The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) – An Assessment of a Pan-African Attempt to Revitalise Agriculture –

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Abstract

CAADP is an exciting change process of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to shape African agricultural policy making and development from within the continent. CAADP covers a wide range of issues from natural resource management through agricultural production and value chains to food security. Its goals, increasing government budgets, donor and private funding, and improving the quality and the outcome of agricultural policies in all African countries, point in the right direction and come at the right time. However, it has to be noted that CAADP has not yet led to a systematic improvement of agricultural policy making – the older CAADP design was not convincing in terms of participation, ownership and use of evidence, and the new, improved design is about to be implemented. Some important elements of the existing CAADP design are still rudimentary, such as peer review or interventions of the pillar network. The overall targets – agricultural growth and poverty alleviation – are still far away from being a reality. Nevertheless, CAADP has shown that it is a learning system, and it has developed into a comprehensive concept. It must now demonstrate that it can implement its agenda. It must develop and institutionalise convincing quality control mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation, and it must coordinate the many tools and actors that it has put into motion. In case CAADP fails, there is a risk that the entire agricultural sector will once again be classified as “too complex to be managed”. Donors are therefore well advised to support it wisely, but the main impetus must come from the African agricultural community, state and non-state actors.

1 Introduction

After two decades of neglect, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the agriculture programme of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), is a most prominent attempt to find a comprehensive answer to the problems of agriculture and related issues on the continent. In fact, CAADP
goes beyond agriculture and integrates food security, agriculture-led value chains and natural resources management (fishery, forestry, water) into one large concept of fostering growth and combating poverty and hunger in rural areas. If in the following the terms ‘agriculture’ and ‘CAADP’ are used, it is in this wider understanding.

CAADP was initiated in 2001 and launched in 2003. Early on, a lot of attention was paid to it by the international community, but it took some time and several attempts for it to take off. Weak implementation was the norm rather than the exception for earlier Pan-African and other NEPAD initiatives, and it is remarkable that CAADP has survived over such a long period and has been gaining strength enormously over the last few years. It is to the credit of NEPAD and the early supporters of CAADP for having put agriculture on the agenda early on, but it seems that it is only in conjunction with the food crisis in 2007/08 that CAADP received the decisive push. More than half of all African countries are now seriously engaging in CAADP, and with more resources devoted to CAADP and agriculture in general there are now good prospects that in the next few years a number of CAADP-labelled programmes will be implemented. As it is gaining momentum, it is a good time to ask what can be expected from CAADP. What are its main strengths and weaknesses? Is it able to direct attention and funds into agricultural growth, poverty reduction and food security? Can it maintain the momentum of political support for agriculture beyond the present boom? Is there a need for fostering this process, and if yes, how to do it? The following article will try to answer these questions.

With regard to information, there is a large number of documents that mention and deal with CAADP, but there is hardly any independent research about its implementation. CAADP is a regular issue at AU, G8 and G20 meetings, and other high level political forums, but it is regularly mentioned only superficially – almost a ritualised repetition of calls and commitments to support CAADP. More specific documents originate from within the realm of CAADP, particularly conceptual papers as well as documents delivered during country CAADP processes. However, they do not allow to critically assess its value added, as it is often not clear whether policy change occurred and if so, to what extent CAADP caused this. The same ambiguous picture is evident for financial support of various activities with a CAADP label: funding for African agriculture is often provided under autonomous programmes which are later and often only nominally attributed (“aligned”) to CAADP. The activities that are extremely widespread and dispersed in time and space result in many people having been or currently being involved in CAADP, but hardly anybody both sees the bigger picture and has in-depth experiences (other than a few insiders).

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One of the few sources of information which allows a look behind the curtain is the Global Donor Platform Rural Development (GDPRD) which has established the CAADP Development Partners’ Task Team, a formalised link to CAADP (GDPRD, 2010) where problems and new developments are openly discussed. The protocols of these platform meetings permit some insights into ongoing discussions and development of CAADP. An internal review of CAADP has also been carried out starting in March 2009; it was updated and finalised in time for the partnership platform meeting in April 2010 (NPCA, 2010). Evaluation and learning from experience, including donor reactions, resulted in an overhaul of CAADP and an implementation guide which reflects many lessons learned and proposes improvements (NEPAD, 2010a).

This article is based on a research project that analysed in-depth the implementation of CAADP (and the agriculture related activities and impacts of another NEPAD initiative, the African Peer Review Mechanism, APRM) in Kenya, Ghana and partially Uganda. It compares them to past and existing national agricultural policy processes (ZIMMERMANN et al., 2009), in order to understand what was the value added of CAADP. A recent update (KOLAVALLI et al., 2010) extends the experience in Ghana to the time after completion of the first planning cycle in October 2009 (so called Compact signing, see chapter 2.2). Key informant interviews and participatory observation during national and international CAADP meetings and conferences for a current research project on the multi-level governance dimensions of CAADP were also used. The secondary literature discussed above provided additional information that allowed to check and generalise own findings.

The remaining text is structured as follows: chapter 2 provides an overview of the design and implementation of CAADP so far. It is particularly the second phase between 2005 and 2009/10 which explains the status quo of CAADP, but without an understanding of its origins and an outline of the current redirection, the picture would not be complete. Chapter 3 assesses CAADP at three levels of intervention: the international, the Pan-African/regional and the national level. Finally, in chapter 4 some conclusions are drawn for CAADP itself and lessons learned for African agricultural policy.

2 CAADP Design and Implementation

2.1 Agriculture within the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

CAADP is one of NEPAD’s now eight broad priority areas. NEPAD was inaugurated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2001 and later adopted as the economic programme of the African Union (AU). This happened at a time when important changes emerged for Africa, such as a marginalisation of Africa in world
politics and the Millennium Agenda. Given a general disappointment with the performance of the OAU, some important political leaders sought an alternative platform for discussing African issues at the international level, while also trying to gain influence on Pan-African movements. Gradually the OAU was transformed into the AU as a much broader and more legitimised entity of Pan-Africanism. By adopting NEPAD, the AU tried to reconcile both movements, but without full success. It is important to understand the tension between AU and NEPAD to also understand some aspects of CAADP and, as will be argued below, it is only since 2010 that a satisfactory solution has been found (for a review of NEPAD, see for instance Taylor, 2005).

Contrary to OAU principles, interference in internal affairs of other countries is no longer rejected in the AU, but actively welcomed, provided it is in line with human rights and generally accepted values, principles and mechanisms. The key principles of NEPAD are reflected in the concept of CAADP:

– African ownership and broad participation of stakeholders in formulating policies and strategies.
– Harmonisation of these policies and strategies and integration into regional and pan-African agendas.
– Evidence-based policymaking, including peer learning and review.
– Building partnerships to enhance and coordinate private and public investment.

Beyond general principles, it is obvious that CAADP has made fundamental changes to its concept over the last years. These are important to acknowledge, since the path dependency of some features means that CAADP both has a historic legacy and is restrained in its future policy space.

2.2 The Development of CAADP Concept and Implementation

In adopting NEPAD, the African governments recognised both the importance of agriculture for development and poverty reduction on the continent and the existing weaknesses of member countries’ agricultural development and policies (NEPAD, 2002). The priority goals of CAADP are sustainable agricultural growth and poverty reduction. While many CAADP activities include and aim at the regional and international level (see chapter 2.1. and 2.2), its core emphasis is focussed on the national level (chapter 2.3). With this focus, CAADP’s historical development can be grouped into 3 phases:

– The first phase 2002 to 2005 covered formulating CAADP’s initial concept and an orientation towards Bankable Investment Project Profiles (BIPPs).
The second phase 2005 to 2009/2010 reoriented implementation towards short but comprehensive CAADP policy processes aimed at generating national consensus strategy papers called Compacts.

The third phase started about mid 2009 with finalising basic policy documents and changing CAADP’s procedures towards greater flexibility, more inclusiveness and more focus on the post-Compact phase, with drawing up detailed investment plans.

Phase 1 – Formulating basic documents and early attempts of implementation

Regardless of CAADP’s later developments, the initial documents (particularly NEPAD, 2002) are still formally valid. They provide the foundation for some key features of the initiative, above all its emphasis on the so-called “pillars for priority investment”. Investments were identified as the most important need of the long-neglected sector. Four thematic pillars on which agricultural investment strategies should be built were recommended:

- sustainable land and water management,
- rural infrastructure and market access,
- food security, and
- agricultural research.

Costs up to 2015 were roughly assessed at US$ 251 billion, about 56% of which for capital investment, 27% for operation and maintenance, and 17% for safety nets, such as food and emergency relief. The main funding would come from African governments, 55%, 15% of this from private actors, the rest from international sources (of which foreign direct investments contribute 10%). Total costs are large, but it “is noteworthy that the gross 2002-2015 investment requirement, at US$ 17.9 billion per annum, is equivalent to just over 90 percent of Africa’s annual cost of agricultural imports of nearly US$ 19 billion.” (NEPAD, 2002: 4). The first documents had already acknowledged that “Africa will also need to improve the policy and regulatory framework for agriculture to make it more supportive of both local community participation in rural areas and commercial private sector operations. It will need to improve governance, in terms of giving a voice to both small and large-scale players in the farming community” (NEPAD, 2002: 10).

After a consultation process including important member countries, regional groupings, development banks, farmer organisations and other stakeholders, CAADP was adopted by the African ministers of agriculture in June 2002 in Rome. Subsequently implementation plans were drawn up. In July 2003, the newly created African Union (AU)
adopted these documents at its second regular summit and reconfirmed its commitment in the form of the Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa (Maputo Declaration: AU, 2003). All AU countries committed themselves to allocate at least 10% of national public budgets to agriculture and to achieve 6% agricultural growth.

CAADP initially had a bias towards crops, but later on the sub-sectors livestock, fisheries and forestry were added in a companion document (NEPAD, 2006). Two cross-cutting issues were identified, often also referred to as “Pillars 5 and 6”, namely capacity strengthening for agriculture and agribusiness, and information for agricultural strategy formulation and implementation.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) was a key actor in this first phase of CAADP (FAO, 2002). It provided significant guidance, not only conceptual but also during implementation. The main approach was to set up country investment programmes and bankable projects validated in national stakeholder workshops. This process was conducted in 49 African countries (FAO, 2004).

The impact of this first phase with the BIPP approach was negligible and hardly any reference has been made to these documents. The BIPPs were not implemented, neither by African governments nor by donors. The lack of integration with countries’ national strategies, poor governance and lacking mechanisms to guarantee quality of policies and economic and political sustainability are important reasons. An approach more focussed on these critical issues was called for.

Phase 2 – New design based on streamlined policy processes and Compacts

Based on the disappointing results of the first phase, CAADP changed its approach since 2005, moving NEPAD principles to the forefront. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) became the most important external partner. The new approach emphasised changing the quality of the process of policy formulation and implementation, building partnerships, promoting dialogue, peer review and mutual accountability at all levels, and exploiting regional complementarity. At the country level, more emphasis was given to policy process design, rather than to BIPPs. The main steps of the CAADP policy process were (own numbering based on DAKA, 2007):

1. Appointment of a ‘Focal Point Person’, usually at the planning unit of the agricultural ministry.
2. Launch of the CAADP process at a multi-stakeholder workshop.
3. Drawing up of technical documents.
4. Secure backing beyond the agricultural ministry through cabinet approval.
5. Taking stock of existing national policies, strategies and experiences with implementation and country level economic and poverty modelling to analyse whether the quantity and quality of existing and planned agricultural budgets, policies and programmes are adequate to achieve the CAADP and MDG objectives.

6. Developing strategies to fill any gaps identified. This phase includes dialogues among various stakeholders on the proposed strategies, particularly at a roundtable (RT) conference organised to discuss policies and investment opportunities along CAADP’s pillars, to develop partnerships, to harmonise development assistance and to establish a framework for review and accountability. The RT concludes by signing the CAADP Compact document. According to CAADP (2010a), it is a Strategic Agreement (Document) on joint and collaborative action on agriculture, it has political and technical content, it specifies key areas for investment and it defines roles and responsibilities. It is signed by representatives of national stakeholders of agricultural policy (including the Ministry of Finance) as well as donors. The Strategic Agreement commits them to implement the Compact and the proposed strategies.

7. Establishment of detailed investment programmes.

8. Implementation of programmes, monitoring and evaluation.

Regional Economic Communities (RECs) were given an important role to guide CAADP implementation in member countries, to provide part of the funding and to harmonise agricultural policies in the region. For each of the main pillars, a guiding document was to be drawn up, and pillar networks and lead pillar institutions were designated.

The CAADP country processes were launched in 2006. More than 30 countries were scheduled to have their Compact signed by March 2007. However, the CAADP process faltered at an early stage in most countries. Until mid 2009 only a single country (Rwanda, in March 2007) had signed a Compact. It is only since mid 2009 that implementation accelerated and by mid 2010 more than 20 countries have signed a Compact, most of them as a result of a concentrated effort of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); other countries are at various stages in the CAADP process (see table 1).

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2 These are: *Pillar 1*: University of Zambia and Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS)-Agrhymet (in Niger), *Pillar 2*: Conference of West and Central African Ministers of Agriculture (CMA/AOC), *Pillar 3*: Kwa-Zulu Natal University and CILSS, Sokoine University/Tanzania, *Pillar 4*: Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA)
The CAADP pioneer Rwanda merits special attention. During two years it increased budget allocation to agriculture and agricultural growth, but additional donor support was considered insufficient. Thus, it pioneered an international CAADP follow-up conference in December 2009 – with some success: according to the Ministry of Agriculture, donors have pledged US$ 350 million, mainly as budget support (MINAGRI, 2009; compare KAGIRE, 2010; AGRI PRO, 2010).

### Table 1. Stages of CAADP implementation in African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>COMESA Stage*</th>
<th>RT Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ECOOWAS Stage</th>
<th>RT Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>SADC Stage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>8/2009</td>
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<td>Comoros</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>D.R. Congo</td>
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<td>Cote d’Ivoir</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>The Gambia</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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* Numbers of stages according to CAADP process steps listed in chapter 1.2

Source: adapted from RESAKSS (2010): updated September 21, 2010

Around 2008/09 CAADP went through a period of both crisis and revival: on the one hand, it became clear that CAADP did evolve much slower than expected, and did not find sufficient support from member countries. “CAADP’s biggest disappointments have been its failure to secure greater understanding and ownership of CAADP at country level, and to not achieve more in terms of increased investment in the sector by governments and development partners” (NCPA, 2010: viii). This will be discussed...
in chapter 3.3. On the other hand, new opportunities for sound agricultural policies and support programmes emerged both inside and outside of Africa, particularly following the World Development Report 2008 “Agriculture for Development” (WORLD BANK, 2007) and the food price crisis of 2007/08. The number of people suffering from hunger rose substantially and food riots broke out in many countries. Particularly urban populations were affected. Some major food exporters banned exports, and many governments lost confidence in international food markets. While food prices dropped rapidly at first, major analysts predicted an end of inexpensive food (OCED/FAO, 2008), and private and state investors began to massively increase their investments in agriculture (WORLD BANK, 2010).

Against this background, African governments reiterated their commitment to CAADP in 2008, and particularly in 2009 at the 13th AU summit in Libya (AU, 2009). To support capacity building and strengthening national CAADP processes, a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was established in 2008 (AFRICA PARTNERSHIP PLATFORM, 2006; GDPRD, 2010). At the same time donors promised further funding, often as part of new initiatives to combat food insecurity following the 2008 food crisis. Particularly in the new US Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (US AID, 2008), CAADP plays a key role for the African continent as a guarantor for country-owned strategies.

Phase 3 – Consolidation of CAADP design and post-Compacts

Since 2009 a rethinking and redesigning process of CAADP has been going on in light of internal stagnation and external developments. The operational guidelines for CAADP were made clearer, more nuanced, realistic and flexible. This primarily concerns the pre-Compact phase, where many adjustments have been made: assigning CAADP teams instead of isolated focal point persons; reducing exclusive dependence on RECs for implementation by creating country support teams; stronger highlighting of the importance of actors outside the (agricultural) ministries and integrating them into CAADP, in particular the private sector (including farmers) and the financial ministries; more flexibility in processes; expanding analytical work from economic modelling to policy, institutions and capacity assessment, reinforcing finance/economics, ecosystems and technology; and switching from a mechanical and more static RT process to “flexible mainstreaming and alignment of CAADP into national development strategies, focusing on organisational development and the quality of a strategic process for design and management, as well as building competence and engaging in continuous learning” (NEPAD, 2010a: 10).

Most importantly, the post-Compact phase that had previously only been weakly conceptualised, was elaborated (CAADP, 2010a). This phase is now designed to
operationalise the Compact with concrete investment plans and programmes, and a list of evaluation criteria.

Also, specific and realistic guidelines and rules are being established for pillar organisations and the services they are expected to provide, for strengthening institutions, governance and capacity of the agricultural sector, for peer learning, for monitoring and evaluation of CAADP processes, outcomes and impact, and for mutual accountability of stakeholders and donors.

At all levels of CAADP an acceleration of activities is visible. As of September 2010, 22 countries and one region have signed Compacts (see table 1). These Compacts have been elaborated, based on the understanding and design of Phase 2. In these, as well as in newly starting countries, implementation of Phase 3 has initiated by carrying out post-Compact steps.

3 Assessment of CAADP and Major Challenges

It is clear that any assessment of CAADP and its value added at this stage is necessarily tentative. Since CAADP tries to influence the international, regional and national levels of agricultural policy agendas, any assessment should also look at these three levels. The major areas of activity and impacts of CAADP attributed to these levels are:

i) At the international level, CAADP is a partner and provides a platform for dialogue and support for African agriculture.

ii) At the regional level, CAADP is suited to foster regional integration and coordination in agricultural and related policies, such as trade, infrastructure, innovation systems, food markets, disease control, regional value chains, natural resource management, and others.

iii) At the national level, CAADP can provide incentives to stakeholders to discuss, design and implement improved agricultural, food security and related policies, according to the values and principles of CAADP and embedded in a regional framework.

3.1 CAADP as Privileged International Partner and Platform for Dialogue on African Agriculture

The high visibility of CAADP and its ‘good will’ in the international arena is probably its main achievement and chance of success. CAADP is a regular topic at international high level forums, such as meetings of the G8, the G20, the United Nations, the Accra 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the declaration of the World Summit on
Food Security in 2009 and many other recent global initiatives on agriculture and food security (see the CAADP homepage news; AUER, 2010).

Such a role is becoming increasingly important to raise debate and to position issues within the international community, as well as to galvanise, inform, shape and advocate global partnerships which are becoming increasingly popular superstructures for international cooperation (AUER, 2010). Partnerships are a new type of alliances that include the private sector and other non-state actors. Global partnerships could also increase the coherence and coordination of individual donor activities with feedback to headquarters where strategies and foci of country portfolios are developed. This can be expected to contribute to aid effectiveness. For donors, these approaches are also attractive as they promise quicker disbursement of funds with relatively uniform conditions across countries as well as high visibility for aid campaigns, though less for the individual contributors.

Individual African countries alone neither have the capacity nor the possibility to play this catalysing role at the international level. In fact, to create a common platform for dialogue with international donors and governments exactly was one of the main reasons for Africa to set up NEPAD (see above).

Yet, the role of NEPAD/CAADP as representative of African agriculture is not uncontested. At its start, NEPAD was strongly rejected by civil society but also by many African governments for its Washington Consensus style approach to development, its top-down creation by a small number of more advanced countries and its lack of democratic and all African control (TAYLOR, 2005). NEPAD has become less controversial over time, particularly with the adoption of the declaration on democracy and political, economic and corporate governance (which includes the creation of the APRM, for a long time considered the “flagship” of NEPAD). Yet, the coexistence of AU and NEPAD continued to be uneasy. Over time, the importance of the AU as a political actor increased, while the political weight of NEPAD was shrinking after the successive retreat of its founding members and lack of real success stories. Thus, NEPAD lost some of its “unique selling point” on the international scene.

For CAADP there were parallels of these general problems between the AU and NEPAD. There is an inherent risk of overlapping and competition in the role, competences and agendas of CAADP and the AU Commissioner for Rural Development and Agriculture (compare AU/NEPAD, 2006). Over time, both have tried to define and redefine their respective roles.

With the recent reorganisation of NEPAD and its conversion into the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) in early 2010 (NEPAD, 2010b) these weaknesses may be reduced. An AU programming committee will steer the activities.
of NEPAD and bring the organisation closer to the AU. According to the new principles (NEPAD, 2010a), the AU provides the overall direction and political backing for CAADP, lobbies and advocates on behalf of CAADP, supports and facilitates the mobilisation of investment funding, links CAADP to organs of the AU, coordinates African agriculture strategy development and participates in the management of the peer review process; while CAADP is responsible for partnership and coalition building, managing quality of CAADP implementation, monitoring and assessing impacts, communication and acting as a think tank on strategy development in African agriculture. Whether this reorganisation is sufficient to reconcile both actors remains to be seen; naturally the line separating the two institutions is fluid.

A key problem at the continental level is the lack of capacities. The AU commission seriously lacks personnel and material resources; it also acts within political and diplomatic boundaries. However, CAADP also has problems fulfilling its role. Less than 10 professional people are working at the secretariat in Midrand, some seconded by other organisations. CAADP is administratively linked to the South African Development Bank, and there are concerns that the secretariat is overcharged (NPCA, 2010).

The lack of resources is currently partially mitigated by the MDTF, partially by opening the boundaries between different programmes of NEPAD. This could mobilise internal resources and concentrate them on priority issues, for the time being most probably CAADP, which has “reportedly gone further than any other part of NEPAD in articulating African leadership” (NPCA, 2010: xiii).

In summary, the old achievements and the new structure will reassert CAADP’s position as a privileged partner and platform for dialogue on African agriculture and for defending the interests of African agriculture in the world for at least some years, enough to prove its value at the implementation level. Yet, it is unlikely to have the capacities to steer regional and national processes directly, beyond setting the principles and establishing the design for processes at these levels. While intervening in national processes is not intended, in practice this could be necessary, as will be further discussed below.

3.2 CAADP as Pan-African Initiative and as a Catalyst for the Regional Integration

Many CAADP activities have been directed at the continental and regional level. AU and NEPAD are based on the ideas and ideals of an “interactive” pan-Africanism. The new approach of CAADP clearly follows this philosophy; its new design contains strong elements of regional and continental networking, peer learning and review.
Particularly RECs are important in the new CAADP design, they are “the operational arms of the African Union in the regions” (NEPAD, 2010a: 31) and the coordinating and facilitating bodies for CAADP implementation. Two RECs have been particularly active in implementing CAADP: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), only those countries are advanced in the CAADP process that also have a membership in COMESA, with the exception of Tanzania which plays a particular role in the REC landscape (compare table 2). In November 2009, one region (ECOWAS) finally approved a regional Compact.

The rationale for including RECs into the CAADP concept is pertinent: as the drivers of economic integration in Africa, a generally agreed vision of the AU and a desirable objective for almost all observers, they are responsible for a wide range of policy harmonisation efforts which directly or indirectly affect agriculture: trade policy, product standards and health regulations related to food, registration of seeds, intellectual property rights, regional cooperation in agricultural research and food security, transboundary disease management, etc. Most RECs are mandated with these issues, sometimes already have been for a long time. In particular, RECs with CAADP activities aim at becoming customs unions implying that at least agricultural trade policy would have to be harmonised. RECs could help standardise statistics and CAADP monitoring, and they may be better positioned to maintain political support of CAADP (FAO, 2010; DE JANVRY and SADOULET, 2010).

In fact, many of these regional harmonisation efforts in agricultural policy are still weak, as are the RECs and regional integration in Africa in general (UNECA, 2008). Countries hesitate to give up autonomy and policy space, funding is scarce, communication difficult, and often the physical, economic, social and political characteristics of member countries are far from compatible. Double membership is a problem particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Several factors influence the adoption of CAADP at the level of RECs:

- A thriving political agenda into which CAADP fits: for COMESA, trade integration is at the core of its mandate and agenda, and consequently the trade components of CAADP (mainly anchored in pillar II) have facilitated the adoption. In addition, the new North-South-Corridor project jointly developed by COMESA, SADC and the East African Community (EAC) with strong support from donors and private partners has given new impetus to linking agricultural development and intra-African trade. In ECOWAS, it is also a common trade policy and further the common agricultural policy (ECOWAP) which serve as points of connection
for CAADP. However, both policies face an obstacle for integration: sensitive agriculture goods. ECOWAP and some member states stipulate that these need particular protection, while the common trade policy did not provide for particular protection, and importing member states fear rising food prices. By adopting CAADP and promoting agriculture as a whole, there is hope that a compromise on sensitive goods will be easier to achieve. In addition, ECOWAS prepares a programme for enhancing regional agricultural production and trade which it hopes will be assisted as part of aid-for-trade in support of a regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). CAADP also fits well into this agenda.

– **Regional integration:** More generally, RECs are gradually emerging as important stepping stones for wider and deeper integration and policy harmonisation in Africa, not only within the African community but also in the donor community. This will certainly contribute to a strengthening of regional orientation in agricultural policies, and therefore of CAADP (ABDULAI et al., 2005; WORLD BANK, 2008).

– **Additional resources:** fresh resources are required for CAADP, and they need to be flexible, but “the scale of the task of launching and supporting CAADP implementation simultaneously in many countries is far beyond even the strongest of them [the RECs]” (NPCA, 2010: 8). There is a huge gap between the ambitions of RECs and the actual financial and personal resources provided by member states. On the other hand, member states are reluctant to give up autonomy in favour of RECs and are unlikely to provide funds and resources unless there is a clear value added. While ECOWAS has revenues from an import levy at their disposal, other RECs depend on contributions from members and thus have less policy space to adopt new initiatives on their own. Donor funding for regional activities can make an important contribution to making more resources available, thereby creating “value added” and “convince” member states to delegate competencies, at its best by co-funding with own funds. On the other hand, external funding bears a risk to ownership of the supported programmes by RECs, and in many cases the absorptive capacities for additional funds are limited and must be established over a longer period.

Apart from coordination for the national CAADP processes, several Pan-African or regional CAADP initiatives have been launched, and many initiatives seek to partner with CAADP, for instance on bioenergy, on the food crisis, on fishery development, on sustainable land management, and most prominently on fertiliser use (see the Abuja fertiliser summit, AU/NEPAD, 2006). Because of their abundance, topical variety, and lack of systematic monitoring of and communication on follow ups, it is almost
impossible to follow these activities and understand the degree of influence of CAADP. The internal evaluation states that “from 2005, successive attempts to launch ‘early actions’ at regional level under the respective RECs, failed to materialise, although some promising actions have recently emerged under COMESA in early 2009” (NPCA, 2010: 8). Thus, it is too early to know how these have evolved.

Pillar frameworks and networks of research organisations and think tanks are another key element of CAADP’s Pan-African vision to better base agricultural policy making on stronger evidence. They are designed to be vital contributors to regional and national CAADP processes. This can also serve to reduce the sometimes dominant role of donors in agricultural policy making that they might have through their expertise (which is contested, not at least because most donors have substantially cut their activities in agriculture and have reduced their presence in the countries concerned to a minimum), but certainly through the funds they provide. While at the level of individual African countries, local capacities may be restricted, at the regional or continental level this is clearly not the case and African expertise can be recruited for most issues.

However, until recently this role has not materialised. Pillar framework elaboration was for a long time heavily expert-based, neglecting other stakeholder groups such as farmer organisations and the private sector (RANDALL, 2009; KIRIRO, 2009). Though the frameworks are judged to provide “useful information, […] they have not yet been used when designing national programmes and projects” (NPCA, 2010: 13). With regard to the networks, many of the pillar organisations have a very weak financial foundation, and can hardly extend their services continent-wide without payment from governments receiving advice, or with external support.

But there are also structural challenges to the concept of CAADP pillars. One is the selection mechanisms for lead institutions, distribution of external funds and communication. Initial selection has obviously not always followed transparent criteria. There are concepts on how to correct this, but as long as some institutions may drop out, it would not make sense to massively support pillar institutions. It also has to be seen how pillar networks deal with the challenge of transferring knowledge and experience across countries with often very different ecological, economic, social and political backgrounds. Little experience exists about how pillar networks interact and cooperate with existing country organisations, how far there is willingness of national stakeholders and policymakers to accept advice from external (though African) experts and how this willingness can be promoted. If the political economy is discriminating against the use of (national) expertise, it is not evident that external expertise would be better received. The interaction among pillars and pillar networks is also not yet clear, but very important since many agricultural programmes include elements from all of
them (AUC/NEPAD, 2007). Thus, it has yet to be seen how pillar networks are able to live up to expectations.

Peer review and learning is another of NEPAD’s and CAADP’s declared key instruments for coordinating and improving policies. A wide range of meetings take place where peer review could be advanced: ministers of agriculture regularly meet at the AU and REC level; national focal CAADP persons have repeatedly reencountered in international workshops; CAADP related organisations show a high level of interaction, though admittedly many of these meetings are oriented towards the still emerging CAADP design and not toward discussing the substance of concrete policy options. In practice, the peer process “does not appear to have been adopted in those countries that are moving through the RT process” (NPCA, 2010: 19). There have been frequent calls to make peer review operational within CAADP (see various presentations at GDPRD, 2009a; CAADP, 2009; CAADP, 2010b). The limited progress of peer learning amidst overwhelming interaction shows that this instrument needs to be made more effective.

A growing number of other actors support CAADP in its regional and continental functions. IFPRI has already been mentioned, which was instrumental in establishing the new CAADP design, in promoting CAADP, in channelling funds from donors to CAADP, and in providing expertise for modelling exercises and other issues. Of strategic importance is the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (RESAKSS), a joint effort of several international research centres (notably IFPRI), RECs and donors which effects statistical monitoring of progress of CAADP and of African agriculture in general, manages some regional research activities and collects and disseminates research evidence within and across regions (RESAKSS, 2010). The FAO seems to reinforce its support for CAADP. Another initiative is the CAADP Day, an event attached to highly visible Pan-African forums such as the AU/NEPAD summits, or the Agricultural Science Week. The Africa Forum, a former Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) learning platform on sector wide approaches in agriculture, has been partially handed over to CAADP and could become an important tool for continental peer learning at the level of policy practitioners (compare AFRICA FORUM ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT, 2010). New coalitions are gradually established with other regional and continental actors and networks, such as the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the International Partnership for African Fisheries Governance and Trade (PAF), with regional farmer organisations, and many more. First contacts have also been made with the Pan-African Parliament which, though yet lacking a formal mandate, could provide further legitimacy and a network for dissemination of CAADP related information. Again, questions remain of CAADP’s capacity to steer such initiatives.
In summary, CAADP tries to become a catalyst for African-led exchange of information on and policy harmonisation around agriculture. While the concept and objectives are promising and the groundwork for and important steps in implementation have been initiated, challenges remain enormous. There already are numerous networks existing, created by a variety of actors, most with a mission to provide leadership which makes it difficult to create an umbrella. The creation of African networks is costly as many and very diverse types of actors are involved in agriculture, food security, natural resources management, etc., and thus, in CAADP. Generation, storage and distribution of information are complicated by a lack of transparency, resources, and very much varying levels of communication infrastructure, skills and habits of involved actors. In fact, in many countries an organised representation of farmers, civil society and agro-business has yet to be established or strengthened, before they can be linked to the regional and continental levels of CAADP. On the other hand, it is higher level forums such as those organised by CAADP that stimulate and give additional “raison d’être” to representative organisations, if these forums prove to be effective in allowing stakeholders to influence reforms or the flow of funds. In general, CAADP seems to be torn by the dilemma of limited capacity to organise such forums, to contribute to regional and continental agendas, to select partners and to enhance visibility and utility for its member states and RECs.

3.3 CAADP as a Catalyst for Improved and Better financed National Agricultural Policies and Programmes

Though trans-national level issues are important features of CAADP, it is the national level that is the litmus test of its effectiveness. To assess CAADP’s impact at the national level the two key indicators of the Maputo declaration, budget allocation to agriculture and agricultural growth, can be useful. Another indicator frequently used is progress in CAADP processes. All indicators are briefly reviewed below, but a closer look will show that they are not ideal and that more in-depth analysis is needed to assess CAADP.

As to the budget allocation indicator, CAADP (2009) reported that eight countries were exceeding the 10% target, based on Fan et al. (2009a). The current homepage of RESAKKS (2010) also counts eight countries, although they are not all identical. There is evidence that some countries have increased their agriculture portfolio in recent years, by 75% on average between 2000 and 2005, but that on the other hand some countries reduced it, and yet others show no clear trend. In fact, the data may not show real developments, considering that African agricultural statistics are often inconsistent, outdated, and not compiled according to the definition of CAADP but only include budgets of agricultural ministries. CAADP’s definition is wider and includes components such as food security, rural roads, natural resource management.
and research, items which are often found outside classical agricultural budgets. These differences can be grossly misleading - for instance, in Kenya where six ministries were already clustered into a (partially) joint national Strategy for the Revitalisation of Agriculture, the share of the ministry of agriculture in the total budget of these ministries has decreased from 65% to 38% in only 4 years between 2003 and 2007 (ZIMMERMANN et al., 2009).

A general problem of the 10% budget target is its indifference towards the individual situation of a country. It takes neither the importance of agriculture in the economy nor its relative potential for growth or poverty reduction into account. Thus, the 10% target, though very useful in the political arena and easy to communicate, is highly arbitrary (MAHALAMBE, 2009). During the national CAADP policy processes more refined levels of agricultural funding requirements are calculated with the help of national economic models including investment-growth linkages and poverty elasticity of growth (BENIN et al., 2008). These can be solved for different levels of investment effectiveness, ambitions to alleviate poverty and agriculture/non-agriculture relation. For instance, FAN et al. (2009b: 17) calculate that “in order to achieve the MDG1, our analysis indicates that African governments will need to increase their agricultural spending by 20 percent per year. At the country level, this requirement ranges from achievable levels (e.g. Ghana, 9.5 percent) to far more difficult levels (e.g. Madagascar, 33 percent”). Of course, these models can also only give approximate indications, due to data and model constraints (see above), but they provide a more realistic quantitative target than the 10% blueprint. In any case, there is a certain movement of budget allocation in the direction of CAADP, but insufficient, particularly in agriculture-based countries, and quality and context-specificity of data are unsatisfactory.

The second key indicator of CAADP, agricultural growth, is even more problematic as a measure for CAADP progress. According to RESAKSS (2010), in 2008, 10 countries achieved an agricultural growth rate of 6% or greater. Another 14 countries recorded growth rates between 3% and 6%, while 6 recorded positive growth rates under 3%. However, the link between agricultural budget spending and growth is far from linear. Policies and regulations as well as private sector response are at least equally important variables, and several variables that decisively influence agricultural growth are beyond the control of governments (and CAADP), e.g. climate and international prices. It is this complexity which makes agriculture a difficult candidate for modern sector support (FOSTER et al., 2001; 3RD HIGH LEVEL FORUM, 2008), and it also renders it problematic to use such an aggregate indicator for policy quality and progress.

A further indicator frequently used for measuring CAADP progress at country level is the stage of advancement of the CAADP processes which has made tremendous progress since July 2009 (see table 1). It is certainly a combination of reasons that has
led to this progress in the historic constellation following the food crisis (see chapter 2.2): the conviction of national governments that CAADP has value for improving quality of agricultural policies, growth, food security and poverty alleviation; the belief of agricultural ministries that their share in national budget will increase; and the expectation by countries that new external funds will be available. It is impossible to disentangle these motivations case by case, but it is clear that according to which motivation dominates, different conclusions must be drawn on the value of CAADP both so far and for the future. If the conviction in its value prevails, there is a high likelihood that countries are willing to accept the CAADP quality mechanisms, while the motivation for expecting increased external funds bears a higher risk of a decline in quality. The progress of countries in the CAADP agenda is thus an important step in realising the promise of CAADP, but it is not yet a guarantee that it is actually happening. Genuine CAADP-led policies and investment programmes are not yet implemented and cannot serve to allow further assessment based on impacts.

Given these present uncertainties whether and to what extent CAADP genuinely guides policies and investment programmes and advances their implementation, an assessment of CAADP at the national level has to look at the quality of the contributions which CAADP has brought to national agricultural policy making processes. Corresponding to both the CAADP agenda and the criteria of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, appropriate criteria are the level of participation and ownership of CAADP, use of evidence and orientation towards results in policy making, and alignment of donors. The few detailed external investigations of the processes (FARMING SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA, 2008; ZIMMERMANN et al., 2009), the critical self-assessment and communication at the CAADP partnership platform (see above) as well as anecdotal evidence for individual countries show that CAADP processes are not necessarily a sufficient improvement to existing agricultural policy processes which of course existed prior to the CAADP agenda in all African countries. In particular, these experiences show:

- **Ownership and commitment** made in Maputo and in other international declarations was found to be only weakly reflected at the national level, at least until recently. “Although successful in generating ownership at the highest political levels through Heads of State, CAADP has not been able to translate this into such strong commitment on the part of technical staff in the sector at country level. In many countries CAADP is not well-known or understood and its added value remains unclear. At a technical level, planners are unconvinced of the purpose of a CAADP process which appears to attempt to run parallel to existing strategies and programmes” (NPCA, 2010: 7). “From the countries visited, actual political support varies greatly reflecting, rightly or wrongly, the perceived failure of CAADP to mobilise increased resources” (NPCA, 2010: xv). For the highest political level...
(presidents, ministries of finance), that can only shift budgets between sectors, these increased resources obviously refer to additional donor money, whereas at lower levels increased government and/or donor spending is the incentive. Obviously, in most countries neither high level politicians nor sector politicians and technocrats were sufficiently convinced that CAADP would help to improve their own processes or to increase budgets for a long time. The private sector, farmers and civil society are only second to take up the CAADP agenda in a country (see chapter 2.1) and have difficulty in getting ownership in the rather government-driven CAADP processes (compare MAHALAMBE, 2009). Given the described resource-oriented attitude towards CAADP and the fact that the recent changes in CAADP design did not reach most countries in time to substantially change the processes leading to the Compacts, it is likely that the boom of CAADP since mid 2009 is rather the result of external resources than of development of genuine ownership at the country level.

There was the risk for the level of participation in classical (phase-two) CAADP processes to be lower than in many autochthonous country policy processes. Typically, the processes were led by a small number of technocrats in the ministries of agriculture with limited, usually external funds. Often, other ministries also affected were insufficiently involved (if there is not an already existing inter-ministerial approach in place, such as in Kenya). There is no systematic monitoring whether the participation of the private sector and civil society in CAADP processes is better than in autochthonous country policy processes. There are doubts whether this is generally the case. According to case studies, this is not the case in Ghana and Kenya (ZIMMERMANN et al., 2009). AGRI PRO (2010) also doubts CAADP caused improvements for some of the countries it is working in. In Zambia, the private sector complained about the short notice of CAADP meetings and lack of information as well as low quality of participation (FARMING SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBIA, 2008). In Mali, a first CAADP strategy was set up completely separately from the existing agricultural sector strategies and therefore rejected from signature at the last minute (own interviews). In Swasiland, the private sector was hardly involved in CAADP, and the representative of the country in the Pan-African Parliament did not know about the process and the Compact (own interview). On the other hand, for Ethiopia the ministry of

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KOLAVALLI et al. (2010: 18) note: “NEPAD and ECOWAS organized several implementation and monitoring meetings during 2008 and 2009 to urge the countries to organize round tables and also inform them of the processes to be followed. The participants from Ghana felt that these meetings were arranged on an ad hoc basis and with short notice to participants. They felt that these meetings significantly disrupted country processes because senior staff had to attend them. They also felt that information was often requested on very short notice, posing a challenge even for a dedicated focal person.”
agriculture claims that CAADP has improved private sector participation (own interviews), and national farmer organisations are now firmly a part of the process. However, in CAADP, sub-sector and decentralised consultations are not envisioned, nor requested. This lack of participation also reflects the typically weak organisation, representation and capacity of agricultural non-state actors, and CAADP and the responsible RECs have difficulties improving this situation.

- The CAADP process calls for *improved use of evidence in agricultural policy making* to better base policies on lessons learned. Major elements of this evidence-based policy making are stock taking, modelling and participation at the national level, and pillar work and peer review employing external expertise (see chapter 2). This evidence principle is probably the most important element to improve policies, but there are difficulties in putting it into practice for several reasons. First, both the brevity and the rigidity of the design of the CAADP phase-two process (see above) and the lack of funds have limited CAADP processes to analytical and planning exercises which can work with readily available information and existing models (this is different for instance in the APRM, where larger surveys are part of the design). Second, the external advice through pillar organisations and peers was almost absent, at least until recently, and it is still a work in progress and certainly not yet clear to member countries how it will be put into practice (see Chapter 2.2.). Third, there is a lack of assessment of organisational, institutional, governance and political constraints in the sector. However, these are often the most pressing needs for reform. “CAADP has not shown whether the level of investments that have been estimated as being needed to transform African agriculture could be absorbed. There is evidence of unspent resources and low efficiency of expenditure in the sector which reflects the general lack of institutional and human capacity” (NPCA, 2010: xv).

- With regard to *alignment and harmonisation of donors* along CAADP processes, the response has initially been slow. In analogue to countries, local donor representatives were often quite reluctant to accept and support the CAADP process (see above). Many saw little value in it, but rather the risk of undermining ongoing autochthonous processes in which they were involved. A certain reluctance to give up a strong position in influencing agricultural policies in favour of a new strong player (CAADP) has probably also been a motivation not to support CAADP. Observations of poorly executed CAADP processes (e.g. in Mali) filtered back into donor headquarters. Basically through the international promotion of CAADP and reformed implementation guidelines that included donors (see GDPRD, 2009b), the overall cooperation of donor representatives was improved, particularly by emphasising that CAADP should not be executed in parallel to existing country processes, but merge
with these. While reluctance still exists with some, others are now pushing strongly for more CAADP support.

In partial conclusion, it is not yet clear what CAADP has brought as added value to the national level. The mere existence of a CAADP process and Compact can obviously not automatically be assumed to improve the quality of sector planning and budgeting. For the case of Ghana, KOLAVALLI et al. (2010: 21) conclude: “CAADP implementation up to the round table has only marginally improved the way policies are developed and implemented in Ghana.” Even more, it cannot yet be expected for CAADP to have had a major impact on agricultural policies, let alone implementation – the processes are still too new. Ghana is arguably a country with relatively good capacities, policy making rules and governance, compared to most other African countries. In weaker countries, the principles of CAADP can provide more added value. On the other hand, capacities to implement and learn from CAADP are also more limited.

4 Conclusions for CAADP and Lessons Learned for Agricultural Policy in SSA

CAADP is an exciting and innovative attempt by the AU/NEPAD to shape African agricultural policy making and development. CAADP covers a wide area of issues from natural resource management through agriculture and value chains to food security. Its goals to increase government budgets and donor and private funding and to improve the quality and the outcome of agricultural policies in all African countries are extremely ambitious.

It is important to understand that CAADP is a work in progress. Up to now, there is continuous adaptation of the approach according to experiences during implementation, but also due to the expectations of stakeholders. It is likely that without these changes, CAADP would have suffered the fate of the many African initiatives, including some other AU/NEPAD programmes, which had been ineffective and faded away. With substantially increased resources available over the coming years, with refined procedures including the newly emphasised post-Compact phase, declared willingness to align with national policies and to more flexibility to support these, hope seems to be justified that the best of CAADP is yet to come.

Since CAADP has become part of the agricultural development discourse at the international level, this will certainly increase its visibility and importance at the national level. The AU target of a 10% share for the agricultural sector in national budgets has set a benchmark for countries to demonstrate their commitment to the sector. Donors seem to be more willing to align themselves with CAADP now, and the prospect of additional external funding is obviously inspiring CAADP’s progress. High quality
support in developing sound national agricultural policies is called for, and if it contributed to this goal, CAADP would be valued. Over time, it has assembled a convincing set of principles, procedures and support instruments that can make a difference to the African continent. Viable alternatives are not to be seen, except the option of continued autonomous country processes plus donors – business as usual, an option that does not have a favourable record to look back on.

However, it is important for CAADP to be realistically assessed as to what can be expected from it in what time frame. Otherwise, disappointment and frustration will be unavoidable, and the sector may fall back into misery, once again confirming the notion that it is too difficult to reform. Given that policy reforms and their implementation take a long time, at this stage CAADP cannot realistically be expected to have had substantial influence on the realisation of increased agricultural budgets, on the quality of implemented sector planning, nor in cross-sector and regional harmonisation and policy implementation.

One conclusion is that the CAADP instruments are not yet fully deployed. Though much progress has been evident in recent years, participation, ownership, evidence-based policymaking and donor alignment – all key ingredients of CAADP’s approach – have been found to develop unequally in the past. In the past, inadequate integration of CAADP into ongoing national agricultural policy processes, lack of capacities at the continental, regional and national level, weak communication and administration, weak donor support as well as lack of political will at the highest national levels to implement the Maputo declaration were major problems for an easy start of CAADP. Now, problems have shifted to orchestrating the huge support machinery that CAADP has built up, and to steering the entire continental process in a transparent and results-oriented way. In view of limited capacities, most of this will have to take place without central (continental as well as regional) management, so procedures, quality management, coordination, delegation as well as monitoring and evaluation will have to play a key role. This work is only just beginning (see for instance, BENIN et al., 2010, on monitoring and evaluation). The RECs, though highly important in theory for agricultural policy making in a time when African regions try to integrate, are a weakness in the implementation.

Another conclusion is that the strong emphasis on investments without tackling the existing governance problems of the agricultural sector risks to jeopardise the sustainability of these investments, and thereby the willingness of (state and private) investors to provide funds. Similarly, an overly strong and rapid increase in external support in many countries and many areas could overstretch capacities of most actors involved at the continental, regional and national level. Thus, setting priorities and
sequencing will be important, but difficult, given the wide-ranging agenda of CAADP and the high expectations already existing.

It has to be noted that CAADP is still highly dependent on donor support for funding of capacities and motivation of many national actors to support it. This is a risk to genuine national ownership, quality and sustainability of the CAADP inspired programmes. On the other hand, given the political and administrative weaknesses of the agricultural stakeholders in Africa, it is realistic to assume that a certain external incentive is necessary. Therefore, dependence cannot be avoided, even though CAADP (and other forceful factors such as the food crisis and increasing agricultural prices) create incentives to foster intrinsic motivations to enhance African support for agriculture. Donors supporting CAADP must be extremely careful to strike the right balance between under- and over funding. Donor harmonisation is needed to avoid the dangers of overstressing CAADP with individual donor agendas. The linkage of external assistance to internal (sector) budget approval through the approach of matching sector budget funds, which is supporting CAADP’s principles, could be a good way to support the CAADP agenda in such a balanced way. Here, donors are challenged to accept a country’s own strategies (with quality assured by CAADP and assessed according to its guidelines), and to show enough flexibility in fund allocation.

But even if CAADP is able to address all these issues perfectly, the major changes that have to take place at the national level, will require local change and will require a long timeframe to happen. The complexity of the agricultural sector, the many very different actors involved and its protracted political, organisational, institutional and administrative challenges make it extremely difficult to design sufficiently comprehensive but acceptably simple procedures to support the CAADP agenda. The sheer number of very different countries to be supported at the same time is also a major handicap for CAADP. Countries’ resistance to internal change and to external interference, even under an “African” flag, should also not be underestimated. Motivations for such resistance can be numerous, such as protection of internal neo-patrimonial networks (see also Hoeffler in this issue), distrust in external solutions or national pride. For some cases (Kenya, South Africa, the countries of North Africa) such an interpretation seems pertinent, but also other countries have yet to demonstrate the willingness to accept external (African) interference (see above on peer and pillar interventions). Finally, there are a number of factors why countries may not want to invest more in agriculture, and why the sector may be unable to absorb higher investments (HEADEY et al., 2010). CAADP can only address these to a limited extent.

This conclusion does not diminish the potential value of the CAADP process. CAADP has gained tremendous influence not only at the international, but also at regional and national levels, and can exert considerable pressure for change on national administra-
tions, politicians and donors. However, the conclusion cautions not to overestimate the actual influence that CAADP has on agricultural policies in Africa, and to plan future support carefully. The major challenge is not planning, but implementation (see Heidhues as well as Hoeffler in this issue). CAADP has to find means to follow up, guide and support implementation if it wants to act as a credible kind of “quality label” for national agricultural policies in Africa.

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