Financial Restraint, Banking
and Rural Development

Mathew Shane
The effects of financial market performance on the rate and distribution of economic growth is an issue which has long been debated. Since the financial markets play a central role in both the mobilization of saving and the allocation of investment funds, any imperfection which occurs in these markets must influence the saving and investment flow and thus indirectly the course of economic growth. Although this seems to be a rather obvious proposition, evidence on either the nature of financial market imperfections or their impacts on growth is difficult to obtain. In a paper by Darrell it is concluded that there does not appear to be "any systematic relationship between ... style of banking structure and ... tempo of economic growth."

In this paper, arguments and evidence is presented which leads the author to conclude that the structure and imperfections of the financial markets does influence the course of economic growth. In particular, it is concluded that due to a monopoly structure in rural banking, an agricultural credit system which has helped induce a labor saving agricultural technology, and private and public flow of funds that impediments to rural development and incentives for rural

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out migration have been created. Although this is only one of a number of forces operating to cause the post war growth pattern, this financial structure is a key causative element and must be dealt with to initiate a successful rural development strategy.

Central to this argument is the demonstration that a financial market restraint in the form of a rural banking monopoly is binding. Thus the next section will develop analytically and test empirically the implications of monopoly performance in banking. Then given this basic restraint, and some well known features of the rural economy, the general proposition on rural growth is developed.

I. Banking Monopoly and Performance

It is a well known feature of U.S. banking that rural banks tend to have lower loan-to-deposit ratios than urban banks. Table 1 which summarizes key banking statistics for the Upper Midwest region by rural to urban categories aptly indicates this. L/D ratios are approximately ten percent lower in the population located banks than in the largest urban reserve city banks.

Several explanations have been proposed for this. There are those who maintain that because of the unit banking structure and limited banking competition in the rural community that the low L/D ratios reflect the monopoly power of rural banks in the loan market. Others, still relating the low L/D ratios to a supply problem, point out that rural banks have an asset diversification problem since such a large percentage of their assets are tied to a single

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2/ The data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. The states of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana are included.
### Table 1:

RATIOS DERIVED FROM 1968 CALL AND INCOME REPORTS CHARACTERIZED BY BANK CATEGORY AND POPULATION CLASS OF BANK LOCATION FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE TOTAL 4 STATE AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-999</th>
<th>1-4999</th>
<th>5-9999</th>
<th>10000+</th>
<th>R. CITY</th>
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<th>5-9999</th>
<th>10000+</th>
<th>R. CITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ASSETS (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Securities</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>19.45</td>
<td>18.58</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>9.21</td>
<td>20.23</td>
<td>18.99</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>14.11</td>
<td>11.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans (Net)</td>
<td>43.79</td>
<td>43.02</td>
<td>47.62</td>
<td>50.79</td>
<td>52.38</td>
<td>40.30</td>
<td>46.49</td>
<td>48.73</td>
<td>51.87</td>
<td>51.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Assets</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Assets</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>2.37</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEPOSITS (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of Time to Total Deposits</td>
<td>56.65</td>
<td>53.79</td>
<td>56.05</td>
<td>53.50</td>
<td>36.32</td>
<td>54.54</td>
<td>56.22</td>
<td>58.19</td>
<td>54.50</td>
<td>30.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Total Loans to Total Deposits</td>
<td>48.06</td>
<td>47.81</td>
<td>51.68</td>
<td>55.61</td>
<td>57.61</td>
<td>44.04</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>53.24</td>
<td>57.28</td>
<td>58.68</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL LOANS (IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)</strong></td>
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<td>Percent of Total Loans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Loans</td>
<td>16.02</td>
<td>23.47</td>
<td>31.20</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>16.07</td>
<td>15.14</td>
<td>25.74</td>
<td>34.87</td>
<td>38.37</td>
<td>14.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secured by Other Properties</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Loans</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>21.99</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>16.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Loans</td>
<td>59.30</td>
<td>43.21</td>
<td>23.54</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>71.13</td>
<td>45.93</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Farmers</td>
<td>49.02</td>
<td>35.19</td>
<td>19.07</td>
<td>9.81</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>57.58</td>
<td>42.27</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Farmers Secured by Farmland</td>
<td>10.28</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Individuals</td>
<td>15.12</td>
<td>19.22</td>
<td>25.23</td>
<td>30.70</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>17.47</td>
<td>21.55</td>
<td>26.26</td>
<td>18.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Loans</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Loans</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuations Reserve</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Banks in This Group</strong></td>
<td>502</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
agricultural area. The natural response to such a portfolio risk problem is to diversify by reducing the percent of portfolio in loans and increasing that in bonds. Finally, a third group insists that the problem has its root in inadequate loan demand derived from the lack of investment opportunities in the rural area.

As stated, and by merely looking at the descriptive data, there is no way to distinguish between these alternative explanations. Indeed, it appears that, perhaps, a little bit of all three are involved. For instance, one of the most pronounced rural to urban trends evident in Table 1, is the very sharp reduction in the percent of agricultural loans from 59% and 71% in the most rural located banks to approximately 1 percent in the larger urban reserve city banks.

Of course, people have been talking about the lack of opportunity in the rural areas for years. What is involved here is what economists refer to as a classic identification problem or how to distinguish between effects of supply and that of demand. In what follows, applying the theory of monopoly to banking, I will show how it is possible to distinguish these. In order to do this, I must reformulate the problem.

If the monopoly explanation is correct, than we are observing a reduction in L/D ratio due to an increase in monopoly power. To derive the implications of this, it is only necessary to compare a bank operating competitively with a bank operating monopolistically in the loan market.

Figure 1 presents a hypothetical commercial bank loan market in relative terms under conditions of monopoly. Notice the horizontal axis is in percentage terms and thus that the L/D supply function
Figure 1: The Commercial Bank Relative Loan Market under Conditions of Monopoly

achieves a maximum at 100 percent. Using traditional monopoly analysis, the bank provides loans upto \( L^m \) percent and charges an interest rate of \( r^m \). Under competitive conditions market supply and demand determine the L/D ratio and as drawn this would occur at loan percent \( L^c \) and interest rate \( r^c \). In other words, we would expect to see a decrease in the L/D ratio and an increase in the loan interest rate associated with an increase in monopoly power in the commercial bank loan market.

How does this differ from a situation in which the relative demand for loans in the rural area is less than that in urban areas?
A reduction in demand either under monopoly or competitive conditions would lead to a reduction in the L/D ratio, but also a reduction in loan interest rate. This is indicated in Figure 2. Notice that the effect of monopoly even under conditions of reduced demand is to raise the loan interest rate from the comparable competitive case.

Figure 2: Commercial Bank Relative Loan Market with a Reduction in Demand

To test these alternative hypothesis about banking behavior, cross sectional grouped data was analyzed for four states in the Upper Midwest for the years 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1971. The data although on an individual state basis is similar to that presented in Table 1. Each column is treated as a separate observation. In total,
there were 118 nonzero observations out of a possible 160 columns.\(^3\)
The data is characterized by state, size of town of bank location, type
of bank affiliation and date.

The following linear regression was estimated based on this data
to test the hypothesis:\(^4\)

\[
\frac{L}{D} = 107.79 - 1.02 \frac{GS}{A} - 1.04 \frac{OS}{A} - 0.98 \frac{C}{A}
\]

\[
+ 0.03 \frac{TD}{D} - 0.03 \frac{RE}{L} + 0.02 \frac{FL}{L} - 0.00 \frac{CL}{L}
\]

\[
- 0.95 \frac{IL}{L} + 0.0002 \frac{A}{BN}
\]

Number of observations = 118

\[R^2 \text{ adjusted} = .979692\]

\[F \text{ statistic} = 628.133006\]

where \(L/D\) is the loan-to-deposit ratio. \(GS/A, OS/A\) and \(C/A\) are the
percent of government securities, other securities and cash to total
assets. \(TD/D\) is the ratio of time to total deposits, \(RE/L, FL/L\) and
\(CL/L\) are the ratios of real estate loans, farm loans and commercial
loans to total loans while \(IL/L\) is the ratio of interest and discounts
on loans to total loans. \(A/BN\) is the average assets per bank category.

\(^3\) Because of space, this data could not be presented here. However,
anyone interested in seeing the total set can obtain a copy by
writing the author.

\(^4\) The numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. In general, the higher
the ratio the more significant the coefficient. For a coefficient
to be significant at the 5% level the t-ratio must be greater than
1.98.
The regression estimates are interesting in several regards. The most important for this context is that the coefficient on the interest rate term is negative and very significant at well above the one percent level, that is, interest rates tend to rise as the L/D ratio falls. This strongly supports the hypothesis that monopoly power of rural banks exceeds that of urban banks. In other words, that there is a binding financial restraint operating in the rural community, and that it is supply factors rather than demand which accounts for the lower L/D ratios in rural banks.

The regression results also shed light on the issue of portfolio diversification. None of the loan composition terms is a significant explanatory variable for the loan-to-deposit ratio. The farm loan term (FL/L) is positively related to L/D, just the reverse of its expected sign while the coefficient of the commercial loan term (CL/L) is approximately zero. Thus we reject the risk portfolio problem as an explanation of low L/D ratios in rural banks at least to the degree that the loan composition would measure this.

Based on the evidence presented in this section, we must conclude that there is a binding financial restraint operating in the rural community in the form of rural banking monopolies.

Financial Restraint and Rural Development

Although a supply restraint in the rural bank loan market would in and of itself have a restrictive impact on rural development, it is the combination of this financial restraint and other peculiar features of the rural economy which in concert act to impede rural development
and stimulate rural out migration. These other features which are particularly relevant here are: (1) rural dependence on commercial bank financing, (2) institutional factors which encourage outflows of funds from the rural area, and (3) technical change in agriculture which is highly labor saving and dependent on a competitive agricultural loan market. It is to these factors which we now turn.

A. The Importance of Rural Banking

Commercial banks play a dominant role in the rural financial market. No other institution either operates in almost all segments of the rural economy or provides as large a share of rural credit. In agriculture, which is probably the most competitive of the rural loan markets, bank loans account for approximately 25 percent of agricultural finance both nationally and regionally. In the non-agricultural rural sector, data is not readily available. However, very few institutional lenders outside of commercial banks operate in a significant way in the rural non-farm area. The national money and security markets which primarily serve large corporations play an insignificant part in non-farm rural finance. Insurance companies which at one time were an important rural financer have been restricting their non-urban financing. The small business administration operates somewhat but again because of the ease of operation probably utilizes the preponderance of their funds for urban financial support. Savings and loan associations which are primarily mortgage lenders are very heavily concentrated in the urban areas of the Upper Midwest. And so on. Thus, although this must
be viewed as highly preliminary, I would propose that 50% or more of 
the rural non-farm sector is dependent on bank financing.

How important is the rural non-farm sector? In the Upper Midwest 
region, which is substantially more dependent on agriculture than the 
country as a whole, 13% of total employment is in agriculture while 
only slightly less than half of the total population lives in large 
urban metropolitan areas of 50,000 or more. Thus this rural non-farm 
sector accounts for approximately one-third of total employment.

B. Other Institutional Factors

There are a whole set of private and public institutional biases 
which have the tendency to generate a flow of funds from the rural to 
the urban areas. Some of these flows do not appear to be moving in 
response to economic factors but rather are due to the structure of 
institutions. The cumulative effect of these factors is to 
further worsen the financial restraint on rural economic activity.

The most notable, if not the most important, is a common feature 
of a correspondent banking system. Rural banks hold deposits in large 
urban correspondent banks in return for services performed. In the 
Upper Midwest over $350 million worth of correspondent balances were 
held in Twin Cities banks as of December 1969. This represented 
approximately nine percent of total deposits and was concentrated in 
16 metropolitan banks. No county in the two state region studied 
outside of the Twin Cities had a net inflow of these balances.

A second institutional factor relates to the spatial distribution 
of savings and loan associations and savings banks in the Upper
Midwest. These are very heavily concentrated in the major metropolitan areas and because of the higher interest rates paid on deposits, this has generated a large outflow of funds from rural areas. It has been estimated that approximately $600 million worth of rural deposits are held by Twin Cities S & L's.

Other financial purchases on the savings side tend to lead to outflow of rural funds although the magnitudes are difficult to estimate. Purchases of insurance and securities might account for substantial outflows. The uses of funds in these institutions is dominated by the urban sector.

However, the movement of funds to the cities through the private financial markets is not the only way that funds are redistributed away from the rural area. In a study of the "Financing of Public Services in West Minnesota" it was shown that the net outflow of funds through the state and federal government taxing and expenditure pattern was $61 million in that region alone. This seems like a relatively small amount, but it represented almost 38 percent of state and federal tax collections or $270 per person. If this is at all indicative of the net impact (expenditure minus taxes) throughout the rural area, then this is a major financial deterrent to rural development.

C. Agricultural Technology and Finance

Studies of agricultural development in the U.S. conclude that technical change has been highly labor saving. This is not a surprising result and on an intuitive level follows from the rather dramatic drops in labor input in U.S. agriculture. For instance, in
the four states studied in this paper there was a 35.6 percent drop in agricultural employment between 1960 and 1971 while there was a 17.9 percent increase in total employment $\frac{\text{7}}{\text{10}}$. The main effect of investment in agriculture has been a steady release of surplus rural labor, a labor group which must find alternative employment elsewhere.

Supportive of this trend is a competitive agricultural loan market which provides the investment resources necessary for that technical change. Central to this credit market is the Farm Credit System a pseudo-government agency which was set up for the sole purpose of providing competitive credit to agriculture. Of all agricultural lenders, this institution is growing most rapidly (regionally at a rate exceeding 10 percent over the decade of the sixties and 14 percent between 1970-1971 $\frac{\text{10}}{\text{10}}$). The key to this institution's success is heavily dependent on being able to finance their loans through the issuance of bonds on the national bond market at U.S. Agency rates. For instance, in the fall of 1973 when prime lending rates were between 9.5 and 10.25%, the Farm Credit System was lending at approximately 8.5 percent.

Conclusion

Putting together the features of the rural economy noted above, we are now in a position to analyze the effects which financial restraint has on rural development.

First, there is the existence of a rural financial restraint in banking, the main empirical effect of which is substantially lower loan-to-deposit ratios and higher interest rates. This has the effect of restricting credit to the entire rural community, but particularly
the rural non-farm sector which is heavily dependent on bank financing. The major effect of this is an underinvesting in the rural area, a force to reduce the rate of growth and employment creation.

Next, there are the institutional forces which tend to move funds into the urban areas. Again these have the effects of reducing lendable funds for rural investment and thus further restraining the availability of rural finance.

Lastly, there is a dynamic agriculture supported in large measure by a competitive financial market which has resulted in a sizable surplus labor force in the rural area.

If employment opportunities were available in the rural area, then undoubtedly some of the surplus labor would shift from agriculture to non-agriculture work in the rural area. Ironically, however, the very sector which needs the financing is the most restrained and the tendency are effects which we are all aware of -- low rural per capita income, rural outmigration, stagnant and dying rural communities.

The factors I have analyzed in this paper are only one of a host of forces operating in the rural area to induce these patterns. Low social investment, poor public services, inadequate transportation and financial restraints all combine to create these patterns. Rural development will only occur when these disincentives for growth are removed and central is the financial restraint on rural investment.
REFERENCES


