An Overview of International Development
Perspectives in History:
Focus on Agricultural and Rural Development

An Overview of International Development
Perspectives in History:
Focus on Agricultural and Rural Development

By

Donald E. Voth

SP 05 2004       September 2004

Donald E. Voth is a Professor Rural Sociology-Emeritus, University of Arkansas
An Overview of International Development
Perspectives in History:
Focus on Agricultural and Rural Development

Donald E. Voth
Professor of Rural Sociology--Emeritus
University of Arkansas

AGEC 4163
International Agricultural and Rural Development
2004
Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4
Perspectives on Development and Development Thought ................................................................. 4
What is Development, and how should it be measured?....................................................................... 5
Core Values of Development.................................................................................................................. 5
Three Objectives of Development......................................................................................................... 5
How is development distributed throughout the world?....................................................................... 6
The Process of Development.................................................................................................................. 8
The Demographic Transition.................................................................................................................. 8
The Stages of Growth.............................................................................................................................. 11
Reynolds' Historical Patterns and "Turning Points" .............................................................................. 12
The W. A. Lewis Model......................................................................................................................... 13
The Hayami Ruttan Model of the Development of Agricultural Technology ...................................... 13
From what angle do we look at development?..................................................................................... 14
Major Periods or Phases in International Development Thought when viewed from the Perspective of the West ................................................................................................................... 16
Early Industrial Revolution in the West 1750-1900 .......................................................................... 16
Colonial Period, 1850-WWII ............................................................................................................... 17
The Immediate Post-War Period 1945-1960 ...................................................................................... 19
Theoretical development ..................................................................................................................... 20
Development Approaches Used ........................................................................................................... 21
Reactions to this period ....................................................................................................................... 21
The National Planning Period 1955-1965 ......................................................................................... 21
Population Bomb/Green Revolution 1960-1973 ................................................................................. 23
The "New Directions" Mandate, 1973-1980 ....................................................................................... 25
The Superlatives of Capitalism, Structural Adjustment, and the "Washington Consensus," 1980 to the early 1990's .................................................................................................................. 27
Background ........................................................................................................................................ 27
Significant strategy developments ....................................................................................................... 31
"Policy Dialogue," "Structural Adjustment" and "Political Dialogue," or Democratization .......... 31
Privatization, incorporation of business development strategies, entrepreneurship, and credit ... 33
Decline of Agricultural Fundamentalism .......................................................................................... 33
Sustainability ....................................................................................................................................... 33
Participatory strategies ....................................................................................................................... 34
Civil Society .......................................................................................................................................... 37
Return to Poverty—and to the Present ................................................................................................. 37
Shifts in the World Bank ...................................................................................................................... 38
Reasons for the Change of Direction .................................................................................................. 40
Practical Implications of a More Nuanced Approach with a Focus upon Poverty Reduction .......... 41
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 42
Appendix 1: The Main Messages of the UNDP Poverty Report 2000 .................................................. 45
Appendix 2: "Voices of the Poor," A World Bank Report, Key findings ............................................ 47
References .......................................................................................................................................... 48
Introduction

This essay has developed gradually over the approximately 20 years, until 2000, that I taught what was then listed as AGEC 5163 and RSOC 5163, International Agricultural and Rural Development. The first draft was written during the “New Directions” mandate period, while the Green Revolution and its Agricultural Fundamentalism dominated and the Washington Consensus strategy was just emerging. Project funding was still common in international agricultural development, at least in USDA. A dramatic shift from the biological science research of the Green Revolution to Farming Systems Research was underway. The UoA Division of Agriculture had just obtained a $5.0 million “Strengthening” grant from USAID, and had successfully competed for several large agricultural development contracts; in Egypt, Haiti, Rwanda, and Burundi. Major updates were prepared in 2000, and again in the summer of 2004.

Because it developed over a long period of time the perspectives, the verb tenses, and even the quality of the document vary throughout. Hopefully readers will forgive, and not be too badly disoriented.

Perspectives on Development and Development Thought

It is, first of all, necessary to develop a basic frame of reference for discussing development and development thought. One way to stimulate this discussion is to pose the simple but profound question of which should be regarded as normal or natural, development or the lack of it, whatever that is. Is the phenomenal economic and social development that occurred to the Western world starting with the Industrial Revolution in Europe to be regarded as the norm of human existence, and the relative under-development of the Third World as the exception, or vice-versa? Whatever the answer, we must turn to a brief discussion of what development is, and how it is measured.

What is Development, and how should it be measured?

When statistical information about the relative levels of development of nations of the world is presented, the most common measure of development is the Per Capita Gross National Product (GNP), a number which constitutes a massive summarization of an almost infinite number of economic and demographic facts, including the structure of the population and the distribution of the benefits of this Gross National Product among sectors, among regions, and among sub-groups of the population. Other numbers may be used, of course, and it has become common to use measures such as the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR), which is the number of infant deaths (deaths before reaching one year of age) divided by the number of live births, usually times 1000, as a measure of socio-economic well-being. This measure is used for two reasons. Pregnant women and infants are, in many respects, the most vulnerable population groups. Hence infant mortality is highly responsive to the availability of basic food supplies, sanitary conditions, and basic medical care. The other reason is that it is, like the GNP, quite commonly available and is one, simple, summary statistic representing the entire country.

The measurement of development tends, however, to obscure what development is. It certainly is much more--and much more complicated--than simple summary measures of the well-being of people in particular countries. Todaro, writing in his excellent textbook on Economic Development, says:

"While economic progress is an essential component (of development), it is not the only component. Development is not purely an economic phenomenon. In an ultimate sense, it must encompass more than the material and financial side of people’s lives. Development should, therefore, be perceived as a multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of entire economic and social systems. In addition to improvements in incomes and output, it typically involves radical changes in institutional, social, and administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes and, in many cases, even customs and beliefs. Finally, although development is usually defined
in a national context, its widespread realization may necessitate fundamental modifications of the international economic and social system as well." (1985:61-62)

It is, thus, possible to speak of economic development, political development, social development, agricultural development, industrial development, and variety of other forms of development. And it is possible to speak of the inter-relationships among the economic, political, social, agricultural, and industrial development.

Elsewhere, in a more detailed discussion of the meaning of development, Todaro defines it in normative terms as follows:

"Development must, therefore, be conceived of as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of absolute poverty. Development, in its essence, must represent the whole gamut of change by which an entire social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of life widely perceived as unsatisfactory and toward a situation or condition of life regarded as materially and spiritually 'better'." (1985:85)

He, then, articulates three core values and three objectives of development, as follows:

**Core Values of Development**

- Life sustenance: the ability to provide basic needs
- Self-esteem: to be a person
- Freedom from servitude: to be able to choose (1985:85-86).

**Three Objectives of Development**

- To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic live-sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health, and protection.

- To raise levels of living including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and humanistic values, all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national self-esteem.

- To expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation-states but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery. (1985:87)
How is development distributed throughout the world?

The three major classifications of the countries of the world focusing primarily upon their levels of development are discussed by Todaro (1985:22-23), and that is the basis for these paragraphs. The United Nations classification system identifies three major groups among the Third World, the 42 poorest countries designated as the "least developed," 88 non-oil-exporting countries which are designated "developing nations," and the 13 petroleum-rich OPEC countries whose national incomes increased so dramatically during the 1970's--but have, in many cases, since declined as dramatically. Another is the classification system of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, which classifies countries into 62 Low Income Countries (LIC's), 73 Middle Income Countries (MIC's), 11 Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's), and the 13 members of OPEC.

Insert 1: WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 1990
(World Bank World Development Report Data)
This is a data set that has been available from the International Economics Department of the World Bank for a long time. In the 1990 version has some 32 tables, each with a large number of data items, for virtually all of the countries of the world, and for groups of countries, using the World Bank classification. The data in the data set are the World Development Indicators published as the annex to the World Development Report 1990. The data are packed on one diskette, which includes a program to display, extract, and print what is needed. Dr. Voth purchased this data set in the early 1990's, so can extract selected data for students to use. The data can be extracted in both hard copy and machine readable form accessible by virtually all common analysis packages, such as Lotus 123, SPSS, etc. Similar data sets must now---2004---must now be available on line.

With these data sources students can, using selected variables, perform analyses using countries as units of analysis. For example, one could examine the variables which are most highly associated with infant mortality rates, or with growth in per capita GNP, etc. World Development Indicators, 1990.

The World Bank has greatly expanded its data program, and data are now available on CD-Rom. Information about the 1990 version of the World Development Report's massive data archive could be obtained at the following web site: http://www.worldbank.org/wdi/cdrom/cdrom.htm.

Unfortunately, the cost of greater availability was higher in the 1990's. The print version of the 1998 World Development Indicators report was $60. The CD-Rom version of the data was $275. The 1998 World Development Report, itself, in print form, could be accessed on the WB web. Much (if not all) of it could be downloaded in the form of .PDF files (readable with Adobe Acrobat). A long list of World Development Reports is now available for download at http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/ (2004).
# Insert 2: Basic World Indicators by World Bank Classification of Countries, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country category</th>
<th>Col.01</th>
<th>Col.02</th>
<th>Col.03</th>
<th>Col.04</th>
<th>Col.05</th>
<th>Col.06</th>
<th>Col.07</th>
<th>Col.08</th>
<th>Col.09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low-income economies</td>
<td>2,884</td>
<td>36,997</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China and India</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>12,849</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other low-income</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>24,149</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-income economies</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>37,352</td>
<td>1,930</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle-income</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>24,451</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-middle-income</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>12,901</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low- and middle-income</td>
<td>3,952</td>
<td>74,349</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>22,240</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>14,017</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>5,158</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, M.East &amp; N.Africa</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>11,420</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>20,293</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely indebted</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>20,057</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-income economies</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>33,739</td>
<td>17,080</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD members</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>31,057</td>
<td>17,470</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,682</td>
<td>8,380</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total reporting economies</td>
<td>4,736</td>
<td>108,088</td>
<td>3,470</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exporters</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>17,292</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonreporting nonmembers</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>25,399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,101</td>
<td>133,487</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Col. 1  Population (millions) mid-1988  
Col. 2  Area (thousands of square kilometers)  
Col. 3  GNP per capita ($) 1988  
Col. 4  GNP per capita; av. annual growth rate (%) 1965-88  
Col. 5  Inflation; avg. annual rate (%) 1965-80  
Col. 6  Inflation; avg. annual rate (%) 1980-88  
Col. 7  Life expectancy at birth (years) 1988  
Col. 8  Adult illiteracy (%) female; 1985  
Col. 9  Adult illiteracy (%) total; 1985  

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the "World Bank" uses its own system, which divides all countries into six categories: low income, middle income, upper middle income, high income oil exporters, industrial market economies, and East European non-market economies. The first four groups include the 143 countries of the Third World and the last two include the 29 so-called First and Second World nations. We have this system available to us, with extensive data in machine readable form. If you wish to use it please contact the instructor, who can supply selected tables for analysis with spreadsheets or statistical packages.

Using the world Bank classification scheme, the world's population in 1990 was divided roughly as is indicated in Insert 2.

The relative proportion of the world's population in developing and developed regions of the world from 1750 until (estimated) 2100 is shown in Insert 3 below.

Insert 3:

The process of development, how it occurs and what brings it about, is, of course the key issue, about which whole libraries have been written. Here, we can only make a few preliminary observations, to return to the subject again and again throughout the course. It is, of course, a process that occurs over time. This has led to the articulation of a number of historical/evolutionary perspectives which are used to organize the various phases in the process. These include the demographic transition model, the "Stages of Growth" model of Rostow, the historical model of Reynolds which focuses upon key "turning points," (1985), plus a number of more abstract, ahistorical models of development economists, such as the Harrod-Domar model and the important Lewis model, to elements of which we will return several times throughout the course.1

The Demographic Transition

The demographic transition model is very simple, and characterizes basic population dynamics throughout the development process. In stylized form, it is represented in Inserts 5 and 6, which have been divided into four phases, which can be further grouped into three: the pre-transitional, the transitional, and the post-transitional. The pre-transitional stage represents traditional society, characterized by high and widely fluctuating death rates, high birth rates, and relatively low rates of population increase. The transitional phase is characterized, primarily, by declining death rates, a consequent widening of the difference between birth and death rates, resulting in rapid population growth. The phase also includes, subsequently, declining birth rates as well. The post-transitional phase is

1 Again, with the exception of Reynolds (1985) these models are all discussed thoroughly in Todaro (1985:62-82).
characterized by a new equilibrium—or near equilibrium—with low birth rates and death rates, and relatively low rates of population growth.

This model, in some form or another, is applicable to the historical development pattern of the entire developed world, as is illustrated by Insert 7 for Sweden and Mexico, and in Insert 8 for Germany. The Demographic Transition for Mexico begins to illustrate the significant differences between the early developing countries and those which have developed later.

The demographic transition model is an empirical generalization about the history of population. Its existence raises certain key questions, especially about the causes of declining death and birth rates, and, most importantly, about the relationship between declining death rates and declining birth rates. Is this model anything more than an empirical generalization about past experience?, or is there something inherent in the processes it describes?

Insert 3 shows the relative impact upon world population growth of the demographic transitions of the "developed" and the "developing" countries. Until about 1910 their growth exceeded that of the "developing" counties. Since then, the growth of the developing countries has greatly exceeded that of the developed countries.

The actual dynamics whereby the demographic transition occurs have caused great debate, a debate about that which causes fertility declines to occur. Is it the availability of birth control technology?, or general improvement in economic conditions?, or change in the fate and status of women?, or what? The debate has stimulated historical research into the origins of declining fertility in Western Europe during, or even before the Industrial Revolution. Many have attributed it to the rise of the "middle class family," a family in which the "quality" of children counts more than the quantity of children. This seems to have arisen very early in Europe, among rural people as well as among those who were urbanizing. Most interesting, though, is the fact that, since the early presentation of the demographic transition model by Warren Thompson in 1929 (Weeks, 1992, p. 75), when only the western, industrialized world could be said to have experienced enough of the transition to make it definable, until now country by country has, in fact, experienced it. Until quite recently Africa seemed to be an exception. However, now there is evidence that even among a broad group of African countries, and in spite of any significant economic improvement to cause it, fertility has shown distinct declines (Washington Post, 1998). A recent report shows the following fertility rates in 5 representative African countries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insert 4: Declining Fertility in Africa</th>
<th>Fertility Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This leaves only one major world region where fertility rates have evidently not yet begun to decline, the Middle East. Explanation of this will almost certainly end up placing some emphasis upon the role of women. On a purely correlational basis one of the country-level variables most highly associated with declining fertility in the past has been the proportion of women who have been to school.
The most widely accepted theory explaining population change over time is the demographic transition theory. It states that a population’s fertility and mortality will both decline from high to low levels as a result of economic and social development. The decline in mortality usually precedes the decline in fertility, resulting in high population growth during the transition period. Finland is a good example of a country that has passed through the four stages of the demographic transition.

Stage 1. High birth rate, high death rate = little or no increase. (Finland in 1785-1790)
- Birth rate 38 per 1,000
- Death rate 32 per 1,000
- Rate of natural increase 0.6 percent

Stage II. High birth rate, falling death rate = high growth rate (Finland in 1825-1830)
- Birth rate 38 per 1,000
- Death rate 24 per 1,000
- Rate of natural increase 1.4 percent

Stage III. Declining birth rate, relatively low death rate = slowed growth rate (Finland in 1910-1915)
- Birth rate 29 per 1,000
- Death rate 17 per 1,000
- Rate of natural increase 1.2 percent

Stage IV. Low birth rate, low death rate = very low growth rate (Finland in 1970-1976)
- Birth rate 13 per 1,000
- Death rate 10 per 1,000
- Rate of natural increase 0.3 percent

Source: Haupt and Kane (1980:58)

Figure 10
The Stages of Demographic Transition
The Stages of Growth

In 1960, Mr. Walter Rostow published what became a very influential book among political leaders, scholars, and the general public in the United States. In the opening chapter he wrote:
"This book presents an economic historian's way of generalizing the sweep of modern history. . . It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off into self-sustaining growth, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. . . . These stages are not merely descriptive. They are not merely a way of generalizing certain factual observations about the sequence of development of modern societies. They have an inner logic and continuity. . . They constitute, in the end, both a theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial, theory about modern history as a whole." (1960:1, 3, 4, 12, as quoted in Todaro, 1985: 63)

It was, of course, the "pre-conditions" and "take-off" stages that received the most attention. Rostow's treatment was thorough, particularly in its treatment of such things as the role of savings and investments and in the respective roles of the various sectors, including, very significantly, agriculture. The "stages" thesis has generated extensive discussion and criticism but, in many ways, the influence of the book in the early 1960's had more to do with the international political climate than with the specifics of its theory. But that is an issue to be treated later (see page 20-21).

Reynolds' Historical Patterns and "Turning Points"

Reynolds has recently published a comprehensive, historical study of development experience which, in contrast to most materials mentioned here, incorporates recent experience, at least until 1980. He says:

My schema thus includes three chronological stages: an era of extensive growth, followed (in cases of success) by a turning point, followed by an era of intensive growth extending in most cases to the present day. I find this schema useful in organizing historical experience and will follow it in later chapters. (1985:8)

He explains further:

A word now about turning points. My turning point marks the transition from a stationary to a rising trend of per capita output, a transition that is arguably important. But after my turning point, that is, within the intensive-growth era, there are additional dates that have sometimes been regarded as turning points and that are also important. One of these is the point at which declining birthrates overtake declining deathrates, so that the rate of natural increase begins to fall. This point, which in northwestern Europe and North America was passed before 1900, has been passed by some third-world countries only since 1960, and in most of those countries it still lies in the future. Another significant date is that at which the agricultural labor force, which goes on increasing for a long time after our turning point, finally begins to shrink in absolute size. This marks a late stage of intensive growth, a stage at which the

Insert 9:

The key feature of Rostow's highly influential book is the identification of five stages of national growth and development. These are: (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high mass consumption. Implicitly there is also a sixth: "beyond mass consumption," but relatively little attention is paid to it (pp. 82-83, 197). These stages he summarizes in the second chapter, after a very brief introduction. Then, chapters three through six each focus upon one of these stages, starting with the "preconditions." The last four chapters deal with a comparison of growth in Russia and the United States (chapter 7), "Relative Stages-of-Growth and Aggression" (chapter 8), "The Relative Stages of Growth and the Problem of Peace" (Chapter 9), and, finally, "Marxism, Communism, and the Stages-of-Growth" (Chapter 10). The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Second Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
suction of labor demand into urban activities is strong enough to absorb more than the natural increase of population in rural areas. (1985:9)

Reynolds goes on to discuss the relationship between his “turning point” and both the key turning point in the Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964) model, which they refer to as the “commercialization point,” at which an assumed initial pool of surplus labor has been drained away from the rural and traditional sector, and real wages begin to rise; and with respect to Rostow’s “Takeoff.”

The W. A. Lewis Model

The British Economic Historian W. A. Lewis is, perhaps, the Dean of Economic Development Studies, having written the first comprehensive textbook on the subject in 1955, and having received, together with T. W. Schultz, about whom we shall hear much more later, the Nobel Prize for his work on development economics in 1969. Lewis wrote an extremely influential article in 1954 entitled “Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour” (1954). This model was later modified, formalized, and extended by John Fei and Gustav Ranis (1964). We shall have more to say about it later. In very brief form, it views the economy as having two sectors, a traditional, rural sector and a modern, urban sector. The rural sector suffers from surplus labor, to the extent that labor has zero marginal productivity—additional labor contributes nothing additional to output. Under these circumstances, held to be common in under-developed countries, labor can be withdrawn from the traditional rural sector without any impact upon its productivity, and labor is available to the urban sector at a wage rate that represents subsistence plus whatever it costs to transfer the labor from rural to urban areas. One of the major policy implications of this model, which we shall examine later, is that it makes no sense to invest in the productivity of the rural sector, since to do so would only displace more labor. Initial investment must be in the urban sector, until it has “drawn off” enough labor to begin to affect the marginal productivity of labor in the rural sector. At that point an important structural transformation of the economy begins to occur.

While labor certainly appears to be under-utilized, or to be utilized inefficiently, in the traditional, rural sectors of developing countries, it was quite decisively shown by T. W. Schultz that the marginal productivity of labor is not zero in a wide variety of under-developed economies. And, it has also been shown, in sharp contrast to what followed from Lewis’ model, that investment in agriculture can have broad stimulative effects upon both economic growth and upon well-being of both rural and urban dwellers.

The Hayami Ruttan Model of the Development of Agricultural Technology

There is another model of development, whose focus is upon the agricultural development process. It is reproduced below. It has grown out of the work of Theodore Schultz and his “High-Payoff Input Model,” (Stevens and Jabara, 1988, pp. 132-133) and especially the “Induced Innovation” model developed by Hayama and Ruttan (1985). This model focuses specifically upon the path taken by agricultural development, which is said to be dependent principally upon a particular economy’s resource endowments, more particularly the relative real costs of land vs. labor.

Though Hayami and Ruttan, as well as Stevens and Jabara, pretend that their model has the capacity to incorporate the inter-relationships represented by all of the arrows in the model above, including institutions and cultural endowments, in fact the only one that is seriously considered is the manner in which resource endowments influence the path of the development of agricultural technology. Thus the model really represents the economic logic of the Green Revolution, in which the principal target of intervention to achieve development is the improvement of the agricultural technology available to poor farmers, intervention which—to be successful—must be based upon the particular resource endowments of the country. In common English this simply means “Appropriate Technology.” Large, U. S. tractors are not appropriate where labor is cheap and land is very expensive—big deal!
There is the suggestion, in the work of some of the Agricultural Economists of the Green Revolution, that try to go beyond that one relationship (resource endowments influence technology), suggesting (1) that resource endowments create "economic demand" for certain directions of the development of agricultural technology, and that these, in turn, (2) also create "economic demand" for changes in institutions, especially for the public goods represented by agricultural research and extension. Unfortunately, these suggestions are not developed, the logic of the demand for public goods is never explored, and the role of cultural endowments is more denied than considered to be relevant.

Nevertheless, the simple model suggested by the schema above does provide an excellent framework to keep in mind when considering the whole era of the Green Revolution and Agricultural Fundamentalism in the 1970’s and 1980’s. For example, the gist of the several books by Kusum Nair, without necessarily being explicit about it, pose the argument that cultural “endowments” often have a major and determinative influence upon the paths available for development of agricultural technology (Nair 1961, 1973, 1979, 1983), though a major burden of Shultz’s classic study (1964), supported and elaborated by Stevens and Jabara (1984), is to downgrade the importance of culture.

From what angle do we look at development?

Finally, before launching into a historical overview of "development thought," it may be helpful to be specific about the angle from which development is viewed. There are many countries in the world, some of which were highly developed during some "golden age" in the past and have since declined to the point that they are, now, viewed as, at least, "developing," if not "under-developed." Egypt is one, as is Iraq, or whichever contemporary nation-state may claim the mantle of ancient Persia and Babylonia. China, India, several of the states of Southeast Asia, and many others, would fall into a similar category. From the current perspective, and without distinguishing those with or without a previous "Golden Age," we can identify at least three, and perhaps four, groups. The first is the "early developing" countries of Western Europe and some of their colonies, such as the United States and Canada. The second group, which includes many of the countries of Central and Latin America, achieved independence early, and
experienced substantial development even prior to the Second World War. The third is those countries, most of which achieved independence since the Second World War, and which have either achieved a modicum of development since then, or those who are still striving to achieve it.

Our perspective is from the point of view of the first group--U. S., Europe, United Nations agencies, etc. Hence, our view is essentially Western, based upon the social sciences of the West. More importantly, we view development, to a significant extent, like the square onion of Insert 10.

Insert 10
The Square Onion of Development

Societal Development (Generic Process)

A society purposively intervenes in this generic process so as to stimulate development (e.g., by Research and Development, investments in infrastructure, etc.

Outside agencies (multi-lateral or bi-lateral) intervene (by request) to influence the development process

It can be said that during the development of the "early developers," that is, during the Industrial Revolution in the West, whatever happened was the action of the generic development processes, fundamentally without even the intervention of the programs and policies of those countries themselves. The modern social sciences arose, however, out of efforts to understand that process, and to develop the insights necessary at least to be able to control the growth and development of the domestic economy. The work of the Classical Economists was fundamentally of this nature. Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, was a guide to what should be done--and not done--in order to foster the economic development of the nation. I recognize, of course, that there could be--probably even was--a literature and set of theories about “the wealth of nations” from ancient China, the Middle East, India, or other major world areas and civilizations. Unfortunately, I do not have them. Who does? What are they?

It is really only after the Second World War that the third, and outside, layer of the onion was reached, when countries, such as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, etc., in dealing with their ex-colonies, or international agencies such as the United Nations, or the United States in order to "build a world safe for democracy,” saw fit to try to intervene in the affairs of other countries so as to support and stimulate their economic development in a bilateral or multi-lateral fashion.
Major Periods or Phases in International Development Thought when viewed from
the Perspective of the West

Seven rather distinct periods can be identified quite easily. The first is the early industrial revolution in the West, which occurred, roughly, from 1750 until 1900. The second is the Colonial Period, extending, perhaps, from about 1850 until the end of World War II, or 1945. The third is the Early Postwar Period which began, of course, in or around 1945, and which ended somewhere around 1960. After this the phases that are identified begin to become a bit more detailed, and to overlap a bit in time. The next ones are the National Planning period, from about 1955 until 1965, the Population Bomb/Green Revolution Period, from about 1960 until 1973, the "New Directions Mandate," which, in retrospect, may not deserve to be identified as a separate period, but which lasted from 1973 until about 1980, and, finally, the "Current Period," which began about 1980.

These periods are each discussed below in some detail.

Early Industrial Revolution in the West 1750-1900

It was during this period that what we now regard as "modern" "developed," or "industrialized" society first emerged in Western Europe. It was a period of quite rapid and radical change in social and economic organization, involving changes in attitudes and values, basic social and political organization, demographic behavior, and in international relationships. It marked the end of mercantilism and the rise of colonialism.

It was during this period that development theory--or economic development theory--first emerged in the West in the writings of those who are now referred to as the "classical economists," Adam Smith (1723-1790), Ricardo (1772-1823), Karl Marx (1818-1883), and Malthus (1766-1834). At the time, of course, they were not what we currently think of as "economists." Rather, they concerned themselves with what, then, was referred to as political economics, or even political philosophy, and their writings and ruminations spanned the breadth of what now includes at least economics, political science, and sociology. Among them also were the "fathers" of contemporary Sociology, figures such as August Compte (1798-1857), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), and, later, Max Weber (1864-1920), whom many regard as the father of the modern study of formal organizations and bureaucracies.

2 To divide history into periods is always presumptious, the presumption being the peculiar perspective of the author. Other similar treatments, with their own peculiar presumptions, are [Eicher and Staats chapter] and Waelbroeck (1998). Since economists seldom pay attention to developments in anything beside their own discipline, one expects a certain narrowness of focus in these treatments, but see especially Sen (1984, pp. 485-508).
Economists have sorted out the strictly economic concepts articulated by these early social scientists (Meier and Baldwin, 1963:17-65), so we only review them very briefly here. Several important things are characteristic of them:

1. They posed fundamental questions about social and economic organization and reorganization, the relationships among economic behavior, political behavior, and sought to explain the changes that were occurring in the world which they lived in and observed.

2. They saw the economic system in rather simple terms, terms that represented the agricultural economy of the traditional society. The components of an economy were, simply, wages, which went to labor, rent, which went to land owners, and profits, which went to capitalists or entrepreneurs. They focused upon the inter-relationships and distribution of these components.

3. Their view of the world was already fundamentally nationalistic, but, emerging, as they were, from a period when mercantilism underlay most national economic policies, they advocated less government intervention into economic behavior, advocating the positive effects of Adam Smith’s famous “invisible hand.”

4. Their focus was upon the “wealth of nations,” and they tended to be pessimistic about the long term, a pessimism that derived, in large part, from the principle of diminishing returns and the principles of population dynamics articulated by Thomas Malthus. They did not have, as yet, any real sense of the profound influence of new and changing technology.

Colonial Period, 1850-WWII

During this period some of the intellectual and policy directions originating in the previous period expanded and developed. For example, a stimulating literature emerged on the basic origins of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, representing interchanges among Tawney, Weber, and Marx. It was in this exchange that Weber wrote his famous “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” which emphasized the impact that religion, specifically the Calvinistic doctrines that emerged in Geneva,
Switzerland, had upon behavior stimulating the rise of capitalism. The influence of this is evident throughout several of the following periods of development thought, especially, for example, in the comprehensive work of W. A. Lewis (1955).

With respect to development theory, there was a tendency to abandon the "big" questions with the development of neo-classical economics, moving to consideration of on-going economic behavior, and economic growth, rather than economic development. Schumpeter, who wrote during this period, was an exception, since he continued to focus upon the process of fundamental social change during the development process, and particularly upon the role of entrepreneurship in development.

Other elements of development theory that emerged, and that were of specific importance to the under-developed world, much of which was subjected to colonialism during this period, were the theory of dualism, or of the dual economy articulated by the Dutch economist Boeke, and the emergence of a strong sense of social Darwinism in the social and economic philosophy of the day. Social Darwinism, the need for expanded markets, and an expansionist religious philosophy were all used, of course, to justify colonial expansion of the western powers all over the world.

Although it is difficult to say when--or whether--the Industrial Revolution was completed in the west, it is true that during this period most of what we normally think of as constituting that revolution was accomplished in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. It also marked the effective completion of the demographic transition for these countries.

To the extent that there was a development strategy being pursued by the Western Powers, it involved colonialism, which included the following strategies, and consequences:

1. Indigenous regimes were defeated and/or suppressed, and metropolitan administrations were established. The pattern of administration varied substantially, of course, with different colonial powers relying, in varying degrees, upon local administrators and administrative structures. In any case, in virtually all of the colonies government, even local government, became an instrument of the metropolitan power in the eyes of the people, hence its only basis for legitimacy was, initially, force, and, subsequently, whatever it might offer in terms of services and protection.

2. Many national boundaries were redrawn, and redrawn, frequently several times, depending upon the relative "pecking order" in Europe. For example, Germany, which claimed significant territories in Africa until being defeated in the First World War, was deprived of all of those territories after the war, requiring major realignment of boundaries.

3. The colonies--developing countries--were simultaneously turned into raw material producing economies and into markets for cheaply produced products--such as textiles--from Europe.

4. There was substantial infrastructure developed in the colonies, including roads and bridges, railroads, postal systems, and communications capability. To a lesser extent western education was introduced as well.

5. Western ideas of democracy were inevitably diffused, even though the Colonial Power may have been very reluctant to let that happen. At least some elites from the Colonies studied abroad. They usually returned imbued with a desire to achieve, for their own people, what they had seen in the Metropole, and what they read in the books of the West.

6. Of course the roots of revolt and the eventual anti-colonial struggle were planted, and in some cases assiduously developed during this period. There seems to have been a typical pattern, more or less as follows: First there was an initial "royalist" opposition to the colonial power, an opposition that was based upon an effort to reinstate the traditional political regime. This was followed by efforts to organize "modern," "western" political parties and/or political organizations. Then, when these were rebuffed by the colonial power, there was frequently a turn to more tightly organized and radical
opposition, an opposition which assumed the inevitability of armed conflict. Frequently these movements became dominated by highly skilled communist parties.

With respect to agricultural and rural development, it is important to note that, although some research, education, and even extension institutions were established in some of the colonies, they were heavily focused upon the production of industrial products for export to the Metropole. In some case, for example in parts of Africa during the 1930’s, severe famines did get the attention of Colonial Administrators, influencing them to at least give consideration to the development of food supplies within the colony, but relatively little was accomplished until after the Second World War, and after gaining independence.

**The Immediate Post-War Period 1945-1960**

"Development thought" in its contemporary form really emerged after the Second World War. The initial post-war period lasted from 1945 until about 1960, and was characterized by the following:

1. Perhaps the most important thing that happened to much of the developing world was gaining independence. India gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947, and this was followed, until the middle 1960’s, by the acquisition of independence by a very large portion of the world that was at that time regarded as under-developed. In Southeast Asia, at least, observing Asians (Japanese) ordering Caucasians around, putting them into prison, etc. is said to have had a profound effect upon Asian populations, who suddenly recognized that Asians could be powerful and dominant. After this, colonialism was doomed.

2. This period began intensive interest in economic and social development, resulting, especially during the period immediately following it, in very substantial investment into scholarship on development.

3. A concern with the poverty observed in the developing countries dominated, and it was regarded as basically unnecessary. The experience that emerged very rapidly in the rebuilding of Europe and Japan led to a feeling that it would be relatively easy to alleviate poverty and help these countries get on the road to development.

4. The U. S., or at least, a western model was assumed as the goal or target of all development. In spite of its uniqueness, some regarded the U. S. as "The First New Nation." It was common, then, to identify characteristics about which under-developed countries differed from the U. S., and to conclude that these (a) would have to change and, (b) that these were the causes of underdevelopment.

5. Anti-communism and the Cold War quickly became a dominant motive in U. S. policy concerning under-developed countries—-and Europe as well, of course.

6. Development thought was, fundamentally, anti-agriculture during this period. There are several reasons for this:

   a. The agricultural sector (not exactly the same thing as the "rural" sector, but nearly) was regarded as basically a consumption sector rather than an investment or productive sector. That is, any investments made in agricultural production would simply increase consumption and not result in an increase in the capital stock of the country. It was assumed that the capital stock needed to built up first, and only then could scarce investment be made in agriculture.

   b. Agriculture was not a "leading" sector. In contrast to other sectors, it was felt that growth and development in agriculture could not have a profound effect upon other sectors, such as the urban, industrial sector.
c. W. A. Lewis' thesis that the rural sector suffered from surplus labor, to the extent that the marginal productivity of labor was zero, implied that investment in agriculture would be wasted, and that the demand for labor from the industrial sector had to become so strong as to "draw off" this surplus before the agricultural sector could be expected to change substantially.

d. The terms of trade for agricultural products, like all primary products, were seen to be disadvantageous. Hence, developing countries usually took the position that they had to work frantically to be able to export higher valued, manufactured products, in order to have more influence in international markets.

7. Progress was disappointing during this period. This resulted, in part, in a view that "blamed the victim." Sociological and Anthropological views tended to view Peasant farmers, and traditional cultures, as irrational, or at least non-rational, resistant to change, unable to "defer gratification" enough to engage in serious savings and investment; as corrupt, etc. Many economists espoused Boeke's dualism, claiming to find fundamental differences between attitudes and behavior in the traditional sector compared to the modern sector. What was needed, many felt, was a strong dose of the "protestant ethic." Perhaps one of the best summaries of this set of views can be found in the reader by Wharton (1969).

**Theoretical development**

This was, really, the beginning of the second phase of intense interest in development. And, following the lead of the classical economists and some of their followers, it focused very broadly upon economics, sociology, anthropology, and political science. The work of Lewis, in particular, was important as a beginning. It is instructive, then, to list some of the chapter titles of this important book (See page 18).
The name that received the most recognition, however, was Rostow, for his *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Still, most of this intense interest in development did not flower until the following phase, since for a significant portion of this period development was still regarded as fundamentally natural and relatively easy to achieve.

**Development Approaches Used**

The prevailing approach included three elements: Community Development, Agricultural Extension, and Industrialization and Capital Formation. Community Development emerged simultaneously in the United States, in Europe, and in the developing countries, as a strategy with which local people could, when supported and stimulated by a local community development specialist, or Village Level Worker (VLW), and with support from government, take the initiative to improve the conditions of life in their own communities.3

What effort there was in agricultural development was dominated by agricultural extension, simply because it was not yet fully appreciated that U.S. or European techniques, varieties, etc., could not be transferred directly to the fields of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. However, it should be noted that it was during this time, in about 1947, that the Rockefeller Foundation began, in Mexico, a serious effort at bringing the possibilities of agricultural research to the developing world (See Stakman, et al., 1967).

**Reactions to this period**

The lack of immediate success caused the "development community" to, in a sense, turn inward and become much more serious about trying to understand development. There was a shift to theory, a shift in economics, from micro-economics to macro-economics, and the beginnings of a shift in the views about the role of agriculture. And, perhaps most importantly, Community Development declined as rapidly as it had grown. The reasons given for the demise of Community Development are complicated, and are discussed in some detail in Voth and Brewster (1989) and Holdcroft (1979). It is said that (a) it focused too heavily upon consumption and upon social services, and not enough upon production, (b) it became captive to local, village elites, who would not tolerate the social change necessary for development, (c) that it simply failed to achieve what was expected, and (d) that the various specialists, and specialist agencies, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and its personnel, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Public Works, etc., had no respect for, and could not tolerate, the role of the generalist Village Level Workers, who were supposed to mobilize local citizens to carry out their own projects and, even, to demand services from the respective specialized agencies.

**The National Planning Period 1955-1965**

---

3 See Voth and Brewster (1989) for an overview of what community development was, and how it was implemented, in 25 countries in 1959 through bilateral assistance from the United States alone, not including similar programs from Great Britain, France, and the United Nations.
This period was relatively brief, but was, in many respects, a natural reaction to the perceived short-comings of the immediate postwar period. If development is really difficult and complicated, perhaps it is necessary to take a deep breath, and do it all according to a national plan. And, perhaps it will be necessary to be quite specific and self-conscious about what investments are made in what sectors of the economy, so as to optimize their impact. The period may be said to have begun with the promulgation of the first five-year plan of India, in 1955. Industrialization was sought, of course, for reasons that are explicit in the discussion of why agriculture received a relatively low priority.

One sees, during this period, the influence of scholars such as Rostow, and several key things are characteristic of it:

1. The focus was still upon industrial development, but carefully calculated investments, in large part by government, or the public sector, were to play a key role.

2. Associated with this focus was an emphasis upon sectoral analysis, and upon attention to the relationship among sectors in the development process.

3. Considerable attention was given, during this period, to the development of, and investment in, "social overhead capital." Social overhead capital included such things as health care, education, communications, etc.

4. International and development studies reached their peak during this period. Large amounts of money from both private foundations and the government were channeled into the development of Area Studies programs, and programs of research and education focusing upon development. Perhaps the most significant--certainly the most formidable--was the two-volume study of Gunnar Myrdal entitled The Asian Drama, which examined development in India and Pakistan and which, because of its tone of pessimism and complexity, probably contributed substantially to the significant reaction or "failure of nerve" among social scientists which became evident later.

5. Perhaps the most important development of this period, however, was the full emergence of the U. S. Cold War strategy which had been based upon the work of Rostow. The major elements of this strategy were quite simple:

   a. The Stages of Growth include certain pre-conditions for a "take-off" which, when it occurs, leads to "self-sustaining growth." There is a strong implication then that the task of stimulating development is to help bring about these pre-conditions. Once that has been done, development will occur, more or less spontaneously.

   b. Investment, and the rate of investment, is an important pre-condition. Investment, at least, can be imported from outside, in the form of assistance or "foreign aid."

   c. Communism and, especially, local communist parties, which had become very attractive to the masses of under-developed countries, were assumed to be attractive primarily because of the misery in which these people lived. Its attractiveness would be reduced, or even eliminated, if there were some improvement in living conditions.

   d. Community development could be used as an instrument to directly touch the masses of people with immediate attention, and benefits in terms of local social services, education, etc.

   e. What remained, was a way to hold back the progress of the local communist parties, which received support from the Soviet Union and China, until such time as the take-off occurred, and self-sustaining growth was evident. At that point the communist threat would disappear. This justified, at the time at least, what was regarded as temporary military intervention to hold back the communists and to allow the natural process of development to occur. (See Voth review and critique of Rostow).

Makes sense, doesn't it?
6. There was still a strong sense that fundamental sociological or cultural inhibitions were responsible for underdevelopment. Much of the very extensive research on development during the period dealt with this, going back to the work of Max Weber, trying to come to grips with the history of development in Europe, and including Japan, which never had a protestant ethic as such, to try to understand development. Programmatic responses emerged in the form of efforts to train business people in developing countries to be entrepreneurs, to be more rational, risk-taking, and "universalistic," etc., so as to make them perform more like western "economic men." Important scholars who worked in this vein were McClelland (1965), Hagen (1962), and Foster. Rogers (1969) summarized, in a relatively brief article, the generally negative stereotype of peasant farmers involved in this view, and Wharton's volume (1969) brings together a wide variety of views concerning it.

One aspect of development theory that emerged from this perspective was consideration of entrepreneurship (Ba, 1992), an issue which had been dealt with in some detail by Schumpeter, and which arose during this period as a potentially important determinant of development which could, perhaps, be influenced by outside interventions. Wilkin has written an excellent review of the relevant literature (1979).

Population Bomb/Green Revolution 1960-1973

There were really four important intellectual developments during this period. They include the population bomb, the early success of Green Revolution technology and the shift to an agricultural research strategy for development, the loss of nerve of development social scientists, and the emergence of a strategy of development in which agricultural development became fundamental to the development process. This is referred to later as "agricultural fundamentalism." A major source concerning both the Green Revolution and the Population Bomb is Dahlberg (1979).

The "Population Bomb" scare burst upon the world scene soon after 1960. In many, perhaps most, developing countries there had not been a national census of population since before the war, say from 1930 to 1940. Around 1960 most of the world had been enumerated in a census, and the results showed very rapid population growth in the developing world and, of course, the post-war baby boom in the developed world. Several biological scientists with a decidedly Malthusian perspectives popularized the eminent threat of excess population.

Many social scientists who had been working on development had, in any case, become impressed--perhaps "depressed" is a better word--with the complexity of development, and especially with the importance of such intractable issues as corruption, inept administration, the Cold War, etc., that they were about ready to lose their nerve anyway. It began to be felt that the scholar/policy-maker, especially one coming to a country from the outside, probably had little to offer until fundamental issues of corruption, despotism, extreme social stratification, etc., were dealt with, perhaps in a revolution. And, because of the rigid positions that had emerged due to the Cold War, it was getting more and more difficult to talk seriously about things like land reform, substantial social change, etc.

At about the same time the successes that had been achieved with Green Revolution technology, which had their roots in the early efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation and its agricultural scientists, such as Norman Borlaug, began to become evident, and large investments were being made in the special agricultural research laboratories throughout the world which became the network of International Agricultural Research Centers (IARC's).

In close association with the development of Green Revolution technology, a synthesis about agricultural development and the role of agriculture in development began to emerge from the extraordinary work of agricultural economists led by Theodore Schultz and his many students. Schultz and his students essentially turned the conventional wisdom about the role of agriculture upon its head. This has been a remarkable intellectual achievement, partially summarized in Shultz's book, and thoroughly--but densely--presented in the two articles by Johnston and Mellor (1961), and Mellor and Johnston (1984). Its major elements include demonstrating that Lewis' argument that the marginal
productivity of labor was zero in traditional economies is wrong, that traditional farmers and peasants
behave rationally in the allocation of their resources, that the reason for low productivity in traditional
agriculture cannot be traced to any attitudinal or cultural impediments, but, quite simply, to inefficient
agricultural production technology. Finally, it has demonstrated that, to a significant extent, agriculture
can and, perhaps even, must be the base of economic development, the sector in which economic
development must begin. Furthermore, broadly based agricultural development has broad impacts upon
the well-being of both the agricultural and rural sectors, as well as the urban and industrial sectors.

All of these generalizations involve very complex issues of theory, measurement, and empirical
reality, most of which are touched in one way or another in our textbook by Stevens and Jabara, which
essentially articulates agricultural fundamentalism in its theoretical treatment of agricultural development.

Obviously, development programs and development practice experienced significant changes
during this period, abandoning concern about "development sociology," and even "development
economics," and focusing upon population issues, design and implementation of population control
programs and, most importantly, a significant shift of resources into agriculture, especially into agricultural
research, and most especially into plant breeding, since it is there where the most interesting successes
had been achieved. Perhaps the most enduring legacy of this period is the extensive network of
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARC's) (See list on page 24) throughout the world and
agricultural fundamentalism as a strategy of development, both of which have served agricultural
development theory, strategy, and practice extremely well, although neither no longer holds the position
of prominence that it did during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

As is usual, there has been a reaction to this period. Recently, and due to significant ideological
and political shifts within the United States, efforts to support population control have come under severe
criticism, and have been very significantly reduced in scope and hampered by regulations. The Green
Revolution and its dominance elicited some reaction and criticism quite early, criticism that tended to
focus upon the distributional effects of the new technology, claiming that, although production increased,
the small and tenant farmers did not benefit. Some argued, in fact, that they suffered from the effects of
the new technology (See items on the impacts of the Green Revolution in the bibliography). A more
fundamental reaction emerged from among International Agricultural Research Center researchers and
others closely associated with the movement, however, and this focused upon questions about the
acceptability of Green Revolution technology. It was observed early that the yields achieved on the
research stations were not being achieved in farmer's fields. This led to an interest--especially at the
International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines--in analyzing the "constraints" to achieving high
yields. A program of research on these "constraints" was launched, which carefully partitioned them into
biological constraints, management constraints, etc. Similar developments occurred elsewhere in the
world, all of which led to the development of what came to be called Farming Systems Research (FSR),
later Farming Systems Research and Extension (FSR/E), the focus of which was to do work on farmers
fields in cooperation with farmers so as to be more sensitive to the complexity of the actual production
systems within which farmers worked. More will be said about this later (Voth, 1992, 1993).

"Agricultural fundamentalism" has always been subject to criticism, and perhaps the most
sustained critique of it has been the various writings of Kusum Nair (see references). Since her early
book, Blossoms in the Dust (1961), which concerned the early programs of community development in
India, Nair has insisted in exposing, using the methods of a journalist, the complex socio-cultural
environments and factors which influence the behavior of farmers throughout the world. Her most direct
challenge is, perhaps, the book that is aptly entitled In Defense of the Irrational Peasant (1979).
Although the critiques of population control programs and of some of the excesses of the Green Revolution have had very significant impacts upon development thought and practice, the criticism of Nair and others has not really dethroned agricultural fundamentalism. More recently policy considerations associated with "structural adjustment" and "policy dialogue" have brought macro-economic considerations to the fore, which has, to an extent, reduced the interest in, and commitment to the fundamentally micro-economic, production economics orientation of this view. Otherwise, it is still widely accepted and adhered to. See United Nations, FAO (1996) for a relatively recent effort to evaluate and draw lessons from the Green Revolution by some who are basically sympathetic.

### The "New Directions" Mandate, 1973-1980

In the 1973 revision of the Foreign Assistance Act, the legislation that defines current foreign aid programs of the United States and authorizes funding for them, a "New Directions" mandate appeared. International development had been essentially "bogged down" because of the war in Southeast Asia, the initial enthusiasm of the Green Revolution was wearing off, and some criticisms of it were beginning to appear, and, during the Carter administration, there was a heightened concern about such things as human rights, the distributional effects of U. S. aid programs, etc. The elements of the New Directions included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Agricultural Research Centers (IARC's)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRRI International Rice Research Center, Los Banos, Philippines, founded 1960, works on rice and multiple cropping.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMMYT International Center for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat, Mexico, founded 1964, Corn Wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT International Center for Tropical Agriculture, Cali, Columbia, founded 1968, Beans, beef, cassava.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIP International Center for Potatoes, Lima, Peru, founded 1972, Potatoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRISAT International Center for Irrigation and Dry Land Agriculture, Hyderabad, India, founded in 1972, Sorghum, pearl millet, pigeon an chick peas, peanuts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILRAD International Laboratory of Animal Diseases, Nairobi, Kenya, founded in 1974, Animal diseases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVFDC Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, Taiwan, founded in 1974, Vegetables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICARDA In Aleppo, Syria, Arid Agriculture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFDC International Fertilizer Development Center, Muscle Shoals, Alabama, founded in 1975, Fertilizers in developing countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISNAR International Service for National Agricultural Research, the Hague, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Targeting upon the poorest of the poor countries.
2. Targeting upon the poorest within the target countries.
3. Involving the supposed clients or targets of development programs as much as possible in program design and implementation.

There were a number of other important developments in international development strategy that emerged during this time, not necessarily directly associated with the "New Directions" terminology in the legislation. These included:

1. The emergence of three somewhat related development strategies, Farming Systems Research (FSR), Integrated Rural Development (IRD), and the Basic Needs Strategy.
2. The passage of what is now referred to at "Title XII" of the Foreign Assistance act.
3. A continued commitment to agricultural development, following agricultural fundamentalism, but a shift of focus from commercial crops to food crops.
4. Another view of international development, which at least attempted to present itself as a true alternative to the conventional views most common--and most thoroughly treated here--emerged to prominence during this time. This was the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was articulated by developing nations during the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly in 1974. "In this session, convened in the immediate aftermath of the petroleum crisis, the General Assembly concluded its deliberations by committing itself to work urgently for the establishment of a new international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality, common interest and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems, which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations." (As quoted in Todaro, 1985:560).

This represented the accomplishment of the work of a large number of scholars, policy-makers, and leaders of developing nations who had, for a long time, been critical of conventional development theory and practice. These views are, perhaps, best referred to as "critical" theorists. Many, but not all, were strongly influenced by Marxist views of development.

5. Several major studies of the World Food situation were performed, first in 1970 and then again in 1980 (Note that there was at least one more World Food Summit in the fall of 1996. See FAO and USAID sources for information.)

6. Finally, as is evident from the "New Directions" mandate itself, as well as from concern with the World Food situation and the NIEO, this was a period of intense concern about equity in development. The "Basic Needs"
strategy approached equity in a peculiarly simple way, calling for a focus upon initially meeting basic food and health needs, so as at least to prevent starvation and death. Measurement, then, became important. How does one determine when basic needs have, in fact, been met. For this, the Infant Mortality rate (IMR) became an excellent proxy. There had, of course, been a long-standing interest and concern about the role of equity in development. Previous scholars had tended to believe that it was probably necessary for equity to decrease as development occurred, since consumption would have to be delayed, and those who had wealth to save and invest would, to a degree at least, have to be favored. This was vigorously debated during this period. Todaro has an excellent chapter reviewing this debate (1985:137-178).

Obviously, this was a period of intense interest in international development, and one in which there was considerable creativity concerning development strategy although, the period, itself, was short-lived. However, many of the things that emerged to prominence during this time have remained with us. Or, perhaps more accurately, they emerge again and again, once in the form of a strong interest in “food security” in the 1980’s and more recently as a highly controversial emphasis upon poverty in the post-Washington Consensus period.

The Superlatives of Capitalism, Structural Adjustment, and the “Washington Consensus,” 1980 to the early 1990’s

This period, only now beginning significantly to wane, is remarkable for the dramatic shifts in world alignments, international relationships, and development policies and strategies which occurred. At risk of some considerable distortion, it will be referred to as the “Washington Consensus,” recognizing that the author of that concept, himself, probably would oppose its use (Williamson, 1993; 2000). However, because it can capture so much it seems appropriate.4

Background

As background for discussing the “Washington Consensus” it is important to identify several historical developments, and some ideological and theoretical trends. Here are several:

1. Foreign assistance in the United States was, for a period immediately prior to the collapse of the Cold War, again, extremely politicized and militarized, like it had been during the most serious excesses of the Cold War. The U. S. government provided overt and covert support to a variety of right-wing military regimes and guerilla movements, especially in Latin and Central America, but also in Africa.

4 One is tempted to use terms like “Neo-Liberalism,” “Thatcherism,” “Reaganism,” “Hegemony of Macro-Economics,” or “Market Fundamentalism.”
2. There seems to have been a certain abandonment of hope or idealism with respect to development in the Third World among developed countries. The strategy of the 1960's which was so heavily based upon Rostow's "Non-Communist Manifesto", grim as it turned out to be in fact, was at least based upon a hope that developing countries could improve their lot and join the rank of the developed, and that it was appropriate for the United States--and other donor countries as well--to assist them in achieving that. It was hard to find even that much idealism, for example, in the U. S. policy during 1980's in many parts of Africa or particularly in Central and Latin America. The US role seems to have been purely defensive and self-interested. The neo-conservative intellectuals and policy-makers of the 1980's argued, of course, that simple self-interest is better than the idealism of the 1950's and 1960's, and they may have been right. Nevertheless, there certainly had been a shift from idealism to an expressed "realism."

3. Closely associated with this, of course, was the emergence of conservative ideology in the United States, as well as in other parts of the world. This conservatism had a strong influence upon development strategy, not only conceptually but in terms of concrete political shifts within the United States, not only the Republican Party's dominance in Congress but the fact that international affairs came under the influence of some of the most radically right wing members even of that party.

4. Loss of compelling argument for international assistance.--The end of the Cold War also in one fell swoop undermined internal political support for bi-lateral and multi-lateral development assistance, especially in the United States, where this support had depended so heavily upon the logic of the Cold War. A citizenry that had been told for more than 30 years that expenditures on international development assistance were crucial to prevent the dreaded spread of Communism, naturally wonders why it should pay taxes for assistance when the spread of Communism is no longer a threat. This loss of public support for international assistance arose already early in the 1980's because of the relative weakness and vulnerability of the U. S. economy during that time.

Various efforts are underway to try to rebuild this support—which was never very strong anyway. In agriculture attempts are made to try to build support for development assistance on the "joint gains thesis," the theory that, as agricultural productivity increases in the Third World, it not only does not decrease Third World imports of U. S. Agricultural Commodities, it actually increases them through complicated processes having to do with elevating general well-being, increasing incomes and resulting changed preferences and increasing demand for imported food and fiber commodities. Of course, appeals are also made to humanitarian motives of the general population. Still, the overall support for international development assistance, which was never very high, seems to have declined considerably since the end of the Cold War. Significant among those who have worked very hard at turning this around are the International food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and its Director, Per Pinstrup-Anderson. See especially his 1995 piece (Pinstrup-Anderson, et al., 1995).
5. Progress

There had been very considerable progress in development, of which the world has become increasingly aware. A very important development was the phenomenal success that has been achieved in some countries, especially in Asia. Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, for example, are outstanding examples of very effective and rapid economic and social development. China and India have avoided the worst catastrophes and India has emerged as a very formidable economic and industrial power in its own right, even though it still has lots of grinding poverty. On a broader scale, there has also been considerable progress on a number of world-wide measures of welfare, infant mortality, for example. And, of course, there has been considerable progress in the demographic transition, now apparently extending even to Africa. Thus, although world population growth continues, the world rates have declined from highs of 2.7 (doubles every 26 years) in the middle 1960’s, to 1.5 (doubles every 47 years) by the most recent calculations. Thus, although famines, political despotism, military conflicts and refugee movements continue to haunt the world’s population, the welfare of the average persons seems to show some minor but steady improvement, and there is strong evidence that, because of the demographic transition, the most grim, Malthusian, projections of world population were not correct.

Gunnar Myrdal’s The Asian Dilemma was a very pessimistic assessment of India and its chances for development. Since then, the success of some of these countries affected a genuine sea change in perspective. It seemed, during this period, quite clear that it could be done. Perhaps the experience of these particular countries could not be replicated, but it was extremely important to know that development could, in fact, occur in the contemporary international environment.

There was another World Food Summit in the fall of 1996. See FAO and USDA sources for more information.

6. Globalization

Globalization is a wholesale way to refer to the increased integration, on a world level, or at least supra-national level of the economy and of society. It is not new, of course, but seems to have accelerated during this period. Or, at least its consequences seem to have accelerated. Communications become increasingly global with the emergence of what are, essentially, global TV networks and, of course, global communications via the internet. In the economic realm, production, product marketing, and even services industries become increasingly global, as has finance. Rural communities in Mexico, Thailand, or Haiti now find themselves competing almost directly with communities in the United States or Europe for the location of textile and light manufacturing factories and, consequently, wage and labor policies in at least low-wage manufacturing become international issues. Most of the attention given to globalization has focused upon the globalization of trade through on both international and regional bases, with Mexico and Canada, both very concerned about the impacts of NAFTA upon their communities, etc. For an excellent analysis of the effect of globalization upon hunger see Bread for the World Institute (1998), pp. 9-13. Associated with globalization is the important concept of “commodification,”—admittedly an inelegant term. “The idea of commodification is not new, of course. It goes back at least as far as Durkheim’s various forms of social solidarity, the “Division of Labor,” and the analysis of alienation, a source of suicide. However, globalization extends the process of commodification on a world-wide basis, putting low-wage workers in remote villages in Thailand in a “community” with low-wage workers in rural towns of Arkansas, based purely upon the basis of their labor as an input into commodity production. Even complex social organization begins to be referred to as “social capital,” as if the ultimate purpose of everything, even social organization, is as input (capital) into the creation of products. (At the moment this is being revised, May, 2000, there is an international internet discussion going on about globalization. Information about it can be obtained at the World Bank Web site, or at this e-mail address: globalization@lists.worldbank.org. There are several briefing papers on globalization at the World Bank site: http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/globalization/paper2.htm).
7. Declining role of the state

Globalization itself has contributed substantially to the declining importance of the state, perhaps most significantly in the fact that national governments have either lost control of, or given up in efforts to control their currencies and acceded to international currency markets. However, there has been a much broader trend towards reducing the role of the state, one that is, perhaps, most dramatically illustrated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the virtual collapse of rigid socialism in Europe as well as elsewhere. Even in the “free market” community a strong conservative trend has been evident throughout this entire period, a trend which everywhere emphasizes the private sector over the public sector and shows a strong aversion to state intervention and state initiatives.

8. End of the Cold War

Finally, there was the relative liberalization in the Soviet Union and China, the absolutely astounding events of 1989 in Eastern Europe and the almost complete loss of legitimacy of communist regimes, a movement that is now extending into Africa where single party dictatorships are increasingly under threat from students, elites, and common people who are tired of the oppressive role that these government have played since independence in the early 1960's.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, together with decline in the isolation of China, reforms in China beginning in the early 1980’s and somewhat similar reforms in Vietnam beginning in 1986, had led to the end of the Cold War, which had dominated foreign policy concerns and international development policy of the “West” virtually since the end of the Second World War. This set of most profound events was not expected by the U. S. and Western Europe, caught them almost completely off guard, and had fundamentally reoriented—or disoriented—their foreign policies and especially their perspective on Third World development. Indeed, in the United States during the Reagan administration of the early 1980’s, there was a distinct hardening of position on the Cold War and, for a period of time, a complete domination of its international development assistance itself by Cold War criteria. Development assistance was politicized even more than it had in the past, and both overt and covert support for right-wing military regimes and guerilla efforts were expanded. Even the essentially flawed logic of Rostow which had prevailed earlier in Southeast Asia was abandoned for a simple, black-and-white logic about what regimes and what kinds of development efforts to support—anything that smelled of communism, socialism, or even grass roots “peoples movements” was opposed, anything allied with anti-communism, anti-socialism, or right wing governments or movements was supported.

During a period from the early 1950’s, roughly corresponding with the Korean War, until the end of the Cold War, roughly 1989, development assistance and foreign policy affecting the Third World from the United States and to a lesser extent Europe as well, was dominated by the logic of the Cold War. What this meant in practical terms was that countries that allied themselves firmly with anti-communism received support and assistance, whether they deserved it or not, whether or not they used it effectively, and, in large part, quite independent of the nature of the ruling regime. Thus the Mobutu regime in Zaire continued to receive support and assistance while it effectively destroyed that country’s economy, while other more democratic and progressive countries (like India, for example) received little support from the U. S., at least.
The effect of these trends upon development thought had been profound. It had seemed to strongly confirm the more conservative, market-oriented policies which were already dominant in development thought since the early 1980's, and to completely demolish the idea that communism or a form of one-party socialism could be an attractive alternate route to development.

9. Dominance of Macro-Economics

As early as the dominance of the Green Revolution it had begun to become clear that agricultural development, itself, depended heavily upon an appropriate economic policy environment. This period saw a massive shift of attention away from agriculture, agricultural development, and development “projects” to a focus upon the policy environment. This is Structural Adjustment. In many respects it was, in fact, beneficial to agriculture, since prior policies had tended to tax agriculture heavily through controlled prices, government controlled market mechanisms, and excessive sensitivity to the political power of urban consumers over rural producers. As is always the case with such shifts, there were major changes in who the development agencies and “advisors” were—macro-economists sitting in auspicious “Centers” were in, agricultural specialists and even their colleagues, the production economists, were out. The Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), with its Jeffrey Sachs, the architect of “cold turkey” reforms in Bolivia and Russia, became, in the United States at least, the predominant source of wisdom about development and development policy.

Significant strategy developments

Several important elements of strategy characteristic of this period have already been mentioned. They include a market-oriented approach, insistence upon less government intervention and upon dismantling the most onerous of government para-statal organizations which, in many developing countries, performed many important marketing, production, and distribution functions, and involvement of private sector organizations much more in the development process. This includes both commercial organizations and large corporations, as well as private, voluntary organizations. Indeed, private voluntary organizations (PVO’s), also sometimes referred to as Non-governmental Organizations (NGO’s) are the current favorites in the development business. There was even, especially during the early years of the Reagan Administration, positive hostility to public agencies and institutions of any kind, leading to strong resistance to investment in publicly funded agricultural research and/or extension.

More concretely, there was a series of mini-phases concerning the liberalization of policies in developing countries, phases in which the World Bank, USAID, and other donor countries tended to be consistent, usually with the leadership coming from the World Bank and/or Washington. This, in reality, was the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1993).

“Policy Dialogue,” “Structural Adjustment” and “Political Dialogue,” or Democratization

During the first mini-phase the key term was “policy dialogue.” As a condition for development assistance, donor agencies insisted upon opening a dialogue with governments concerning policies which hindered development, usually a wide variety of governmental interventions into markets, including the operation and management of various para-statal firms, especially various marketing boards. It is
very common for developing countries to tax agriculture heavily in a variety of ways, effectively inhibiting agricultural development. At the most extreme, as in Egypt, agricultural prices are strictly controlled at prices far below world prices so as to favor consumers, mostly urban. Exchange rates are also frequently managed and manipulated in ways that inhibit investment. The objective of policy dialogue, of course, is to persuade governments to move away from policies that inhibit agricultural development and investment.

The key term for the second phase is "structural adjustment." Structural adjustment is, in effect, implementing the economic policy changes discussed in "policy dialogue." Structural adjustment frequently became a condition for the receipt of development assistance, and became an important issue in the states of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries as their communist regimes collapsed. The effects of structural adjustment have been and continue to be matters of considerable concern, since it has been in effect for a significant period of time already in quite a number of developing countries, and there is, by now, a very significant literature on it and its impacts throughout the world (See African Farmer, 1990, April and Tweeten, 1990 for recent discussions of Structural Adjustment programs and their impacts). A useful recent, critical web site focusing specifically upon Structural Adjustment can be found at: http://www.oneworld.org/guides/sap (Addressed May 11, 2000).

In the late 1980’s the German and French governments began to discuss a possible third phase, or perhaps—to them, an alternative to Structural Adjustment Programs, which has been referred to as "Political Conditionality." Whereas Structural Adjustment focuses upon economic policy, Political Conditionality attempts to leverage specific political reforms, including such things as the elimination of bans on opposition political parties, very common in developing countries, many of which are governed by single-party dictatorships of various kinds; and general reduction in inhibitions upon civil liberties (Brauer, 1990).

A new slogan has emerged in the ongoing debate on how the developing countries can best be rescued form economic and social decline. The slogan is “political conditionality.” After having preached for years that the answer to the problems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America is “structural adjustment” of state-administered economies, Western donor countries have now discovered that more is necessary to achieve sustainable development. The junior minister in Bonn’s aid ministry, Hans-Peter Repnik, formulated the new strategy in a speech to a recent symposium on future aid to Africa. “The time has come,” he said, “to tie our aid—wherever this seems necessary—not only to economic but also to political conditions.” Repnik listed disregard for human rights, insufficient chances for participation of the broad masses, legal insecurity and political instability as obstacles in the way of development. The example of Eastern Europe had shown that fundamental economic reforms cannot be carried out without political reforms. “The indissoluble connection between open and accountable democratic systems and the efficient functioning of economic systems can hardly be seriously disputed today,” Repnik said. His conclusion: “political deficits” must no longer be swept under the carpet in talks with governments in the Third World.

“Political conditionality” will be a radical new departure from previous practices in development cooperation. During the time of the Cold War, aid was often an instrument of extending spheres of influence and safeguarding strategic and political interests. Dictatorial governments were pampered with foreign aid if only they were on the right side in the East-West conflict. Marcos in the Philippines, Mobutu in Zaire and Pinochet in Chile are just three of many examples. The structure of U. S. foreign aid to this very day reflects the military and strategic interests of a superpower rather than developmental considerations. It would certainly be in the interest of developing countries if these policies were to change.

However, it will be difficult to apply “political conditionality” because the circumstances are not as clean-cut in the Third World as they may seem in Eastern Europe. Is there really this clear link between democracy and economic progress? The success story of the East Asian NIE’s—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore—defies this easy logic. In Africa, Kenya has long been the favorite of Western donors because of its open and successful economic system, but President Arap Moi speaks derisively about the “multi-party trash” and insists that no political reforms are necessary. Another “model” in Africa, the Ghana of Jerry Rawlings, has not seen any functioning democracy since independence, and yet it is considered at test case for the validity of the “structural adjustment policy” of World Bank and IMF. And how can one convincingly argue that Nigerian leaders that more democracy will lead to more social and economic development when they can point to a history of failed experiments with democratic politicians who used the open system for shamelessly plundering the nation’s wealth?

When tying our aid to political conditions, we will, therefore, have to look very carefully at each individual case. There can be no doubt that the regard for human rights must be a standard for development cooperation. “Democracy” is more difficult to define, though. There are many forms of popular participation, of which our political system is only one. “Political conditionality” should not be interpreted as an attempt to impose our own concepts and ideas on the rest of the world. Dieter Brauer (1990:1)
Privatization, incorporation of business development strategies, entrepreneurship, and credit

Associated with the limited government, free market orientation of this period, has been a resurgence of interest in entrepreneurship, business activity, and ways that private sector business and commercial activities can be enhanced and supported. There is a wide variety of activity focused upon stimulating business activity, especially among small businesses. Hence, terms like "micro-enterprise development," "micro-lending," etc., have become popular, and a variety of programs are being offered to stimulate small entrepreneurs (See Wilken, 1979, and Ba, 1992 for reviews of the literature on entrepreneurship). One of the most visible movements has been the use of credit mechanisms to try to transform the lives of the poor, and, among these efforts, the Grameen Bank of Bangla Desh has become almost legendary. The Grameen Bank has an excellent web site at: http://www.grameen-info.org/. Another excellent source of information about micro-credit is the web site of the micro-credit summit, the first of which was held in Washington, D. C. in 1997. It can be found at: http://www.microcreditsummit.org/ (Accessed May 11, 2000). Especially interesting is the report on the 1999 Summit which was held in the Ivory Coast. Five background papers were prepared for it, and they are excellent. One of the most incredible statements about the potential for the empowerment of the poor with micro-credit is this, made by Gibbons, et al., after reviewing a large number of micro-credit programs:

"The cost of efficient micro credit to the poor and poorest will vary between 35% and 51% of their average loans outstanding, depending on the conditions under which it is provided. Most of this (50% to 70%) goes to pay the field staff that deliver the financial services to poor women in their villages, the only way they can be reached by microfinance. The poor and poorest women in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are proving that they can and will pay the required cost of this opportunity to reduce their poverty and provide a better future for their children. This is made possible by the impressive returns to their micro enterprises, which normally average more than 100%." (Gibbon, et al., 1999).

Decline of Agricultural Fundamentalism

Associated with the emerging dominance of macro-economic policies, private sector business development, severely limited roles for government, and a heavy focus upon the NGO’s to carry the burden of development programming has been a substantial decline in support for agriculture and agricultural development. It was always argued, following long-standing policies in the United States and Europe, that there was a national interest in public support for agriculture, especially in agricultural technology development through publicly funded research. It was always an irony of the micro-economic orientation of agricultural fundamentalism that, in spite of its hostility to public sector “intervention” in general, it was always held that the government must lead in funding the development of agricultural technology. There are volumes of research to show the high rates of return to these investments. It was this orientation that led to public investments in the Green Revolution and to the establishment of the remarkable network of international agricultural research centers. It was also this orientation which considered national governments to be the prime actors, and hence the prime initial recipients of development assistance. In a word, while committed to neo-classical economics, the economists of the Green Revolution understood and supported the logic of agricultural research as a public good.

These assumptions all have come into question since the 1980’s, as the logical implications of structural adjustment and a more free market orientation work their way through. If structural adjustment requires that governments spend less on social welfare programs, should they continue to finance public agricultural research? Why? The current version of conservatism leaves virtually no place for traditional public goods.

Sustainability
Thanks to some of the criticisms of the Green Revolution technology and especially the concerns and organizational effectiveness of international environmental groups concerned about such things as loss of endangered species, loss of rainforest areas, etc., the issue of Sustainable Development emerged in the middle 1980’s as a major development strategy with which to be dealt. And, there were simultaneous movements in the developed world to more explicitly incorporate sustainability issues into, first, agricultural development and subsequently into community and urban development as well. There is now a massive and very dynamic literature on sustainability, including, in the international arena, the famous “Bruntland Report” and reports and programmatic activities that have emerged from it and, for the United States, the reports of the President’s Council on Sustainable Development and its report, entitled Sustainable America: A New Consensus (The President’s Council, 1996).

Sustainability is difficult to define, and the sustainability movement has taken several different directions. One, and the central feature of the movement, focuses upon overall, global, environmental sustainability. Another, attempting to practice the adage to “think globally and act locally,” attempts to bring the concepts of sustainability down to the level of the local community--usually rather large urban areas. A third direction concerns sustainable agricultural development. In the spring of 1998 USDA celebrated the tenth anniversary of the federal government’s Sustainable Agriculture and Education (SARE) program, which has been central to sustainable agriculture activities in the United States.

Information about sustainability is readily available on a large number of web sites. A recent one, addressed in May, 2000, is: http://iisd.ca/.

Participatory strategies

Farming Systems Research was one initial move from within the International Agricultural Research community itself--the very bowels of the Green Revolution--to begin to pay more attention to the actual circumstances and needs of farm families. It arose principally for two reasons, in Asia because of concern about the “yield gap,” and in Central and Latin America as a kind of people's movement, almost a revolutionary movement, against the institutions which controlled research and extension institutions for the benefit of the large and corporate farm structure. At about the same time some other important things were happening. William F. Whyte published his overview essay on farm family involvement in development (1981, 1982), the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, UK, organized a workshop of some 50 people--social and biological scientists--which ultimately led to Robert Chambers, et al.’s influential Farmers First (1989), among other things.
A key component to FSR was one of its initial phases, the “diagnostic,” or “rapid rural appraisal.” Initially this was carried out by agricultural scientists in an effort to characterize the farming system as comprehensively as possible in a short period of time, so as to be able to identify “key constraints” to development. Out of rapid rural appraisal (RRA) came Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), and a variety of other participatory techniques, techniques which, rather than being dominated by scientists, engaged local people in the appraisal process. These techniques are now very widely used, and considered to be fundamental to the rural and agricultural development process by agencies like the World Bank (WB, 1996), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (See FAO WWW site http://www.fao.org/sd/ppdirect/pphomepg.htm), and others. One agency that has been particularly active in promoting participatory procedures is the Program for International Development at Clark University in Worcester, Mass.

Concerning the importance of participation for reaching the poor, FAO’s Participation in Practice says:

"For governments and development agencies, people's participation through small groups offers distinct advantages:"

- **Economies of scale.** The high cost of providing development services to scattered, small scale producers is a major constraint on poverty-oriented programmes. Participatory groups constitute a grassroots "receiving system" that allows development agencies to reduce the unit delivery or transaction costs of their services, thus broadening their impact.

**Why Participation?** See what FAO says:

FAO (http://www.fao.org/sd/ppdirect/PPre0044.htm)

Rural development efforts have failed to deliver on their promises. One evaluation found that half of rural development projects funded by the World Bank in Africa were outright failures. A review of assistance to agricultural cooperatives reported similar results. A study by the International Labour Organization of "poverty-oriented" projects worldwide showed that the poorest were excluded from activities and benefits.

What has gone wrong? Recent years have seen growing criticism of rural development strategies followed, with only minor adjustments, since the 1960s. These conventional strategies have seen development primarily as a series of technical transfers aimed at boosting production and generating wealth. In practice, conventional projects usually target medium to large scale "progressive" producers, supporting them with technology, credit and extension advice in the hope that improvements will gradually extend to more "backward" strata of rural society. In many cases, however, the channeling of development assistance to the better-off has led to concentration of land and capital, marginalization of small farmers and alarming growth in the number of landless labourers.

The basic fault in the conventional approach is that the rural poor are rarely consulted in development planning and usually have no active role in development activities. This is because the vast majority of the poor have no organizational structure to represent their interests. Isolated, undereducated and often dependent on rural elites, they lack the means to win greater access to resources and markets, and to prevent the imposition of unworkable programmes or technologies. The lesson is clear: unless the rural poor are given the means to participate fully in development, they will continue to be excluded from its benefits. This realization is provoking new interest in an alternative rural development strategy, that of people's participation through organizations controlled and financed by the poor.
Higher productivity. Given access to resources and a guarantee that they will share fully in the benefits of their efforts, the poor become more receptive to new technologies and services, and achieve higher levels of production and income. This helps to build net cash surpluses that strengthen the groups’ economic base and contribute to rural capital formation.

Reduced costs and increased efficiency. The poor's contribution to project planning and implementation represent savings that reduce project costs. The poor also contribute their knowledge of local conditions, facilitating the diagnosis of environmental, social and institutional constraints, as well as the search for solutions.

Building of democratic organizations. The limited size and informality of small groups is suited to the poor's scarce organizational experience and low literacy levels. Moreover, the small group environment is ideal for the diffusion of collective decision-making and leadership skills, which can be used in the subsequent development of inter-group federations.

Sustainability. Participatory development leads to increased self-reliance among the poor and the establishment of a network of self-sustaining rural organizations. This carries important benefits: the greater efficiency of development services stimulates economic growth in rural areas and broadens domestic markets, thus favouring balanced national development; politically, participatory approaches provide opportunities for the poor to contribute constructively to development.

The pivotal role of people's participation in development is now re-emerging in economic and social development thinking. One striking example of this trend comes from the World Bank. In its proposed strategy for sustainable development in Africa, the Bank calls for a “people-centered” approach that will improve the poor's access to productive assets, allow them to participate in designing and implementing development programmes, and foster their involvement in institutions from village to national level. UNICEF has proposed similar measures in its strategy for structural adjustment “with a human face”, stressing people's participation in the formulation of development policy, and efforts to make full use of local potential. FAO believes that the participatory approach described in the following pages will be an essential part of any strategy to meet the challenges ahead.”

A major source for additional information about participatory development and participatory development resources is found at the Institute for Development Studies in the United Kingdom at: http://nt1.ids.ac.uk/eldis/pra/pra_lele.htm
Civil Society

A major consequence of “political dialogue” and democratization is what is now referred to as “Civil Society.” Civil Society is being advocated programmatically by major international development organizations and, in some places at least, is being adopted enthusiastically by local development advocates. Civil society means many things to many people, including, at least, the following:

- Non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) take responsibility for socio-economic development and the provision of many social services.
- Democratic political reforms, open and competitive elections, and selection for government posts, multi-party political system, effective citizen representation in local and national government.
- Providing participatory mechanisms whereby local citizens can participate in local community decision-making, can gain power and influence over local and national government agents and their various programs, and may actually become involved in carrying out public programs.
- Positive efforts to empower traditionally under-represented segments of the population through involving politics and decision-making, organizational development, and education.
- Freedom of groups and organizations of all kinds to meet, organize to achieve their objectives, and to speak out, even if what they say may be offensive to political leaders and elites.
- Reforms of and establishment of freedom of the media and of communication.
- The establishment and protection of basic human rights (freedom of speech, basic property rights, freedom from unreasonable arrest and seizure, religious freedom, etc.).
- Economic reforms, including free markets, elimination of price controls, of state businesses and industries (structural adjustment).
- Development of a “civic culture” through socialization of the public, elites, those who were formerly powerless, etc. (culture refers to the attitudes and values which guide day-by-day behavior).

Thus Civil Society is really the positive, programmatic aspect of political conditionality. These are, presumably, the things that are to be achieved. In reality, much of the programmatic focus has actually been upon some aspects of political reform (e.g., multi-party competition), guaranteeing basic human rights and, most importantly, turning over large portions of the responsibility for development and development assistance to private, non-governmental organizations. Alfredo Handem, a recent Masters student at the University of Arkansas from Guinea Bissau in West Africa, wrote an excellent master's thesis on Civil Society in Guinea Bissau.

Return to Poverty—and to the Present

Except, perhaps, in the U. S. and in USAID, the pendulum has now swung back from the extremes of the neo-liberalism of the Washington Consensus. The swing is less dramatic among the core bilateral aid agencies of countries like Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, most obvious in the World Bank Group, and hardly noticed in the United States. Of course, non-American bilateral aid agencies, though apparently all enthusiastically adopting the tendency to impose the vocabulary of neo-classical economics upon everything having to do with development, were never as heavily invested in structural adjustment as the World Bank, other development banks, and the United States. This change to a significant extent represents the re-emergence of some of the issues discussed immediately above (sustainability, participation, and civil society). As major changes within the World Bank, they represent a number of important developments: (1) a fascinating drama within the World Bank itself, (2) recognition that virtually all aspects of the Washington Consensus have been failures, some of
them disastrous failures, but interestingly, as it was admitted that development was more complicated and should include such things as participation, poverty, etc., the almost stubborn imposition of the vocabulary of neo-classical economics upon even these areas of concern. Thus we have neologisms like "social capital," which is used to capture the essence of whole non-economic disciplines, and, one assumes, serves as a way to avoid having to actually pay attention to the work done by these disciplines, and what they have to contribute to the development enterprise (See Fine, et al., 1999).

Shifts in the World Bank

In a recent, very important, essay by the president of the World Bank and Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize winning economist, we find the following remarkable statement, which is no less than a direct attack on the conventional World Bank approach in Washington Consensus:

"Development economics is the discipline that addresses the world's most enduring problem: persistent and widespread poverty. Three billion people live on less than $2 a day, 1.3 billion do not have clean water, 130 million children do not go to school, and 40,000 children die every day because of hunger-related diseases. Within this deprivation is another dimension: hundreds of millions of girls and women whose lives are diminished and shortened by inadequate economic means and discrimination in social status and medical attention.

Not surprisingly, a problem that has remained unsolved through human history generates controversies over how it should best be tackled. Two general attitudes prevail in development economics. One favors a hard-nosed - even fierce - approach, emphasizing sacrifices to be made for the sake of a better tomorrow, and advocating tough macroeconomic medicine. Unfortunately, this is often accompanied by an almost calculated neglect of urgent social concerns, seen as "soft-headed". This view often perceives social safety nets, social services, even human rights as folly - perhaps high-minded - but folly all the same.

Set against this is an alternative outlook that sees development as an essentially 'friendly' process, based on mutually beneficial exchange - of which Adam Smith spoke so eloquently - complemented by the working of social protection systems, of freedoms, of laws and of judicial systems that can earn the confidence and respect of citizens.

We lean towards this alternative outlook, but also agree that it must be reinforced by sound macroeconomic policies, which are required to generate the resources that social and economic development demand. Profligate spending that ignores resource constraints, and fiscal or monetary requirements, can cripple an economy, and ruin this social progress. By the same token, excessive stringency on the macroeconomics side can have dire consequences for social programs such as health care and schooling. It can even undermine the financial system itself. In this sense, the two issues are like two sides of a coin; each is incomplete without the other.

Our shared understanding has developed in recent years, during which one of us has presided over the World Bank, while the other has researched and written on development as a process of expanding the freedoms that people enjoy. These include freedom from starvation, from undernourishment, from illiteracy, from preventable and

---

5 This has come as a surprise to me. I had assumed that the introduction of free markets, elimination of price controls and government procurement and marketing organizations, would benefit farm families. However, I have yet to find a single foreign student here at the UoA who considers the Washington Consensus policies imposed upon his or her country to have been positive. One must, of course, recognize, the positive impacts experienced by the reforms of China and Viet Nam. However, these can hardly be considered to have been part of, or in any way influenced by, the Washington Consensus.
premature death, but also freedom of speech, of political participation, and of social cooperation. For the World Bank, too, development is a process that ends with freedom from poverty and from other social and economic deprivations."

If we may disregard for the moment the fact that the claim that development economics is about poverty—which an even casual reading of the literature in this field will show to be patently false—this is an absolutely remarkable statement. And it is made by two of the three people who have done the most to turn around, both the discipline of development economics and major international institutions. The turn-around is away from the Washington Consensus—note their comments about macroeconomic policy—to a focus upon both poverty reduction and a much more complex, nuanced approach to international development.

There is evidence of this very significant shift almost everywhere one turns—except in the development policies and programs of the United States. Consequently, it came as somewhat of a surprise to many of us in the United States. For all we knew we were still in the throes of the Washington Consensus! The World Bank’s widely distributed and widely discussed “Comprehensive Development Framework,” (CDF, World Bank, 1998) the efforts in the WB, IMF and the United Nations agencies to develop a consensus around the CDF, and the several international reports which attempt to bring focus to poverty represent this shift of focus (World Bank, 2000; United Nations Development Program, 2000, see Appendix 1).

Stiglitz’s statement in 1998 is typical of the transformation that was being launched:

“Development as a Transformation of Society

Development represents a transformation of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more “modern” ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is; the modern perspective recognizes change, it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions that, for instance, reduce infant mortality, extend lifespans, and increase productivity. Key to these changes is the movement to “scientific” ways of thinking, identifying critical variables that affect outcomes, attempting to make inferences based on available data, recognizing what we know and what we do not know.

All societies are a blend. Even in more “advanced” societies there are sectors and regions that remain wedded to traditional modes of operation, and people wedded to traditional ways of thinking. But while in more advanced societies, these constitute a relatively small proportion, in less advanced societies, they may predominate. Indeed, one characteristic of many less developed countries is the failure of the more advanced sectors to penetrate deeply into society, resulting in what many have called “dual” economies in which more advanced production methods may co-exist with very primitive technologies.

Change is not an end in itself, but a means to other objectives. The changes that are associated with development provide individuals and societies more control over their own destiny. Development enriches the lives of individuals by widening their horizons and reducing their sense of isolation. It reduces the afflictions brought on by disease and poverty, not only increasing lifespans, but improving the vitality of life.

Given this definition of development, it is clear that a development strategy must be aimed at facilitating the transformation of society, in identifying the barriers to, as well as

---

6 The statement of Joseph Stiglitz below is as good evidence as is needed.
7 The third is Joseph Stiglitz, until about 2000 the Chief Economist at the World Bank. In 2000 Stiglitz retired from this position. He is now on the faculty at Columbia University.
potential catalysts for change. These notes outline some of the ingredients of such a New Development Strategy. Approaching development from the perspective of transforming society has profound implications not only for what governments and aid agencies do, but how they proceed -- how they engage, for instance, in participation and partnership. Thus, this paper can be seen as providing an analytic framework for much of the rethinking that has been occurring in the last few years about how best to promote development. (Stiglitz, 1998).

Here we have a return to development as a complex, multi-faceted process, profoundly implicating all aspects of cultural, social, and political organization. What it does not do, though, is identify any particular levers of opportunity for achieving development. Thus it apparently abandons what seem have to have been the essential simplifications of—respectively, Community Development, the Green Revolution, Basic Needs, Food Security, Structural Adjustment, etc. Each of these, in its own way, provided a simplification of the development process by underlining what the perspective considered to be the key “levers” with the greatest potential for impact. But, then, perhaps development really cannot be simplified.

An even more serious problem raised by this re-orientation of the logic of development is the violence done to the authenticity and complexity of the various new, non-economic elements allowed entry, by being forced into the vocabulary of neo-classical economics. So, participation, and even this weird thing called “civil society,” become tools or instruments in the development process. “Social capital” directly implies that complex socio-cultural organization exists “for the purpose of producing something,” else why the term “capital,” which is, in economic theory, an aspect of a production function. These are, in fact, issues of profound and very complicated socio-political—or democratic—theory, going back at least as far as ancient Greece. Extensive experimentation, commentary, and research was done internationally in context of Community Development and domestically in the United States during the War on Poverty, none of which has been—or will be—consulted by those promoting what they naively regard as a “new” approach.

Reasons for the Change of Direction

In addition to the recognition of the failure of the World Bank’s initial focus upon large scale infrastructure projects and its subsequent infatuation with the Washington Consensus, there are at least two pieces to this change of direction. One is the focus upon poverty, the other is the introduction of a more comprehensive and more nuanced approach to development. The introduction to CDF states: “The Comprehensive Development Framework takes a holistic approach to development. It seeks a better balance in policymaking by highlighting the interdependence of all elements of development - social, structural, human, governance, environmental, economic, and financial. It emphasizes partnerships among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector, and other development actors. Perhaps most important, the country is in the lead, both "owning" and directing the development agenda, with the Bank and other partners each defining their support for their respective plans.” (World Bank, 1998).

As was recognized by Wolfensohn in an NPR interview during the April 2000 demonstrations against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington, D. C., having basically accepted the need for transformation from the top, a very difficult task for these organizations is to change their culture. They are, of course, almost entirely staffed by economists which, in itself, makes the proposed transition almost impossible. So, we will see.

How did this change come about? In terms of any kind of broad movement we must look to three important trends which had already gained considerable momentum previously. These are the sustainability movement, the “participatory development” movement, and, especially, the emerging role of Non-Governmental organizations. From the neo-liberal perspective of the Washington Consensus, governments were out, and private, volunteer activities—those carried out by non-governmental organizations—were in. One of the most significant shifts in the allocation of development resources during this time was from supporting governments to supporting NGO’s, for right wing ideological
reasons, because they, presumably, are more effective, and in order to build “civil society.” Consequently, NGO’s—many of them faith-based—have begun to play a significant role in development policy for both international organizations and for bilateral aid. And, their message has tended to be very critical of the macroeconomic policies of structural adjustment and to emphasize the problem of world wide poverty.

Of particular importance to this "movement" among NGO's and the people who are attentive to their activities have been the threats of globalization, the on-going international trading structure being built under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, and, especially, the heavy international debt load carried by many developing countries. The latter concern, of course, causes them to target the International Monetary Fund and "international banking institutions."

However, for major international agencies like the World Bank, it is probably correct to say that the work of a few economists has been fundamental. Principal among these is Amartya Sen, whose Resources, Values, and Development (Sen, 1984) won the Nobel Prize in Economics. The genius of Sen’s work, from the very beginning in the 1950’s, was to burrow below the level of formal transactions to which markets regularly assigned monetary values—the domain of 99% of economics—to the level of the real but usually unmeasured resources used by and the real behavior of poor people. Out of this grew a focus upon such complicated things as human relationships and, especially, the idea of “entitlements.” He showed a stubborn impatience with a discipline which, because it could not measure them, assumed that real human issues like poverty, gross inequality, sexism, etc., did not exist. In so doing he contributed very significantly to moving the issue of poverty into the limelight of development thought, a position it had never really had before, at least not in the neo-classical economics of the so-called "West."

Sen’s work laid a foundation upon which Joseph Stiglitz and others could build in developing the top-level conceptual framework for a major reorientation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Whether that reorientation can actually be effectively implemented still remains to be seen and, of course, the internal cultures of those two organizations are probably the major impediment which will have to be overcome.

Practical Implications of a More Nuanced Approach with a Focus upon Poverty Reduction

It is far too early to tell whether the change in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund will result in a more effective way of dealing with under-development and poverty. There is no question, though, that there have already been very substantial shifts of resources away from infrastructure support, into human resources and what A. W. Lewis called in his very first textbook on development, "social overhead capital."

There would seem to be reason to be concerned about the "more nuanced" approach to development, if one can judge, for example, from the experience of Integrated Rural Development (IRD). IRD was said to have failed miserably precisely because it tried to do too many things at once and, perhaps also, because it invested too heavily in things which did not promise a concrete, economic return—at least not in the short run. Does not the "Comprehensive Development Framework" of the World Bank run the same risk?

One of the development strategies which has shown remarkable success is group and micro lending, a strategy which was really never anticipated at the time that Yunus' original experiments in Bangla Desh began what became the Grameen Bank. Indeed, at the time the conventional wisdom was that credit was not an effective instrument for stimulating development. It is, of course, completely consistent with the World Bank's current change of direction, may even be an important cause of it. The

---

8 Sen’s critique of utilitarianism, the underlying philosophy of neo-classical economic analysis, in his “Rights and Capabilities,” (Sen, 1984, pp. 307-324) is an excellent window into his probing intellect. It compares well with the work of Theodore Schultz, also a Nobel Prize winner, in which Schultz, also using observations from India, devastated prevailing assumptions of peasant farm family behavior (Schultz, 1964).
most remarkable thing is that these programs have shown again and again that poor people are absolutely bankable, something that, even until today, conventional bankers all over the world refuse to believe.

There should be much to learn from the programs of the 1950’s and 1960’s: the U. S. War on Poverty and its efforts to empower the poor through "maximum feasible participation," the extensive work that was carried out in the francophone world under the rubric of "animation rurale," which was also focused upon empowerment of the poor, even from radical rural and community development advocates such as Paulo Freire of Brazil and his old but powerful "Pedagogy of the Oppressed." However, until now one sees no evidence that the economists proposing poverty reduction are reading anything beside their own colleagues who, with the notable exceptions of Sen, Stiglitz, and a few others—especially those willing to continue to bear the stigma of being "institutional economists," know nothing about poverty, or what has been done in the past to try to ameliorate it. We’ll see.

Contents of Post-Washington Consensus

Excepting Washington’s application of Walter Rostow’s “stages of growth” to Viet Nam in the manner he suggested as “A Non-Communist Manifesto,” the Washington Consensus seems to have been the most complete failure of any of the many strategies of development used since the Second World War and discussed here. Exceptions to this broad assessment would seem to be in some cases in agriculture and, most importantly, in the highly controlled liberalization of some former socialist regimes, most notably China and Viet Nam. There the gradual and highly controlled introduction of free markets, de-emphasis upon state enterprises and state control of the economy, and partial return of "ownership" of property has had truly dramatic effects upon productivity and well-being of the populations. However, by virtue of their gradual and highly selective and controlled nature, they did not follow the Washington Consensus orthodoxy. Those former socialist regimes which were persuaded or coerced to follow the orthodoxy, applying “cold turkey” reforms, have suffered severe social and economic reverses from which they will not recover for a long time.


Where I would have expected the Washington Consensus to have had positive effects in at least some countries is in agriculture and even in some small-scale industry, since Structural Adjustment meant dismantling things like government mandated deliveries of agricultural products at artificially low prices, controlled markets for agricultural products—almost always to the disadvantage of producers, control of markets by state enterprises,, which are usually horrendously corrupt, etc. However, I have yet to find a foreign student at the University of Arkansas who agrees that, in their country, it did, in fact, have a positive impact, even upon agriculture and farm families.

The major complaints, though, concern the arbitrary and sometimes draconian reductions in support for basic social services and education, the consequences of which tend to fall disproportionately upon women and mothers.

My treatment of the Post-Washington Consensus focus primarily upon the World Bank, which is probably far too narrow. I simply have not been able to spend the time examining the strategies of various other donors, e. g., the Canadians, the Swedes, the Dutch, the European Community, the Japanese, etc. The United States has become a relatively small player, at least compared to its role in the past, and one simply expects USAID desperately to cling to any and all aspects of the Washington Consensus that it can, so it is not likely to be playing a significant intellectual role.

9 It is instructive, on this point, to examine the role of the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) and specifically the role of professor Jeffrey Sachs. Sachs was the key architect of “cold turkey” reforms in Bolivia. Then he played the same role for Russia and some other republics of the former Soviet Union. Ultimately the Institute was caught with its hand in the till in Russia. As a direct consequence, it has lost much of its influence and has been completely re-organized (Wedel, ).
When viewed in this way—primarily from the perspective of the World Bank and the other development banks—the Post Washington Consensus is almost synonymous with Stiglitz, formerly the Chief Economists of the World Bank. And, from a practical development strategy point of view, the influence of Stiglitz seems to encompass several things:

1. His various papers and lectures in which he elaborates both his emerging theoretical framework (institutional, “market failure” and “informational-theoretic” economics) and his practical recommendations for development strategy.

2. A heavy emphasis upon poverty and poverty reduction. This is reminiscent of the “Basic Needs” strategy of the 1980’s, especially during the Carter administration in the U. S., and is, of course, congruent with the programs of many—probably most—NGO’s. What has emerged is a broad requirement, imposed by the World Bank, that every recipient government prepare and have available a “Poverty Reduction Strategy.” So, one can, now, find “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers” for many, many countries.

   Presumably this also means a shift of World Bank and other Development Bank investments into projects specifically designed to ameliorate poverty. To my knowledge, this is, in fact, happening in Viet Nam. I am not able to comment on other countries, but it is probably true there too. Associated with this, then, are significant increases in recipient countries in the intelligence gathered and made available about poverty, and about the proportion of the population and of families considered to be in poverty, and also discussions about the “poverty line.”

3. The promulgation of the “Comprehensive Development Framework,” the CDF. Extensive information is available about the CDF on the internet.

4. From an intellectual and disciplinary point of view Stiglitz’ influence, though deviating far from the discipline of economics’ conventional development framework of the World Bank, still retains the vocabulary, methods, and approach of neo-classical economics. In fact, it contributes substantially to the disciplinary imperialism of economics in which the territory of other disciplines—sociology, political science, and anthropology—is reframed in the terms of the reductionist and individualist vocabulary of the Chicago School. Ben Fine, himself an economist, has been especially articulate about this (references ). As it turns out, this is not merely a question of the role of academic disciplines—it makes a very big difference whether education, for example, is viewed as an individual’s long-term investment strategy in his or her capabilities for future returns than if it is viewed as one of the tools or mechanisms a local social structure “uses” to slot and screen people based upon—whatever criteria apply, race, ethnicity, social class, “right side of the tracks.” The neo-classical economic framework has, essentially, no way to deal with such group level phenomena, terms like “market imperfections,” “information theoretic” notwithstanding.

5. Another feature of the Post-Washington Consensus is the launching of what the development banks call “social funds.” Exactly what is social about them is not clear, except that they are not the usual “economic” funds for heavy infrastructure, etc.\(^{10}\) and that their use is presumably contingent upon the participation and decision-making of local people, or the poor, etc. In a previous error these would

\(^{10}\) The origin of the term “social funds” needs to be traced. As Fine has argued, economists, especially in the World Bank, have begun to range freely over the other social science disciplines, slashing and burning as they go, creating their own, quaint vocabulary as they go. Hence we have “social capital,” as a tub into which most of sociology and political science intelligence about development could be dumped, Is the adjective “social” for “social funds” from social capital?, or, more likely, is its origin another sort of residual—“social” means anything else, which we cannot comprehend or measure with out micro-economic tools. A perusal of projects undertaken will show that there isn’t anything particularly “social” about the projects. A more appropriate title would have been something like “discretionary funds,” or “discretionary block grants” to (blank,) with the blank usually being some level of government, national, provincial, or local.
probably have been called “Community Development Funds,” but one never uses a previous strategy title—one might actually have to read the literature and evaluation of that strategy before launching the new solution for the world problems! These “social funds” are described by the World Bank as:

“Social Funds allow poor people and communities to become actively involved in their own development. Social Funds support small projects ranging from infrastructure and social services to training and micro enterprise development which have been identified by communities and presented to the social fund for financing. Social Funds appraise, finance and supervise these grants, which then may be managed by a wide range of actors, including local governments, NGOs, line ministries, community groups and local project committees.”

5. Closely associated with these developments are the consequences of the work of two very different people--Muhammad Yunus and Amartya Sen. Yunus, formerly a professor of economics and business at Vanderbilt University in the U. S., launched what has become one of the most remarkable economic development strategies and institutions since the Green Revolution, the Grameen Bank of Bangla Desh. The success of the Grameen Bank and its many, many emulators is principally poor women, and the capacity of poor women in groups to manage credit, with which they can create, for themselves and their families, significant income streams not previously available. Sen, on the other hand, has made major contributions at the theoretical level, shifting at least some of the focus of the discipline of economics below the level of currency, and the stubborn measurement of value by currency. Sen developed and elaborated the idea of "entitlements," which refers, not only to the money to which one has access, but the total bundle of claims one has upon the socio-economic system within which he or she lives. It becomes immediately obvious, of course, that a unit of currency, say, a U. S. dollar, has a much greater value to a poor widow in India or Bangla Desh than it does to Donald Trump. This quite unremarkable observation, in one fell swoop, invalidates all purely “economic” efforts at developing an economic analysis of welfare or well-being.

Conclusions

What, if anything, can be said in conclusion? Only a few things. First, we seem, now, to have gone full circle. We could well simply reprint A. W. Lewis' 1950's textbook on economic development. We would find ourselves very much at home. However, one major difference is that we would see the vocabulary of neo-classical economics being applied to the complexities of political science, sociology, and anthropology.

Still, each phase has made its contributions, both to the substance of development and development practice, and also to the realm of ideas and the realm of institutions. Though national planning is no longer considered to be the core of economic development, it is still there. Though Community Development has, presumably, been dethroned, it is still there. Indeed, its principles have long since returned under the rubric of "participatory development," and now people are, again, even willing to use the words "community development" again without fear of ostracism. The Green Revolution has left us with an awesome array of international agricultural research institutions, as well as a greatly enhanced agricultural productive capacity--though we may not particularly like the taste of the new varieties.

And, perhaps most importantly, we have finally been liberated from the rigidity of the Cold War so that we now may have the luxury of approaching development in a much more unbiased and much more effective way. If only we can maintain focus upon it--that's the problem.
Appendix 1: The Main Messages of the UNDP Poverty Report 2000

The Commitments to Poverty Reduction

* A new global strategy against poverty needs to be mounted - with more resources, a sharper focus and a stronger commitment - based on the commitments made at the 1995 Social Summit.
  - Donor countries are cutting back on aid and failing to focus what remains on poverty.
  - UNDP needs to provide better assistance, more focused on helping to improve national policy-making and institutions.
  - For many countries it is in improving governance that external assistance is needed - but not as a new form of conditionality.
  - A major shortcoming of current anti-poverty planning is the lack of achievable time-bound goals and targets.
    - Fewer than a third of countries have set targets for eradicating extreme poverty or substantially reducing overall poverty.
    - Countries should also now explicitly incorporate human poverty targets into their planning.

Developing National Anti-poverty Plans

* Anti-poverty plans need to be comprehensive - much more than a few projects "targeted" at the poor.
  - They need adequate funding and effective coordination by a government department or committee with wide-ranging influence.
    - A special poverty reduction fund can help provide better financial accounting, coordination and resource mobilization.
    - A multidimensional problem, poverty should be addressed by a multisectoral approach, cutting across government ministries and departments.

* Anti-poverty plans should be nationally owned and determined - not donor driven.
  - Poverty programmes are often disjointed because external donors provide much of the funding - outside regular government channels - for individual projects.

Linking Poverty to National Policies

* A new generation of poverty programmes is needed that focus on making growth more pro-poor, target inequality and emphasize empowering the poor.
  - The old-school prescriptions of supplementing rapid growth with social spending and safety nets have proved inadequate.
  - Reforms are needed in old-style structural adjustment programmes, which took up poverty after the fact or as a residual social issue.
  - Policies for pro-poor growth should be an integral part of any national anti-poverty plan.
  - The sources of inequality, such as unequal distribution of land, need to be squarely addressed.

Linking Countries' International Policies to Poverty

* Countries should link their poverty programmes not only to their national policies but also to their international economic and financial policies - a connection rarely made.
  - External debt is now clearly linked to poverty - through the Enhanced HIPC - but indebted countries still doubt that relief will go far enough and are wary of new conditionality.
  - Unlike debt, trade policies are not linked to poverty - as shown at the WTO meeting in Seattle.
    - If trade expansion is to benefit the poor, the international rules of the game must be made fairer - starting with eliminating the rich-country protectionism that is biased against developing countries.
  - Official development assistance - supposed to strengthen the hand of developing countries - has markedly declined and remains ill focused.
    - Many donors still rely on a hit-and-miss project approach, bypassing the government, dispersing efforts and eroding sustainability.

Governance: The Missing Link

* Responsive and accountable institutions of governance are often the missing link between anti-poverty efforts and poverty reduction.
  - Holding governments accountable to people is a bottom-line requirement for effective governance.
    - Having regular elections - free and fair - can help, especially at the local level, but such democratic forms are no vaccination against poverty.
    - Accountability in the use of public funds is crucial to poverty reduction efforts.
    - Shifting decision-making power closer to poor communities by devolving authority and resources to local government can also help.
  - To ensure accountability and democracy, poor communities must organize themselves to advance their interests.
    - If corruption were cleaned up at the same time that the poor organized themselves, many national poverty programmes would undoubtedly ratchet up their performances in directing resources to the people who need them.

Pro-Poor Local Governance: The Neglected Reforms
* Campaigns against poverty have often bypassed and ignored local government, and have thus hampered their effectiveness in benefiting the poor.
  o Local government must be strengthened - and held accountable both to the central government for the funds allocated to it and to its constituents for how it uses them.
  + Although requiring time, resources and capacity building, the lasting benefits to the poor of such an approach will outweigh the immediate costs.

The Poor Organize: The Foundation for Success

* The foundation of poverty reduction is self-organization of the poor at the community level
  o This is the best antidote to powerlessness, a central source of poverty.
  o What the poor most need is not resources for safety nets but resources to build their own organizational capacity.
  o Once afforded the opportunity, communities can quickly build their own organizations and develop their own leaders.
  + Poor people can then combine their community groups into larger area-based institutions to exert influence with local government or the private sector.
* Civil society organizations arising outside poor communities can play a valuable role by engaging in policy advocacy on behalf of the poor and influencing national policy-making.
  o Relying on such civil society organizations to deliver goods and services to poor communities - more the responsibility of government - is inadvisable over the long term.
  o The goal is not for civil society organizations to take over the legitimate functions of the state, but to forge a strategic alliance between the state and civil society for poverty reduction.

Focusing Resources on the Poor

* Effective targeting follows from empowerment, not the other way around.
  o If the poor lack organization and power, the benefits of poverty programmes are unlikely to reach them - or, if they do, to make a lasting difference.
  o Most national poverty programmes rely on targeting benefits to the poor, but still assume that external agents deliver the benefits and that the poor are passive beneficiaries.
  + The very term targeting probably clouds the issue: better to talk more generally about focusing poverty reduction resources.
  o While targeted interventions can often be effective in reaching the poor, they are too often regarded as the core of national poverty programmes - and as a substitute for reform of national economic policies or governance institutions.

Integrating Poverty Programmes

* A general weakness of poverty programmes is their lack of integration, due in large part to organizing them as a set of targeted interventions unconnected to national policies.
  o Lack of integration is also due to the habit of thinking sectorally and organizing governments accordingly.
  + Poverty, a multisectoral problem, does not fit neatly into any one department or ministry.
  o The problem of lack of integration is especially acute with respect to such issues as gender and the environment.
  o Initiatives to promote basic education and health care - especially in combating major health epidemics - also need greater integration with national poverty programmes.

Monitoring Progress against Poverty

* Countries need a comprehensive but workable monitoring system to gauge their progress against poverty.
  o Targets for both income and human poverty should guide this system.
  o To illuminate the causes of poverty or generate enough policy-relevant information, large income and expenditure surveys will have to be supplemented with rapid monitoring surveys focused on human poverty and with participatory assessments.
  o A general weakness of poverty monitoring systems is that they are not designed to also provide evaluations of anti-poverty policies and programmes - so there is little systematic verification of what approaches work and what do not.
Appendix 2: “Voices of the Poor,” A World Bank Report, Key findings

The new study, the result of 10 years of intensive consultations with the poor, was to gather first-hand research about the lives of the poor, what they wanted to improve their lives, and drive innovative new Bank policies to reduce poverty, for its upcoming annual World Development Report, which this year addresses the theme of "Attacking Poverty."

Based on the thousands of discussions with communities throughout the developing world, the book offers a number of key findings which the poor themselves say greatly affect their daily lives.

- Poverty is multidimensional

The persistence of poverty is linked to a web of recurring factors. First, while poverty is rarely about the lack of only one thing, the bottom line is that the poor constantly live with hunger; second, poverty has important psychological dimensions, such as powerlessness, voicelessness, dependency, shame and humiliation; third, the poor lack access to basic infrastructure, such as roads, transportation and clean water; fourth, people realize education offers an escape from poverty, but only if the quality of education and the economic environment in the society at large improve; fifth, illness is especially feared because of exorbitant health care costs and not being able to work; and last, the poor rarely speak of income but instead focus on managing assets-physical, human, social, and environmental-as a way to cope with their vulnerability.

- The state has been largely ineffective in reaching the poor

While recognizing the role of government in providing infrastructure, health, and education services, the poor feel that these government interventions should go much further. Too many interactions with state representatives are marred by rudeness and humiliation as the poor seek services such as health care, education for their children, social and relief assistance, police protection or justice from local authorities.

- Corruption and distrust emerge as core poverty issues

Poor men and women often do not trust government officials. This is based on their daily experiences with corrupt civil servants, their attempts to get teachers to educate their children, trying to get medicines from health clinics even after they have paid for them, seeking justice, or trying to get police to protect them.

- Households are crumbling under the stresses of poverty

Households often disintegrate as men, unable to adapt to their "failure" to earn adequate incomes under harsh economic circumstances, often turn to alcoholism or domestic violence, leading to a breakdown of the family structure. In contrast, women tend to swallow their pride and do demeaning jobs or anything that puts food on the table for their children and husbands. Gender inequity remains remarkably stubborn; economic empowerment for women does not necessarily lead to social empowerment or equality within households.

- The social fabric, the poor's only "insurance" is unraveling

Social insurance-the bonds of reciprocity and trust which the poor depend on in the absence of material assets-is unraveling. Difficult to reverse, the breakdown in social solidarity and social bonds leads to increased lawlessness, violence and crime, to which the poor are most vulnerable within a society.
References

Ba, Mahamadou Nassirou

Benor, Daniel and Michael Baxter

Brauer, Dieter

Bread for the World Institute

Dahlberg, Kenneth A.

Fei, John C. H. and Gustav Ranis

Fine, Ben (Editor), Costas Lapavitsas (Editor), Jonathan Pincus (Editor)

Gibbons, David S. and Jennifer W. Meehan

Hagen, E.E.

Handem, Alfredo

Haupt, Arthur and Thomas T. Kane

Heilig, Gerhard, Thomas Buttner, and Wolfgang Lutz

Holdcroft, Lane E.
Johnston, Bruce F., and John W. Mellor

Kellogg, Earl, Richard Kodl, and Philip Garcia

Kellogg, Earl D.

McFalls, Joseph A., Jr.

Mellor, John W. and Bruce F. Johnston

Merrick, Thomas W.

Lewis, Arthur

Lewis, Arthur W.

McClelland, David C.

Meier, Gerald M., and Robert E. Baldwin

Myrdal, Gunnar

Nair, Kusum

Nair, Kusum
1973 Three Bowls of Rice India and Japan: Century of Effort. Michigan State University Press. (Voth personal copy)

Nair, Kusum

Nair, Kusum
1983 Transforming Traditionally: Land and Labor use in Agriculture in Asia and Africa. Riverdale, Maryland: Riverdale Company, Inc. (Voth personal copy)

North, Douglass C.

Paarlberg, Robert L.

Paarlberg, Robert L

Paarlberg, Robert

Paarlberg, Robert

Purcell, Randall B., and Elizabeth Morrison (eds.)

Pinstrup-Anderson, Per, Mattias Lundberg, and James L. Garrett.

President’s Council on Sustainable Development, The

Reynolds, Lloyd G.

Repetto, Robert

Rogers, Everett M.
Rostow, W. W.  

Schultz, Theodore W.  
1964  Transforming Traditional Agriculture.  New Haven, CN:  Yale University Press (Voth personal copy).

Sen, Amartya  

Stakman, Elvin C., Richard Bradfield, and Paul Mangelsdorf  

Stiglitz, Joseph  

Stiglitz, Joseph  

Tawney, R. H.  

Todaro, Michael P.  

Tweeten, Luther  

United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)  

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  

Voth, Donald E., and Marcie Lyn Brewster  

Voth, Donald E.  

Voth, Donald E.

Voth, Donald E. and Zola K. Moon

Waelbroeck, Jean

Weber, Max

Weeks, John R.

Wharton, Clifton R., Jr.

Williamson, John

Williamson, John

Whyte, William Foote

Whyte, William Foote

Wilken, Paul H.

Wolfensohn, James D. and Amartya Sen

World Bank
World Bank

World Bank

World Bank

World Bank

World Bank

World Commission on Environment and Development (The Bruntland Commission)

World Hunger Project, The
Various African Farmer (periodical), especially Number 3, April, 1990, on Structural Adjustment and Women in Agriculture in Africa.