245
	(0.148)	(0.248)
Migrant nonfarm employment (yes=1 no=0)	-0.0470	-0.460*
	(0.147)	(0.256)
If he/she is a technician/manager (yes=1 no=0)	0.101	0.0308
in no site is a technician manager (jes=1 no=0)	(0.130)	(0.223)
If he/she is nonfarm self-employment (yes=1 no=0)	-0.0388	0.394*
ii ie/siic is iioiitatiii seii-eiiipioyiicii (yes=1 iio=0)	(0.134)	(0.237)
Head's gender	-0.227	0.781**
riead s gender	(0.227)	
** **	0.00986*	(0.389)
Head's age		0.00370
W LILOWS F. L F.	(0.00597)	(0.0100)
Household Off-farm Employment Empowerments		
Household Size	-0.0423	-0.0616
	(0.0395)	(0.0723)
Household Average age	0.0140**	-0.0170
	(0.00659)	(0.0113)
Proportion of women member	-0.0106***	0.0157**
	(0.00376)	(0.00624)
Average education level	0.00491	-0.0226
	(0.0204)	(0.0353)
Proportion of Labor	-0.00837***	-0.00646
	(0.00256)	(0.00404)
Proportion of Labor with nonfarm skills	0.00190	-0.00241
	(0.00252)	(0.00430)
Proportion of Labor with nonfarm employment experience	0.00794***	0.00287
	(0.00216)	(0.00372)
Land Characteristics		
Rented land size		0.0723
		(0.0488)
If the rented land can be irrigated		0.0965
in the remed hand can be irrigated		(0.196)
Contract Characteristics		(0.170)
If rental contract is written/oral		0.672***
ii icitai contract is witten orai		(0.195)
If the counterpart if company/cooperatives		0.339
ii die counterparen company/cooperatives		(0.213)
		(0.213)
D	Yes	(0.204) Yes
Region controls Time controls		
	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.337***	0.337
	(0.481)	(0.956)
Observations	1,208	1,208

## **Conclusions and Discussion**

- ◆ In terms of household heads' off-farm employment, it doesn't affect the land rental decision significantly. However, household heads' with migrant work tend to choose short term contract.
- ◆ In terms of household off-farm employment endowments, households with younger average age, less women and less labor tend to rent out their farmland. Households with more women tend to choose long term contract.
- ♦ In addition, if the contract was written rather than oral, the contract seems to be long term.



